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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the neutrality and formality of accounting as a form of intervention in 
situations of conflict faced by Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs). In this thesis, neutrality 
and formality of accounting are limited to evaluation devices and formats used by donors to 
assess NGOs, specifically the Logical Framework (LF). Technical attributes and views were 
desirable for making sense of evaluator experiences in development projects in the 1960s. 
Responding to this, contractors under the United States International Development Agency 
(USAID) combined scientific and management approaches and created the LF (Chapter 2). 
Many development agencies since then have required NGOs to use an LF within project 
proposals and as a basis to monitor and evaluate project performance. At the same time, the 
neutrality and formality of the LF have been widely criticised in development circles. This thesis 
found, however, that in situations where conflict is prevalent, neutrality and formality play a 
role in shaping, informing and structuring conflict. To understand ways in which conflict and 
technicality intersect, this thesis is based on a case study of a grassroots NGO in Sri Lanka, 
Sarvodaya. This thesis identifies and discusses conflict between donors and the NGO, conflict 
as part of society and conflict between actors within an NGO project. Contrary to previous 
literature in accounting, neutrality and formality in Sarvodaya were found to be a malleable 
resource for mobilisation in conflict situations. Neutrality and formality of evaluation devices, 
mainly the LF, were used in Sarvodaya as a way to strategize around sources of conflict between 
external donors and internal NGO accounts in the late 1980s (Chapter 4). Later, after the end of 
Sri Lanka’s civil war, the LF was used to work on projects focused on reconciliation and 
reconstruction. Neutrality and formality of the LF helped to transform social conflicts into 
manageable projects in Sarvodaya (Chapter 5). Lastly, this thesis proposes a framing of ‘sights’ 
– plain sight, oversight and foresight - to explore the ways in which neutrality and formality 
provide a visual methodology for staff to make sense of their daily work, accountability and 
visions of the future (Chapter 6).   
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NOTE REFERENCE SYSTEM AND TRANSLATION 
 
All data sources used in this thesis are listed in Annex 1, 5 and 6. There are two sets of data 
sources and they are coded in two ways:  
1. Empirical material on the history of the LF, (a)  
2. Fieldwork in Sarvodaya, (b) - (d) 
In each set, there are interviews, meetings and documents referenced.  
For historical material on the LF, all interviews and documents referenced from the John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, USAID and numerous evaluation contracts related 
to the LF are coded as (a) and listed in Annex 1.  
Evidence collected from fieldwork is coded differently. Interviews conducted and meetings 
attended are noted as ‘Ib’ or ‘Mb’ (Annex 5). Documents are coded based on the type of material 
(b) for archival Sarvodaya material, (c) project documents on reconciliation projects; and (d) 
documents related to the Oxfam-EU funded project. All documents collected and referenced 
from fieldwork are listed in Annex 6.  
During fieldwork, some interviews were conducted with the assistance of a translator, either 
from Tamil or Sinhala into English.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis provides an in-depth study of the Logical Framework1 (LF), an accounting2 template 
commonly used in the development sector. Created in 1969, the LF is widely used amongst 
donors and non-governmental organisations3 (NGOs) (Wallace et al, 2006). The LF has been 
described as ‘western’ and as an inflexible constraint on NGOs (Bornstein, 2003; Wallace et al, 
2006). In addition, the LF is thought to promote narrow concepts of accountability (Ebrahim, 
2002), distract NGOs from their mission (Bornstein, 2003), stifle community participation and 
favour reductionism rather than context (Gasper, 2000).  
Based on fieldwork conducted from 2011 to 2013 in a Sri Lankan grassroots NGO (Sarvodaya), 
this thesis suggests that such attributes identified in previous studies of the LF can be 
advantageous in situations of conflict faced by NGOs. For the purposes of this thesis, ‘situations 
of conflict’ are understood as the blending of social, political and cultural conflicts present in 
society with administrative conflicts in organisations. Thus far, accounting studies have treated 
forms of social and administrative conflict separately. The proxies driving ethnic strife, political 
clashes and ideological revolutions have not fully been examined as contributing to or co-
existing amongst administrative forms of conflict within organisational life (Bhavnani & 
Backer, 2000). In this context, studies on the resolution of conflicts in society have considered 
accounting as a way to represent interests of reconciliation and learning and as reflective of 
                                                 
1 Presented as a matrix, the LF has informed the structure of NGO contracts with donors and the setup of project 
designs, strategic plans, activity monitoring, evaluations and even risk analysis (Ebrahim & Fernando, 2013). In 
international development, there are many iterations of the LF, yet at its core are two logics: vertical and horizontal. 
In the LF, combined logics connect project activities to wider goals of development (from input to impact) and set 
a pathway for mapping and tracking progress of a project (indicators, data sources and assumptions). 
 
2 For the purposes of this thesis, accounting is understood as an assemblage of ideas and practices which are 
mobilised to satisfy political and economic aims within diverse contexts (Miller & Rose, 1990). In addition, 
accounting is considered pervasive since it constructs and enables particular forms of social and organisational 
visibility (see Hines, 1988; Hopwood, 1983, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1992; Miller & Napier, 1993). Such visibility 
renders individuals and groups as knowable in society; individuals view their identities and responsibilities through 
sets of calculations and groups gain traction within a network of accounting assemblages (Miller, 1992; Miller & 
Power, 2013). 
 
3 There are many definitions of NGOs (see Anheier, 2005; Gray et al, 2006), but generally NGOs are concerned 
with “the delivery of services to people in need, the organisations of policy advocacy and public campaigns in 
the pursuit of social transformation (Lewis, 2009, p.1).  
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particular ideologies (Arnold & Hammond, 1994). In contrast, studies on administrative 
conflicts limited themselves to the parameters of organisations, sub-units and the threat of 
external actors on internal operations or culture4 (Alino & Schneider; 2012; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008; Fischer & Ferlie, 2013).  
The aim of this thesis is to explore the role and possibilities created by accounting in situations 
of stakeholder conflict. In particular, this thesis affirms that social and administrative conflicts 
are not distinct, and that together, they produce situations of blended conflict for NGOs. This 
thesis focuses on three episodes of blended conflict – the introduction of external accountability 
requirements that ran counter to internal local accounts, the phasing in of former separatist 
regions into realms of government administration and NGO projects and coordination of diverse 
stakeholders within a development project. By exploring such episodes, this thesis will 
underline how proxies, ideologies and techniques within both social and administrative conflicts 
seep into NGO management. To explore the role of accounting in situations of stakeholder 
conflict, this thesis will focus on two attributes of accounting – formality and neutrality.  
 
Formality and Neutrality of Accounting in NGOS  
 
This thesis frames and explores two core qualities of NGO reports, performance and evaluation 
metrics – formality and neutrality. The first, formality, is understood in this thesis as adding set 
authoritative structures and a sense of directionality to the act of reporting. It also encapsulates 
pressures faced by non-western NGOs to report in western formats.  
In the development literature, the idea of formalising NGO operations through reporting 
requirements has been widely discussed (Ebrahim, 2002, 2003, 2005; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008; Wallace et al, 2006). For example, Lewis (2007) noted that ‘formal’ accountability 
                                                 
4 For example, Alino & Schneider (2012) found that the design of budgets and control systems within organisation 
management accounting structures potentially reduced conflicts in decision making. For small groups within an 
organisation, budgets and control systems direct group attention, supply information and identify alternative 
actions in a manner which is deemed ‘fair’ by organisational actors (Alino & Schneider, 2012). In the development 
sector, organisational conflict is often framed as divergent practices and imbalances of authority between ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ actors, i.e. NGOs versus donors as well as differences in expertise (Wallace et al, 2006). 
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systems often reflect a narrow principal-agent view of accountability in which the donor sets 
goals of reporting and, as the agent, the NGO services and reports on such goals. He also 
highlighted that this approach to accountability replaced notions of trust with a system of checks 
and reporting mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. Hence, trustworthiness was directly 
correlated with measured cost-effectiveness, targeting and the quality of services rather than a 
feeling of trust. In this view, Lewis (2007) and Ebrahim (2007) concluded that such formal 
forms of accountability represent the managerialisation of performance and an ‘audit culture’ 
in the development space. Trust, as displaced by performance and audit is consistent with 
Power’s (1997) view that reliance on audit to check and verify information has exploded in 
society.  
The rise of audit within and outside of the financial sector symbolises the spread of governance 
through formalised accountability. For Power (1997) the underlying features of audit practice 
are the quest for independence, the collection and analysis of evidence as a technical endeavour, 
a view based on the said evidence and object of audit (e.g. financial statements). The end result 
is that individuals and organisations become accountable to “rituals of verification”. The 
introduction and use of an audit culture in the development sector reflect the typical principal-
agent interactions of NGOs and donors (see Wallace et al., 2006) and also reframe relations 
held by NGOs at the community-level to be more formal. For example, Vannier (2010) found 
that the government and NGOs in Haiti proposed a certification process to legitimize local 
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). The process itself introduced an audit culture at the 
community-level as the CBO was expected to avert perceived corruption and political 
opportunism by handling funds and decision making in a structured and bureaucratic manner 
(i.e. authority to the treasurer, voting on community issues etc.). The introduction of such audit 
practices through the certification process presented CBOs as ‘knowable’ audit objects for 
NGOs and the government. In this setting, formality became a reference point and a structure 
for NGOs and the government to objectify ‘good’ and ‘bad’ CBOs from an audit viewpoint.  
The use of formal reporting structures and processes represent the execution of authority, 
influence and control on local and less powerful actors (Escobar, 1996; Esteva & Prasad, 1998). 
Some examine accounting as an extension of ongoing colonial and western imperialism and 
how accounting plays a constitutive role in structuring calculated everyday ‘truths’  (Alawattage  
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& Wickramasinghe, 2008). In this vein, Wallace et al (2006) noted that the allocation of power 
between NGOs and donors was framed within an ‘aid chain’ of development. NGOs and 
communities, as recipients of funds, were considered lower on the aid chain, and as such, were 
subject to donor pressures of professionalization (Wallace et al, 2006). In light of the above, 
formality concerns foreign or external requirements which structure or shift power dynamics 
within development efforts. 
In this context, formal efforts in the development sector have been found to direct NGOs and 
community attention. Duvala et al (2015) noted that donors exert power over NGOs through 
required reporting practices used in order for NGOs to secure funding. Donor reports and blank 
templates encouraged NGOs to become ‘financially inclined performers’, which aim to deliver 
results as defined by funders. In addition, the use of donor and other administrative mechanisms 
has been found to inculcate efforts of standardization, database building, documentation, 
calculation, and territory mapping in day-to-day management of projects in order to demonstrate 
legitimacy (Rottenburg, 2009). As a result, the grounds of cooperation set in the project are 
technocratic rather than moral, legal, and political (Rottenburg, 2009).  
Overall, formality can be defined as a structural effect on relations set forth by overriding trust 
with procedures, imposing an ideal of success (and failure) in line with financial interests and 
setting the directions of reporting practice. 
In contrast, neutrality emphasises the representation of social, economic, political and cultural 
interests as a ‘neutral’ or technical account. In this vein, Miller (1992) noted:  
Far from being neutral devices for mirroring the social world, the calculative technologies of 
accountancy are complex machines for representing and intervening in social and economic life (p. 
78). 
Miller (1992) highlighted that accounting is not neutral and, in fact, aspects of accounting 
simultaneously construct and act upon society (also see Burchell et al, 1985; Hopwood, 1983; 
Hopwood, 1978; Miller & Napier, 1993). The use of accounting to measure, classify and record 
is often partial in its representations, since that which is not rendered countable is often excluded 
from accounting procedures and, as such, is bracketed as a ‘qualitative’ issue outside of 
accounting (Robson, 1991). However, parallel to the exclusion of particular interests as 
qualitative, accounting also continually expands into new domains of representation. For 
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example, in the 1970s, the rise of value added5 accounting in the United Kingdom (UK) sought 
to frame value created in a wide range of enterprise activities as a technical exercise. In light of 
this effort, Burchell et al (1985) noted “… the social can influence the technical practice of 
accounting and, that in turn can mobilise and change the world of the social” (p. 382). In 
essence, neutral representations constructed by accounting are subject to wider contextual 
factors and, as such, accounting incessantly shifts in ‘what it is not’ to becoming ‘what it ought 
to be’ (Robson, 1991; Hopwood, 1987).  
Notably, the spread of accounting as neutral is linked to the dominance of professions and ideals 
of expertise (Robson, 1991; Carnegie & Napier, 2010; Hine, 1991). In line with Miller (1992), 
Robson (1991) expressed that accounting is “clothed in the discourse of neutral, technical [and] 
professional endeavour” (p. 549). In the development sector, the use of expertise and 
professions6 within local contexts have been widely discussed (Howes, 1992; Rahnema, 1996; 
Korten, 1984; Kardam, 1993). For example, in an analysis of eleven World Bank projects, 
Hirschman (1967) noted a particular role for experts in projects. For Hirschman (1967), experts 
conveyed certainty that a project could reach completion7, although in reality there was 
uncertainty due to contextual factors that surrounded the project. Experts purposefully 
                                                 
5 To define value added, Burchell et al (1985) noted:  
 
“These facts are that the concept “value added” appeared as an indicator of the value created by the activities of an 
enterprise in a number of different sites (private companies, newspapers, government bodies, trade unions, 
employer associations, professional accountancy bodies, etc.), functioning in a number of different practices 
(financial reporting, payment systems, profit sharing schemes, economic analyses, information disclosure to 
employees and trade unions, etc.), where before it had been largely absent or, at the most, an object of very limited 
sectional interest” (p. 385).  
 
6 In the development sector, experts and professions have evolved to reflect a certain kind of knowledge 
(economics) at the expense of others (sociology and anthropology). In response, based on a study of the World 
Bank’s the Sociology Group in the late 1980s, Kardam (1993) found that, in order to include non-economic 
knowledge into broader discussions, sociologists should: “… follow the example of environmental scientists in 
defining their work as a technical input to the economic analysis of projects, and to make it as a quantitative as 
possible (p. 1779). 
 
7 In his theory titled the ‘Hiding Hand’, Hirschman explained that difficulties are not visible at the time a decision 
to ‘take up’ a project is made, and, if they are accounted for, they are underestimated (Hirschman, 1967). The 
theory is based on observing production-oriented projects and carves a particular role for the expert as guiding the 
project to completion, acting as a source of knowledge and ‘hiding’ aspects which may impact the take up of a 
project. Economists, financial analysts and engineers, as the prominent professional groups take on the expert role. 
Hirschman also noted that the Hiding Hand operates through the ‘ignorance of ignorance, of uncertainties, and of 
difficulties’ (Hirschman, 1967, p. 35). Masking uncertainties through an illusion that techniques – if applied 
correctly – can accurately and seamlessly cultivate certainty is essential for ensuring project confidence and buy 
in (Hirschman, 1967).   
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“misjudge the nature of the task, by presenting it to ourselves as more routine, simple, 
undemanding of genuine creativity than it will turn out to be” (p. 13). The expertise supporting 
these projects, academics, practitioners and consultants, fosters an illusion that experts have 
already found all the answers to the problems and that all that is needed is faithful 
implementation” (Hirschman, 1967, p. 23). In this respect, he noted, any difficulties or project 
botches can be “blamed on the failure to follow the experts’ instructions rather than on the 
shortcomings of their advice” (Hirschman, p. 23). 
The proliferation of professions and expert techniques in the development sector have been 
discussed in relation to local knowledge.  Escobar (1996) noted  that administrative procedures 
of ‘planning’ in developing countries involved “… the overcoming or eradication of ‘traditions’, 
‘obstacles’ and ‘irrationalities’, that is, the wholesale modification of existing human and social 
structures and their replacement with rational new ones” (p. 135). In this vein, Ferguson (1994) 
highlighted that such mechanisms framed decisions as technocratic goals and supplanted 
traditions in order to shape and administer locals in pursuit of attached political interests. In a 
study of a development project in Lesotho, Ferguson (1994) noted that political decisions, for 
example on resource allocation and livestock, were ‘de-politicised’ to be technical solutions to 
technical problems. As a result, the defined development object was mobilised in favour of 
market interests of powerful actors, rather than local communities. In this sense, neutrality of 
accounting potentially side-steps input and local knowledge by framing development in 
technical terms.  
In addition, attributes of neutrality serve particular functions in development such as 
coordinating actors. Rahaman et al (2010) found that accounting’s technical and social potential 
played a pivotal role in harmonising multiple actors to fulfil social purposes. In a study of a 
global response to HIV/AIDS in Ghana, accounting practices allowed the World Bank to 
cultivate an alliance of 3,000 NGOs rather than relying on traditional modes of government 
service delivery. Speciﬁc accounting techniques such as pre-action approvals, open-book 
accounting, and auditing activities were used to organize and govern alliances. In this case, 
technical aspects of accounting were discussed as securing financial control across actors 
through being forward looking, standardizing efforts and disciplining actors within its 
framework. Notably, while accounting was useful for coordinating actors, financial control also 
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limited local input and, as Rahaman et al (2010) suggest, accounting may undermine social 
efforts if inflexible to local contexts.  This danger of over-reliance on accounting was a similar 
finding in a study of El Salvador’s development sector as accounting was important for 
translating ideas and comparing efforts towards accountability and transparency, yet also 
limited the potential to represent desired flows and change within organisations (Neu et al, 
2009).   
Overall, investigations of accounting formality focus on power imbalances, a culture of mistrust 
and structured forms of accountability. On the other hand, descriptions of accounting’s 
neutrality underline the presentation of political efforts as technical endeavours, enhancing 
perceptions of project certainty through experts and limits the representation of local 
knowledge. Even though some perceive such attributes as pervasive, Porter (1995) highlighted 
that numbers and the act of quantification have a role to play in cultivating a certain kind of 
trust and higher forms of social integration. In an examination of the rise of statistical 
objectivity, he noted:  
Since the rules for collecting and manipulating numbers are widely shared, they can easily be 
transported across oceans and continents and used to coordinate activities or settle disputes. Perhaps 
most crucially, reliance on numbers and quantitative manipulation minimizes the need for intimate 
knowledge and personal trust. Quantification is well suited for communication that goes beyond the 
boundaries of locality and community. A highly disciplined discourse helps to produce knowledge 
independent of the particular people who make it. (p. ix)  
With this in mind, attributes of formality and neutrality could act as a social glue; and with 
reference to situations of conflict previously mentioned, formality and neutrality of accounting 
can potentially be useful to address conflicts in NGOs. For this thesis, formality and neutrality 
of the LF will be examined within a broader system of reporting and within three episodes of 
NGO existence. In addition, a historical account of the rise of the LF and associated attributes 
of neutrality and formality will be provided.  
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Research Questions and Case Context 
 
In studying the LF’s neutrality and formality in relation to situations of conflict, this thesis poses 
the following research questions:  
1. How do accounting templates, such as the LF, operate in situations of conflict between 
donors, NGOs and local communities?  
2. Can the LF support donors, NGOs and local communities to manage, deal with, and 
alleviate conflict? 
3. If so, what characteristics or features of the LF potentially shape, align and inform 
relations?  
To address these questions, fieldwork was conducted in Sri Lanka’s largest and oldest grassroots 
people’s movement and NGO, Sarvodaya. Established in 19588, Sarvodaya is based on spiritual, 
social, cultural and economic development. The founder, A. T Ariyaratne, created a complex 
set of philosophies referencing Buddhism, Mahatma Gandhi and Sri Lankan traditions. In light 
of their holistic development model, projects range from emergency relief to child protection. 
In line also with its ideologies, the movement continually expands and conducts activities 
throughout the island through an extensive network of over 15,000 villages. 
Given its history and network, this NGO played a pivotal role in working with Conflict Affected 
Communities (CACs) in the North and the East9 (Walton, 2008). For three decades, the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tiger Tamils of Eelam (LTTE), a Tamil 
separatist group, were at war. Dating back to 1983, ethnic tensions fuelled the creation of the 
LTTE and their quest for a separate Tamil homeland in the North and East of Sri Lanka. During 
the conflict, the LTTE grew and ruled communities under its purview separately from the 
government. However, on May 9th, 2009, the civil conflict came to an end with the defeat of the 
                                                 
8 Sarvodaya views itself as a movement and an organisation (see Chapter 4). It is a registered NGO, charity and 
corporation and has received funds from international donors since the 1970s. 
 
9 For example, certain departments in Sarvodaya are dedicated to working in conflict affected areas and the NGO 
developed its own approach called the‘5R’ (Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconciliation, Reconstruction and 
Reawakening) which is an extension of the 3R approach created by Sarvodaya in 1983 in response to communal 
violence.  
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LTTE by government armed forces. For CACs, this act did not necessarily mark the end of 
Tamil sentiments which motivated LTTE. In this new post conflict scenario, Sarvodaya became 
heavily involved in reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. It had established 
relationships with affected communities which predated the conflict. By 2010, it received nearly 
$4.6 million USD in donor grants, mainly for work in CACs. Donors were interested in the 
NGO’s access into restricted government areas and its reputation amongst communities in the 
North and East. As part of donor requirements, some projects required LFs to be prepared by 
Sarvodaya to plan, monitor and evaluate projects.  
 
Contributions 
This thesis provides several contributions. First, it provides an in-depth analysis of the LF with 
particular reference to its role as an accounting device. Thus far, few studies have been 
completed on the LF, none of which focus on the accounting aspect10. Furthermore, this thesis 
explores the LF ‘in action’ within a series of development projects in Sri Lanka. Using a case-
based approach, the uptake and movement of the LF are examined between Sarvodaya, 
communities and other stakeholders in the development sector. Fieldwork in Sarvodaya was 
conducted over a period of three years and unrestricted research access was granted to project 
sites, staff and organisation documents (i.e. annual reports, training materials, project proposals 
etc.). Such access and length of study provided an opportunity to analyse shifts within the 
organisation as well as multiple projects and LFs over an extended period of time. The ability 
to examine the LF in this manner allowed data collected to include the many roles the LF 
assumed within projects (i.e. planning, monitoring and evaluating) since new purposes were 
attached to the LF as projects grew in their complexity of activities and strove to meet desired 
targets. This approach of examining the evolution of the LF empirically resonates with Burchell 
et al’s (1980) position that: “accounting, it would appear, is made to be purposive rather than 
being inherently purposeful” (p. 13).  
                                                 
10 One exception is a working paper by Martinez & Cooper (2012) titled Making Non-‐Governmental 
Organizations  Accountable to the State: Stratifying International Development 
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In addition to providing empirical insights on the LF, this thesis also examines accounting 
within a period of transition in Sri Lanka. The thesis is a window into management practices 
undertaken at the end of three decade civil conflict, and subsequently, at the start of new 
reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the development sector in Sri Lanka. 
In so doing, this thesis provides rich insights on accounting within the context of civil conflict, 
an uncharted field of inquiry in accounting thus far. This context gives light to possibly extreme 
examples of quantification in order to craft the civil context as operable for diverse stakeholders 
such as the government, communities and NGOs.  
Similarly, the case central to the thesis, Sarvodaya, possesses a dual identity of a grassroots 
people’s movement and an official NGO. As explored in Chapter 4, local forms of movement 
administration enter into management discussions to navigate external actors in the 1980s. And, 
in Chapters 5 and 6, the potential of the LF to incorporate local knowledge and aspirations is 
further explored through diverse projects in post-conflict projects hosted in the North and East 
of Sri Lanka from 2009-201311.  
Moreover, this thesis compiles and discusses attributes of neutrality and formality in accounting 
and international development literatures. It also furthers studies of accounting and conflict by 
examining how societal and administrative conflicts shape the role(s) of accounting. Through 
an analysis of the LF over an extended period of time, this thesis seeks to understand how 
perceptions of neutrality and formality evolve (Chapter 2) and the mobilisation of attributes 
within three different episodes of organisation and project existence (Chapter 4-6). In making 
sense of neutrality and formality empirically, this thesis examines the rise of the LF in the United 
States in the late 1960s, the spread of external accountability requirements in Sri Lanka in the 
mid-1980s and project use of the LF from 2009-2013. In general, this thesis spans four decades 
of empirical material (primary and secondary) and two countries (developed and developing).  
Overall, the main arguments of this thesis are that (1) perceptions of neutrality and formality 
are desirable in situations of conflict given breakdowns in communication, informal relations 
and trust, (2) internal actors and wider community stakeholders can potentially construct formal 
                                                 
11 Preliminary fieldwork started in 2011 in Sri Lanka. From 2012-2013, fieldwork was conducted for periods of 
time in Sarvodaya. In Sarvodaya, some projects spanned three to four year periods and, thus, included development 
activities at the close of the civil conflict in 2009.  
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and neutral accounts of their knowledge, experiences and aspirations and (3) constructs can be 
mobilised to redress imbalances in authority by providing internal actors and locals with 
opportunities to structure interactions, facilitate coordination and intervene in their own affairs.  
First, this thesis argues that, in situations of conflict, notions of trust and informal relations are 
not replaced by accounting (Lewis, 2007; Power, 1996; Power, 1997). Rather, formal and 
neutral systems are desirable in the absence of cordial relations and in the presence of tensions 
between stakeholders. It also proposes that formalised uses of accounting potentially foster 
possibilities to develop trust amongst actors. In so doing, this thesis enriches the literature that 
emphasises the potential of accounting as a mechanism to cultivate common platforms for 
dialogue and defining local aspirations (see Porter, 1995), and counters previous studies which 
suggest that accounting functions solely to reproduce historic and status quo distributions of 
power and participation (Escobar, 1995; Esteva & Prasad, 1998).   
Second, this thesis suggests that internal actors and wider stakeholders potentially construct 
neutral and formal accounts in order to represent their interests as management objects. Efforts 
to present experiences as accounts enable wider perspectives to be included within wider report 
systems and the cultivation of expertise around local input. In so doing, this study counters the 
view that administration mechanisms define success and failure from an authoritarian viewpoint 
(Vannier, 2010; Escobar, 1995; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008) and explores the 
potential to imbue accounting with new purposes to represent less dominant actors (see Robson, 
1991; Burchell et al, 1985).  
Third, this thesis argues that internal actors and locals can mobilise neutral and formal accounts 
within a perceived system of thought and action underlying reporting. With the LF used at the 
community level, locals and NGOs structure experiences arising from the conflict as experts of 
their own context. The potential to frame aspirations and grievances as ‘more routine, simple 
and undemanding of genuine creativity’ (Hirschman, 1967) facilitates coordination in this 
setting. While some studies caution on the over reliance on accounting and, subsequently, 
sustain its inflexibility and the related depoliticisation of local contexts (Rahaman et al, 2010; 
Ferguson, 1994), this thesis suggests that administrative structures devoid of context can be 
leveraged to the advantage of internal actors and communities.  
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Overview of Chapters 
 
This thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 outlines the origins of the LF in the 1960s. It discusses three main themes: the 
ideological and political motivations behind the aid industry, formation of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and creation of the LF by Fry Associates and 
Practical Concepts Incorporated (PCI). This chapter charts the development of ‘international 
aid’ as a concept, intervention and, subsequently, an object of evaluation in the United States. 
It also provides an overview of particular events which promoted economic, as well as social 
and cultural definitions of aid and evaluation. To understand the rise of management practices, 
the chapter outlines how ‘the project’ as a vehicle for structuring and delivering aid became 
politicised.  
This chapter argues that, in order to serve political ambitions, the LF is a product of shifting 
ideas of evaluation practice and efforts to incorporate management and scientific expertise. It 
also demonstrates that to push the margins of evaluation practice (see Miller, 1998), ‘evaluator 
experience’ was increasingly understood as a formal category of intervention.  In this vein, 
attributes of the LF evolved to filter experiences as neutral representations which were subject 
to standardisation, formalised systems of reporting and wider debates in the development sector. 
Relevant to the following chapters, it highlights that the LF is defined by its ‘empty’ matrix, 
and represents particular logics of development (management and scientific). Furthermore, 
defined characteristics of the LF were also malleable, mutating to fit the demands of the time.   
Chapter 3 provides a contextual overview of Sri Lanka and Sarvodaya. It discusses the 
emergence of ethnic conflict in the 1980s, key actors within the conflict and Sarvodaya’s 
operational and cultural position in Sri Lanka. This chapter also describes the qualitative 
research method employed from 2011 to 2013, chronicles data collected (69 interviews, 18 
meetings and over 1000 pages of documents) and outlines techniques utilised for data analysis.  
The remainder of this thesis is based on a case study of Sarvodaya. Chapter 4 explores the 
advent of a single external accountability framework in the 1980s. It highlights how external 
concepts and mechanisms of accountability interacted with internal local movement-based 
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accounts of Sarvodaya. The chapter demonstrates how notions of accountability set by a cohort 
of funders called the ‘Donor Consortium’ (DC) sought to represent the ‘movement’ as a 
financial number, accounting entity as well as to measure movement philosophies in a grammar 
of targets and results. It also highlights that after the DC ended in 1995, previously critiqued 
DC traditions were used to represent movement philosophies within the realms of strategic 
planning and management discussions.  
The chapter traces external representations and disagreements between internal actors and the 
DC.  It underscores how a formal and externally driven framework, contrary to previous studies 
(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Ebrahim, 2002; 2003), can be strategically used to represent 
internal accounts. It also demonstrates that acquired depictions of movement philosophies 
framed it as technical inputs in order to protect the movement and mobilise indigenous ways in 
management spaces.  
Chapter 5 and 6 provide mini project case studies of the LF within post-conflict development 
efforts in the North and East of Sri Lanka.  
On the one hand, chapter 5 examines the use of the LF in a series of reconciliation, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation projects. It describes continued tensions between Tamil 
communities and the government in the North and East. It also underscores how local concerns 
and government doctrines pose operational challenges for NGOs. The chapter highlights how 
social unrest seeps into management considerations and informs the use of the LF. Notably, in 
this chapter, the LF is understood by local actors as a methodology to link their aspirations to 
government initiatives such as the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission12 (LLRC). 
In addition, given three decades of conflict, this chapter argues that government perceptions of 
                                                 
12 One formal government response to quell international concerns was the Lessons Learnt Reconciliation Council 
(LLRC).  The LLRC was established as an independent inquiry committee, a government effort after the conflict 
which was to be on par with international investigations. It is an in-country assessment of “the conflict phase and 
the sufferings the country has gone through as a whole” (LLRC, 2012). In March 2012, the 285 LLRC 
recommendations gained international legitimacy as they were endorsed over the Report of the Secretary-General’s 
Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka at the 19thUnited Nations Human Rights Council session. The 
home-grown approach is not without its critics, however. Amnesty International stated that the LLRC ignores 
“serious evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other violations of the laws of war by government 
.forces” (2011). The Tamil National Alliance, the largest political party representing Tamils, has called for an 
international “accountability mechanism” for the implementation of the LLRC itself (TamilNet, 2011). 
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‘deviant’ communities (see Sykes & Matza, 1957) can be neutralised by expressing local 
concerns as technical inputs in formal reporting processes.  
On the other hand, Chapter 6 focuses on a single project partnership between Oxfam-GB 
(hereafter Oxfam) and Sarvodaya. Based on the evolution of the LF in the project, this chapter 
outlines three ways of visually using the LF: first, as a means to structure planning; second, a 
device to promote accountability and; third, a format for brainstorming. In this chapter, these 
three uses of the LF are framed into different ‘sights’ – plain sight, oversight and foresight – 
which visually structure and coordinate actors and activity into a common methodology. This 
chapter builds upon studies on visuals in accounting (Quattrone, 2009) and argues that visual 
representations and concepts provided by the LF structure staff perceptions and rationalisation 
of responsibilities, time and space.   
The final chapter provides an overview of findings, limitations and possibilities for future 
research. 
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2 MAKING EVALUATOR EXPERIENCE   
 THE ORIGINS OF THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter outlines historical events which formalised the delivery of international 
development and explores origins of the LF. The drive toward a planned and monitored foreign 
assistance program for sustained economic development (and later social development) in the 
United States during the 1950s led to the evolution of institutions such as USAID. This 
evolution continued to create a domain for evaluating the success of the development 
interventions. 
The process of linking actors to wider shifts in the field as well as new domains of evaluation 
practice involved active engagement with broad self-reflective categories such as ‘progress’ and 
‘experience’. In the United States, efforts to evaluate development was increasingly accepted 
as formalising and outlining endeavours in technical terms. As evaluators possessed differing 
backgrounds and expertise, the need to formalise and standardise evaluations was recognised 
during the late 1960s.  
It was under such circumstances that proposals and designs of the LF gained support within 
USAID.  Its creators noted that the diverse origins – science, military and management – and 
the simplicity of the ‘matrix’ format of the LF allowed users to deposit experiences within a 
pre-defined framework for experience. This chapter suggests that attributes of neutrality and 
formality were assigned to evaluator experience, and in turn, that attributes were mobilised in 
various ways to meet diverse ends, even as a critique of the LF itself.  
In this chapter, the manner in which neutrality and formality were assigned to evaluate devices 
(as part of larger institutional efforts) in international development in the 1960s is introduced. 
To frame the role of neutrality and formality, references to prior accounting studies on the shifts 
in expertise and redrawing of boundaries within fields and domains of practice are provided 
(Miller, 1998; Hopwood, 1978). An exploration of the ways in which actors are linked and, in 
turn, participated within emergent fields and domains (such as evaluation) in international 
development is described in this chapter. An outline of the USAID consultant contracts, in 
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which the LF reflected and filtered experience according to logic, templates and systems of 
thinking is also provided.  
The field of evaluation is considered as fluid with strong impacts from political and institutional 
changes in international development. This view is consistent with observations that the 
substance and outlook of the concept and practice of accounting is not only shaped, but also 
informed by society itself (Burchell et al, 1985; Hopwood, 1988; Rose & Miller, 2010). In this 
respect, to add and take away parts of practice, there is activity at the ‘margins of accounting’ 
(Miller, 1998).  According to Miller (1998), accounting is not static since:  
The margins of accounting change as the boundaries of accounting are redrawn. The margins are 
fluid and mobile, rather than static. What is on the margins at one point in time can become central 
or taken-for-granted, relatively fixed and durable, at a later date. Moreover, the margins of 
accounting vary from one national setting to another. In all these different respects, there is a 
multiplicity of margins to be considered. (p. 173) 
 
For redrawing margins, a process of dissatisfaction with the status quo and the identification of 
matters of question permits visibility to a series of problems for intervention (Miller & Rose, 
2008; Miller, 1998). As noted by Miller (1998):  
'Problems' have to be made recognizable, a particular perception has to form, people have to be 
convinced that problems are intrinsic to a particular device rather than contingent, a measure of 
agreement has to be reached as to the nature of the problems identified, a consensus has to form that 
something needs to be done, and another way of calculating that fits the problem identified has to 
be made available. Then, and only then, do things change. (p. 174)  
 
 
The evolution of expertise and fields is a result of systematic and coherent efforts initiated by 
the agencies desiring a new mode of practice. As noted by Miller (1998), such change at the 
margins is initiated within multiple sites, involves more than simply the ‘practitioner’ and is 
permeable to other disciplines. In his study of a factory, Miller (1998) found that changes in 
accounting were also driven by tying notions of costs for decision making, discounting 
techniques for investment appraisal and a larger drive for efficiency. Such a theme of efficiency 
is similar to other accounting studies. For example, Hopwood (1992) noted that ‘cost’ was a 
construct made over time that was more or less connected with economic ambitions to measure 
profitability and ensure efficiency. While such studies examine changes in accounting as linked 
to additional categories and motives (economy, efficiency, cost, quality, consumption etc.) 
(Hopwood, 1992; Miller & Napier, 1993; Miller & Rose, 1997) little is known about shifts in 
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accounting in the development sector and the process by which neutrality and formality came 
to represent personalised categories of experience and wider ideals of progress.  
 
As such, this chapter examines the framing of experience within an evolving evaluation 
framework and how the categories of ‘progress’ and ‘experience’ gained attributes of neutrality 
an formality. Notably, the way in which the experience of an evaluator was understood evolved 
over time. At first, experiences gained from development interventions informed the construct 
of evaluation and its field. But later evaluation devices such as the LF became a prism for 
understanding the experiences. The LF is considered as an evaluation device designed to link 
planning to evaluation, and is of interest, given its multi-disciplinary origins (military, science 
and management), as well as sustained use by USAID and other development agencies and 
NGOs.  
 
To investigate ways in which political attitudes towards development connect to the evaluation 
of development itself, this chapter will firstly explore the incentive to offer assistance to other 
countries and criteria leading to the kind of assistance provided in the late 1950s13. Secondly, 
the formation of USAID and the drive towards an accountable and goal-oriented development 
programme will be highlighted. Next, trends in the 1960s in USAID will be discussed in relation 
to the rise of concerns over incorporating evaluator ‘experience’ and, in turn, the creation of the 
LF as an evaluation device linked to project planning. Lastly, the manner in which views of 
neutrality and formality were negotiated and assigned to the LF as it extended to NGOs will be 
discussed.  
 
Overall, this chapter suggests that efforts to connect experience to evaluation as a ‘problem’ set 
in motion neutrality and formality as favourable features of evaluation. This chapter contributes 
                                                 
13 This chapter is based mainly on archival research at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, USA. 
Documents reviewed include letters to and from the president’s office (J.F.K), draft acts, speeches to congress and 
interviews conducted with aid officers (1960-1980s). In relation to the history of the LF, training handbooks from 
the 1970s were reviewed and used as a starting point for identifying possible interviewees. For this chapter, six 
interviews were conducted to supplement archival research. For a full list of interviews and documents, see Annex 
1. 
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to studies on the margins of accounting by examining a shift in a different context (international 
development) and highlighting perceptions towards neutrality and formality.  
 
 
The Beginning of Aid and American Political Motivation 
 
This section briefly outlines political motivations driving the institution of international 
development in the United States during the late 1950s. It also outlines specific approaches, 
mainly economic, used to frame and structure assistance. Here, the effort to frame development 
led to the use and growth of ‘projects’ to deliver services. In this section, projects are shown to 
be an entry point for expertise, and later, as explored in the remainder of the chapter, an avenue 
to innovate and introduce evaluation devices such as the LF.  
 
The Political Rise of Foreign Assistance  
 
Beginning with the Marshall Plan in the post-war reconstruction effort to ‘rebuild Europe’, 
American Presidents – particularly Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower – were inspired to 
promote development to protect Western interests around the world (Rist, 1999). In 1949, 
President Truman channelled the policy for shifting focus to ‘development assistance’ or 
‘technical assistance’. 
As such, interventions became long-term efforts through official government channels rather 
than solely part of emergency-based relief (Eberstadt, 1989). The clearest indication of this shift 
was elucidated by President Truman himself in his Inaugural Address of 1949; he noted the 
fourth objective of his Administration as follows:  
…we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.  
 
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is 
inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty 
is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, 
humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people.  
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The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific 
techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are 
limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are 
inexhaustible.  (Da-1)  
 
At the time, President Truman’s fourth objective served as a foundation for establishing formal 
foreign aid policies in the United States. He further recommended that Congress support 
legislation that would: “enable the United States, in cooperation with other countries, to assist 
the peoples of economically underdeveloped areas to raise their standards of living” (Da-19, p5). 
A year later, the US Secretary of State assured a sceptical Congress that the president’s $45 
million request to achieve the fourth objective would not set a precedent for the vast scale of 
foreign assistance. “By its very nature,” he explained, “this is not and never will be a big money 
enterprise” (Da-19, p.7). Yet, after President Truman’s term in office, President Eisenhower and 
the subsequent administrations continued to finance, this initiative and actively participate in 
evolving this ‘enterprise’ to align with US foreign policy.  
In the 1950s, the effort to provide assistance gained traction as the government’s limited and 
temporary initiative of the Marshall Plan was replaced by a legal platform, the Mutual Security 
Act, of 1951 (Da-5). This act set in motion a deviation from President Truman’s ideals of 1949, 
to provide emergency-based and short term assistance. The act laid the structural foundation for 
a new form of assistance; distinguishing foreign assistance from military aid, albeit maintaining 
some links between military and foreign interventions, which were partially sustained under the 
Eisenhower administration.  
Taking office in 1953, President Eisenhower added a new dimension to President Truman’s 
fourth objective by binding foreign assistance to issues of national security. President 
Eisenhower, a five star General and the Supreme commander of Allied forces in Europe during 
the second World War understood geo-political issues and promoted a change by proposing a 
‘New Look’ for America. With privileged issues of national security (Melanson & Mayers, 
1987), the New Look also included a commitment to forging friendships with non-aligned 
governments.  
Setting out this new vision, on January 5th, 1957, Eisenhower delivered a speech later noted as 
the ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’. He stated:  
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International Communism, of course, seeks to mask its purposes of domination by expressions of 
goodwill and by superficially attractive offers of political, economic and military aid. But any free 
nation, which is the subject of Soviet enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look behind the 
mask. (Da-2)  
 
As such, the objectives of foreign assistance were politically motivated to reach and secure the 
allegiance of nonaligned Nations during the Cold War. Military and political assistance to non-
aligned but friendly nations accounted for nearly half of disbursements from 1953 to 1961 during 
President Eisenhower’s term of office, a significant increase from only 6% between 1949 and 
1953 under President Truman (Da-19). President Truman had initiated foreign assistance as an 
ideological outlet in a new, post-war world while President Eisenhower expanded the concept 
to incorporate national security issues with foreign assistance during the turbulent Cold War.  
Such efforts to align countries politically were influenced by the changing status of former 
colonies in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The majority of the former 
colonies became newly independent nations in the two decades following the Second World 
War, and recognised as sovereign nations. By virtue of the fact that these were “infant” countries 
with meagre national wealth, they were considered to be ‘underdeveloped ‘Nations in the 
emerging global economic order. The use of a binary description “developed” and 
“underdeveloped”, were created in the capitols of western countries with little consideration 
given to the diversity in the level of development among former colonies. Underdevelopment 
itself was a “historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations” that were 
“an essential part of the structure and development of the capitalist system on a world scale as 
a whole” (Frank, 1966, p.5). 
In international development, progress based on this distinction gained traction amongst 
emerging international institutions and they in turn created models that reflected this binary 
underdevelopment-development.  New world institutions such as the United Nations, World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund picked up this developed-underdeveloped trajectory and 
espoused an aspirational model of development based on helping the underdeveloped nations 
reach the developed status. That said, with decolonisation continuing and the Cold War 
escalating, the emerging post-war world order was still in a flux and the conceptual models of 
development found it difficult to penetrate the sphere of policy.  
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By the late 1950s, Walt Whitman Rostow, an economist and Special Security Advisor to both 
President Kennedy and President Johnson, charted a path from underdevelopment to 
development. For Rostow, development was an interpretation of modern economic history and 
attainable by undergoing stages of development. The introduction of stages, Rostow proposed, 
reflected how underdeveloped countries transitioned from a ‘traditional society’ to a developed 
nation with an ‘age of high mass consumption’ by way of economic-based development 
assistance. By 1960, Rostow wrote The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto which noted five sequential stages:  
 
1 Traditional society A traditional society is one whose structure is developed within limited 
production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and 
on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world.  
2 Preconditions for 
take-off 
The period when the preconditions for take-off are developed; for it takes 
time to transform a traditional society in the ways necessary for it to exploit 
the fruits of modern science, to fend off diminishing returns, and thus to 
enjoy the blessings and choices opened up by the march of compound 
interest. 
3 Take-off The take-off is the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady 
growth are finally overcome. The forces making for economic progress, 
which yielded limited bursts and enclaves of modern activity, expand and 
come to dominate the society. Growth becomes its normal condition. 
4 Drive to maturity  After take-off there follows a long interval of sustained if fluctuating 
progress, as the now regularly growing economy drives to extend modern 
technology over the whole front of its economic activity. 
5 Age of High Mass 
consumption  
The leading sectors shift towards durable consumers' goods and services: a 
phase from which Americans are beginning to emerge; whose not 
unequivocal joys Western Europe and Japan are beginning energetically to 
probe; and with which Soviet society is engaged in an uneasy flirtation. 
 
Rostow’s approach of progress, defined as “stages” informed by economics, fuelled the 
‘modernization theory’, a philosophy in international development which favoured the 
importation of Western expertise and technology for economic-based growth (Lewis & Kanji, 
2009).  In modernisation theory, developing nations embarked on the path of modernisation 
which closely replicated reconstruction efforts under the Marshall Plan, which provided an early 
model for the structuring and delivering of foreign assistance (McCarthy, 1987). For the 
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delivery of assistance itself, such mapping of stages linked ideologies of development to 
operational concerns. Stages rationalised the kinds of interventions selected within an economic 
notion of progress. For developing countries to modernise, the pathway for transformations 
ushered in certain expertise and units to structure interventions.  For example, evolution away 
from tradition was linked to science (see Drori & Meyer, 2006), and traditions were decidedly 
framed as unscientific, and therefore ‘not modern’, since:  
 
To be modern is to be scientific. This means, in principle, that a modern state sets its face against 
such superstitious practices as divinisation, magic, and astrology as policy making. The elites usually 
claim to believe that progress rests on rational technology, and ultimately on scientific knowledge. 
Hence, progress involves the promotion of scientific research and the utilisation of its results for the 
common good. (Shils, 1962, p.10) 
 
 
This was in line with Rostow’s stages, as traditions and other local customs were framed as 
interchangeable with expertise and technology. Additionally, expertise and technology was set 
forth as deliverable by a specific unit and method - ‘the project’ - as projects could be slotted 
within stages to meet particular ambitions as well as become an object for management.  
 
From Politics to the Projects of Development  
 
Under such models of development, the politics of interventions informed the setup of projects 
as interventions. The use of projects, rather than long-term programmes, in international 
development has been described as ‘projectised development’ since projects favour and 
reinforce a style of selecting and structuring interventions. In this view, widespread use of 
projects in development is concerned with the possibilities that this ‘unit’ of projects created, 
as…      
The instrumental strengths of projectised development assistance lie in the segmented, specified, 
contractual nature of projects, as opposed to the aggregated, general, non-binding nature of 
programmes and policies.  
 
That is, projects serve as accounting units that coincide with administrative bodies, budgetary cycles, 
and legal parameters. Thus, projects are convenient-size development modules that correspond to 
the structure and resources needed to initiate and implement donor-assisted development activities. 
They are also a legal instrument with which to bind agency and country alike to terms and conditions 
for extending and receiving development assistance. (Honadle & Rosengard, 1983, p.302) 
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Initially, projects were viewed as standalone yet mobile within and consistent with broader 
administrative structures and bodies of knowledge. The use of projects became an ‘approach’ 
to development and grew in popularity amongst international institutions. For example, one of 
the earliest applications of a ‘project based’ approach is the World Bank’s use of ‘project 
lending” (Baum & Tolbert, 1985). In 1948, the World Bank had two concurrent investments in 
Chile for electric power and agricultural credit for machinery. The World Bank’s structuring of 
‘investments’ in the late 1940s in the form of projects was a relatively new practice at the time. 
Subsequently, from 1948-1984 the World Bank completed 2,429 loans and granted 1,515 credit 
lines worth $135 billion.  Of this, 90% of loans and credit lines were in project lending rather 
than in ‘non-project’ formats. The majority of these projects were for schools, crop production 
programs, hydroelectric power dams and fertilizer plants. The delivery of a development 
ideology became communicable through a ‘matching’ or ‘one-to-one’ relationship between 
management practice and sentiments behind an assistance approach.  
Projects were also generally production-oriented with an underlying aim of expanding and 
‘opening up’ markets (Grooves & Hinton, 2005). As such, production-orientated projects that 
had an inherited legacy from 20th century corporate and engineering control-orientated practices 
such as dams, roads and other forms of infrastructure were at the forefront (Howes, 1992; 
Morgan, 1983; Rondinelli, 1983). This resulted in projects that 
…conferred an aura of scientific precision that encouraged administrators to search for quantitative 
solutions to problems and to rely on technical standards rather than to seek knowledge and insights 
from those who were supposed to benefit. (Rondinelli, 1982, p. 50) 
 
It was a formal effort to match an ideology of development to a pathway for planning and 
managing development assistance based on the nature of projects. 
However, parallel to Rostow’s model, a critique of solely economic-based development 
assistance was gaining traction in the 1960s (Inghmam, 1993; Rist, 1999; Sachs, 1996). The 
impetus for economic progress in international development was coupled with ‘social 
development’, a marriage of development projects to a belief of social progress. There were 
calls for those who benefited from projects, the ‘beneficiaries’ in underdeveloped countries, to 
be included in the development process (Inghmam, 1993; Sachs, 1996). The United Nations, in 
celebration of ten years – the first ‘development decade’ – emulated this sentiment and called 
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for the consideration of non-economic forces of development alongside the traditional economic 
forces.  
For example, on the 25th of September 1961, President Kennedy captured this zeitgeist in his 
address to the UN General Assembly on ‘Resolution 1710 (XVI)’, a resolution that established 
the 1960s United Nations Development Decade (Da-7). The President endorsed the resolutions’ 
call on member states to: 
 …intensify their efforts to mobilize and to sustain support for the measures required on the part of 
both developed and developing countries to accelerate progress towards self-sustaining growth of 
the economy of the individual nations and their social advancement.(Stokke, 2009, p.137) 
   
Such discourse of economic and social development was included in a published report entitled 
The Development Decade: Proposals for Action. In it, there was a call to action by the Secretary-
General U Thant, who wrote: 
…development is not just economic growth, it is growth plus change. Change, in turn, is social and 
cultural as well as economic, and qualitative as well as quantitative. The key concept must be 
improved quality of life. (Da-10) 
 
In this way, international development, and therefore projects, became objects for delivering 
not only economic growth, but also social development, and this led to a new dimension in the 
administration of projects. This shift from purely economic growth to economic and social 
development meant that the existing administrative structures were inadequate. A novel form 
of administration as well as dedicated institutions were needed to accommodate emerging 
development pressures and the shifting locus of development and its administration. One such 
institution was the USAID, created in 1961 by the Kennedy Administration.  
The next section will discuss how USAID progressed and refined processes and methodologies 
in delivering development initiatives. Managing the shifts within development interventions by 
articulating ‘goals’ were achieved by importing management expertise from the corporate 
sector. It will also introduce ways in which the need for and, later active solicitation, of 
‘evaluation’ of interventions arose.   
 
 33 
 
The Making of the United States Agency for International Development  
 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, there were numerous government departments dedicated to 
structuring and delivering foreign assistance in the United States. For example, foreign lending 
was handled by the Development Loan Fund (DLF) while the International Cooperation 
Administration (ICA) promoted President Truman’s ‘Point Four’ program (Da-3, Da-4). 
In the early days of the Kennedy Administration, this foreign aid setup in the US changed 
dramatically. The president proposed, and later created, the first long-range economic and social 
foreign assistance organization in America: USAID. This new institution was the result of a 
reorganization and merger of contemporary aid bodies across the government into a single 
department.  
The reconfiguration had immediate implications for projects and the general attitude towards 
administration, of which two key features stood out: planning and articulation of goals as objects 
and the importation of managerial expertise from the corporate sector to infuse a corporate 
culture.  
 
A New Enterprise: Making and Setting Objectives  
 
On 22 March 1961, President Kennedy delivered a special message to the Congress that outlined 
the rationale behind his 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), an act which outlined the 
sentiments and infrastructure needed to create USAID. This FAA later became a key piece of 
legislation, comparable to the Mutual Security Act of 1953 (Da-19, Da-4). 
In his message, the President started with three ‘facts’ about foreign aid thus far. He noted:  
1. Existing foreign aid programs and concepts are largely unsatisfactory and unsuited for our 
needs and for the needs of the underdeveloped world as it enters the Sixties 
  
2. The economic collapse of those free but less developed nations, which now stand poised 
between sustained growth and economic chaos, would be disastrous to our national security, 
harmful to our comparative prosperity and offensive to our conscience.  
 
3. There exists, in the 1960s, an historic opportunity for a major economic assistance effort by 
the free industrialised nations to move more than half the people of the less-developed nations 
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into self-sustained economic growth, while the rest move substantially close to the day when 
they, too, will no longer have to depend on outside assistance. (Da-4) 
 
The speech expressed a commitment, even a responsibility, to providing assistance yet explicitly 
noted the unsatisfactory state of assistance in the context of the 1960s. The remainder of the 
memorandum references past American efforts and suggested that there are ‘new goals’ for the 
sixties to target such as cooperation amongst industrial nations, the securing of the free-world 
and the intertwining of political, social and economic issues in development. To achieve these 
new goals, there was a call to rethink how development should be administered. For instance, 
one section stated: 
The lack of stability and continuity in the program – the necessity to accommodate all planning to a 
yearly deadline – when combined with a confusing multiplicity of American aid agencies within a 
single nation aboard – have reduced the effectiveness of our own assistance and made more difficult 
the task of setting realistic targets and sound standards.  
Piecemeal projects, hastily designed to match the rhythm of the fiscal year are no substitute for 
orderly long term planning. The ability to make long-range commitments has enabled the Soviet 
Union to use its aid program to make developing nations economically dependent on Russian 
support – thus advancing the aims of world communism. (Da-4, p. 2) 
 
At this juncture, the president presented ‘planning’ and, more importantly, long-term planning, 
as a decisive tool in the Cold War. Although considered a ‘Soviet trait’, planning became 
increasingly popular after the Second World War (Bach, 2003). The concept and act of planning 
signalled an “organised and rational attempt to select the best available alternatives to achieve 
specific goals” (Hwang, 2006, p. 71).  
For the president, the possibilities to manage foreign assistance outweighed the Soviet stigma 
behind it, a shift reflected in the 1961 FAA. The FAA advocated for set objectives, long-term 
commitments and the USAID, a novel department for implementation. The FAA presented this 
new management approach for foreign assistance as a means to quell mounting political doubt 
on aid itself. For example, Congressman Morris Udall, openly reflected, and even questioned 
the value of foreign assistance. He noted that there was ‘outrageous mismanagement’ and also 
explained…  
… we have learned that we can't "buy" the world's favour with our dollars. We want our nation to 
be strong and resolute, unbending on matters of principle, and such a bastion of strength that we will 
be respected without currying. In the light of its failures and our own convictions about the character 
of men and of nations, should the Mutual Security Program be allowed to continue? 
… 
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The whole southern hemisphere of our world is in ferment. New nations are emerging. Peoples are 
seeking a voice in their affairs and higher living standards. The siren call of Communism is being 
heard in nearly every land. Can we afford to let the Communists go in with their Rubles and their 
technicians and represent their cause as the only avenue of progress? Can we allow the Chinese and 
Russians to dominate the independent countries of South America? (Da-5) 
 
Udall elaborated on an overall uneasiness with assistance and uncertainty about whether aims 
were truly met, sentiments shared throughout the Congress. Fears over effectiveness blended 
with a call for ‘proper management’.  
In this context, the FAA offered a modern approach that matched objectives with plans. The 
FAA passed through the House of Representatives and Senate on 18 August 1961 and $3.6 
billion of appropriations were authorised (Da-5). The Congress, however, did not completely 
agree with the president’s vision of unfettered long term planning (Da-5). For instance, the 
original FAA proposed five-year treasury financing but the legislature altered this to year-
by-year appropriations, requiring annual congressional approval (Da-5). Presentations by 
USAID were annually held before a congressional committee, a step that reduced USAID’s 
ability to commit to long-term interventions. That said, this was one step closer to a vision of 
long-term planning albeit under congressional oversight. USAID had to build political 
concerns (and opinion) into its planning procedures, in order to respond to congressional 
interests and authority.  
There was an effort to promote objectives as well as planning through the FAA. This was in 
line with congressional expectations and presidential direction. The introduction of USAID 
facilitated an institution shift and, in turn, the reinvention of old structures into a new regime 
of assistance. Corporate talent was thought of as objective-based at the time, and as the next 
section elaborates on, through an initiative called ‘Operation Tycoon’, the president’s office 
aimed to cultivate a business-based outlook by strategically soliciting and placing people with 
corporate experience into USAID.  
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Operation Tycoon: Building up Better Business in USAID 
 
ICA and other bodies were disbanded in the 1960s so existing staff were replaced with new 
talent. For staffing newly formed USAID, employees from ICA and other agencies were 
considered ‘inadequate’. The administration therefore actively recruited from outside the 
government (Da-6). Ralph Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, spearheaded a 
campaign to recruit businessmen for top posts, which was later called ‘Operation Tycoon’ 
(Da-21).  
As part of this campaign, Thomas John Watson, Jr, president of IBM, was enlisted to lead 
the ‘Businessmen’s Advisory Council Executive Committee’. Watson noted in a letter to 
Dungan that there are reasons why businessmen may not be eager to join. For example, he 
wrote:  
In looking at the past performance of ICA, a practical businessman weighs the problems of 
successfully operating in this Agency, subjecting himself to potential criticism of the Congress and 
of the people against his present position and what he can do at home, and is reluctant to step forward 
and take the job. (Da-8, p. 2) 
 
For Watson, the nature of such work seemed to include a political spotlight, and in turn, 
political scrutiny, which businessmen sought to avoid. Likewise, he also expressed that a 
cadre of business talent was desirable, not simply a lone businessman in a top post.  
“Businessmen are keenly aware,” he stated, “that their success is dependent upon their 
working for the right man and having the right men working for them” (Da-8, p.1). At the 
time, some business practices such as Management by Objectives14 (MbyO) were part of 
government culture yet Watson hinted at something greater, a culture of business (Da-20)  
Going forward, different efforts were undertaken by Watson and Dungan to solicit ‘Big 
Business’ into USAID.  For example, Watson set up informal regional meetings with top 
businessmen. He was supported in this effort by Dungan, who sent personalised letters from 
the President’s office to American executives (Da-9). Dungan introduced Watson’s meeting 
                                                 
14 Developed by Peter Drucker in his 1954 book ‘The Practice of Management’. .Management by objectives 
(MBO), also known as management by results (MBR), is a process of defining objectives within an organization 
so that management and employees agree to the objectives and understand what they need to do in the organization 
in order to achieve them. 
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requests and asked for candidate recommendations from the business world. The net was cast 
wide, as Dungan sent letters across America to companies such as the Union Oil Company 
of California, Boeing Airplane Company and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Annex 2).  
Dungan also tried to match talent with what he deemed the values of USAID. For instance, 
after his letter campaign, M.J. Rathbone responded by submitting a list of retirees from the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Dungan sent a response noting, “It is very difficult for 
us who have no knowledge of the gentlemen…to judge whether by temperament or otherwise 
they would be suited for a position in the foreign aid program” (Da-9). He also expressed a 
call for candidates that had a “certain political sophistication, sympathy with the objectives 
of the aid program and understanding of the problems of economic development” (Da-9). It 
seemed that though recruiting from the business world, Dungan was sensitised to a particular 
vision of USAID and sought staff that embodied both ‘corporate’ and an USAID outlook.  
Following the letter initiative in 1962, Operation Tycoon recruited thirty-five men from large 
corporations, family businesses and cooperatives in America (Da-21). Recruits underwent 
six weeks of training, and afterwards were welcomed by President Kennedy himself in the 
White House Rose Gardens. One recruit – Robert Noorer – eventually became the Deputy 
Administrator of USAID (Da-21).  
Through such recruitment and honours, the setup of USAID initiated the inclusion of business 
talents and set in motion an agency culture oriented towards corporate thinking applied to 
foreign assistance efforts. As such, the newly evolving apparatus for aid became predisposed 
to ‘corporate’ discourse and practice.   
By the time David Bell, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget, took office as the 
Administrator of USAID in 1962, ideologies of development and its motivations were 
entrenched (Da-12). Bell’s task was not to innovate at this juncture, but to enhance already 
espoused values. T.J. Reardon, Special Assistant to the President, stated Bell was to “continue 
the important task of refinement and improved application of our foreign assistance tools” 
(Da-11).  
That said, Bell contributed to the field of evaluations by expressing concerns with USAID’s 
‘Technical Information (LORE) Transfer’. LORE referred to the collection, analysis and 
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usefulness of information across the aid agency. In 1965, documents referenced 
dissatisfaction with information from evaluations and conversations of how LORE could be 
improved. For instance, comments on LORE were included in meeting minutes of a group 
discussion in USAID, an advisor noted that one participant said:  
.. you indicate the need “to search for a way to process into the mission evaluation system the 
recurring reports having evaluative content”. You also suggest that AID should “Devise ways to get 
a flow to the field of materials to assist in self-evaluation”, (Da-12, p. 132) 
  
Here, failings in information were presented as a gap between operations in the field, the 
source of information, and documentation. For LORE, one document explicitly outlined ‘the 
problem’ as: 
AID programs are conducted in the field, and its experience is largely gained where its programs 
are. But as the Management Team noted, this field experience is often lost to AID. It is lost because, 
despite Manual Orders and other instructions, required reports are not written at all, or if written, are 
not used: “… AID has an inadequate memory. Evaluation reports on projects in process or completed 
are scare, and what has been done tend to go into the files and disappear. Moreover, the files become 
incomplete and their content lost over the years.”  
 
Thus: “AID has not yet developed a systematic process to appraise the consequences and results of 
its program operations and to exploit the rich accumulated experiences of the Agency.” (Da-12, p. 
133)  
 
As such, under Bell, a drive to make sense of evaluations in relation to field operations and 
promote a ‘systematic process’ took root. These circumstances and attitudes towards 
information were the catalyst for an appraisal process of USAID evaluations, which as noted 
in the next section, laid the foundation for making the LF.  
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Evaluation, Expertise and Expansion: The Logical Framework  
 
 
The State of Evaluation, a Space for Change  
 
In the 1960s, the emphasis on evaluation – its importance, purpose and methodologies – was a 
result of political and fiscal circumstances, as well as evolving development theories (Da-26). 
USAID was noted as an ‘evaluation pioneer’ at the time (Stokke, 1991). Overall, there was a 
fixation on evaluation based on stated objectives, a trend that matched the political doubt on the 
delivered ‘successes’ of foreign assistance thus far. For instance, in 1963, Senator G.W. McGee 
reported to USAID’s committee of appropriations that: “one of the most critical needs of the 
Agency is far more objective and effective evaluation of its programs and projects” (quoted in 
Da-14, p.2). The following year, a set of ‘Operations Evaluation Staff’ was established in the 
Office of the Administrator of USAID. By 1968, USAID established its own ‘Office of 
Evaluation’ and set the standard of evaluation approaches and tools for other bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral agencies (Stokke, 1991). 
Given this spotlight on ‘evaluation’ in the 1960s, Bell wanted information about the practice of, 
and possible improvements for, project evaluations in USAID. Bell and others selected a few 
USAID staff and affiliates to report on the nature of evaluation in USAID.  Of the reports 
produced, two set the stage for the LF’s introduction in 1969: Report to the Administrator: 
Improving AID Program Evaluation (1965) and Report to the Administrator on Improving 
AID’s Program Evaluation (1968) (Da-18). Both reports shared common themes such as a call 
for a ‘unified’ evaluation system with the second report making certain recommendations based 
on the first report. Taken together, these reports set a particular discourse around evaluation and 
a path for ‘evaluation practice’ to follow (Da-18). In addition, there was a third report called 
‘Research, Evaluation and Planning Assistance” which was not commissioned by Bell, but 
based on a ‘task force’ set up by President Kennedy in 1961. Subsequently, the report led to the 
creation of a special unit in USAID dedicated to research on economic development (Da-18). 
The first report - Report to the Administrator: Improving AID Program Evaluation – was part 
of Bell’s 1965 call to “increase the use of evaluation as a planning and management tool for 
improving AID operations” (Da-13). The report was authored by General George A. Lincoln, a 
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military man and a special advisor to Bell. At that time, Lincoln was a professor in the 
Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Before academia, Lincoln had served under 
General George C. Marshall in the Second World War as a senior war planner (Da-27). Due to 
his expertise, Lincoln had been promoted to the rank of ‘Brigadier General’ at the age of 38, 
making him the youngest general at the close of the war (Da-27). Afterwards, Lincoln became 
the deputy head of the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, a career move supported 
by Gen. Marshall (Da-27).  
Lincoln had completed the report while on sabbatical from West Point. For Bell, the report had 
to review USAID’s systems of evaluation and perform a ‘partial inventory’ of evaluation 
systems in USAID and other agencies. To accomplish this, Lincoln reviewed past and current 
evaluation activities, investigated ‘methods of operations’ and ‘field environments’, and lastly, 
interviewed field personnel who, in their mind, would be “the primary producers of, and 
customers for, any increased emphasis on evaluation” (Da-13, p.8). It took one year to collect, 
analyse and write-up findings for the Report to the Administrator: Improving AID Program 
Evaluation, later known as the ‘Lincoln Report’ (Da-13, Da-18). 
Lincoln structured the report to address two questions posed in Bell’s original evaluation tender. 
They were:  
 Have we selected the right activities to undertake in the various aid receiving countries? 
 Are we conducting efficiently the activities we have selected? (Da-13, p. 7) 
 
Bell’s two questions guided the study and led Lincoln to a greater issue in USAID: there was 
no definition of evaluation in place. He discovered and noted:  
Although evaluation is a term often used in AID, no definition thereof has been found in legislation 
or in AID administrative regulations. The term has been used in such a wide variety of ways that not 
much sense can be made in talking about improving “evaluation” until we define what we mean. 
(Da-13, p.10) 
 
In USAID, no formal definition of evaluation existed and dissimilar acts were described as 
evaluation. For instance, employee ratings, compliance audits and project plans were included 
under the ‘evaluation umbrella’ (Da-13). Also, different perceptions of when and how an 
evaluation occurred were evident. For example, one officer noted that evaluations started if field 
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observers shouted ‘Aha! He called it the ‘Aha! approach’. To him, an ‘Aha!’ signalled that a 
problem was identified and, from that point forward, field observers would obsess over that 
particular observation. This approach, in his mind, detracted from learning project lessons and 
the sharing of best practice amongst project missions.  
Lincoln considered such dissimilar or uncoordinated notions of evaluation as equally valid (Da-
13). For him, evaluation was the exercise of judgement, as such a generalizable method to 
include all evaluation realities was important, though not the solution. He stated: 
… the principal key to effective evaluation lies in sophisticated, objective individuals who are able 
to identify the appropriate scientific methods insofar as their input is likely to contribute, and are 
able to apply those methods, particularly methods of quantitative analysis. (Da-13, p. 17)  
 
The application of scientific methods was presented as a means to access the users of such 
methods and, as Lincoln further notes, “the problem of reaching usable judgements is on balance 
much more a one of people than of formulas” (Da-13, p.17). To capture ‘people’, including their 
diversity, and provide guidance on what evaluation was, Lincoln defined evaluation as based 
on experience. He claimed:  
There is nothing incorrect about any of these uses of the term, and there are undoubtedly others 
which are equally valid. If a wide variety of activities, also called by other names, are ‘evaluation,’ 
the term becomes an ‘omnium – gatherum’ and the concept is unmanageable.  
 
If there is to be meaningful effort to improve ‘evaluation,’ therefore, AID needs a concrete and 
restrictive definition of the term – one consistent with both AID activities and the uses made of 
evaluation results. The following concept of evaluation, employed through this report, meets these 
requirements: Evaluation is the examination of our experience to provide guidance which can be 
utilised to improve program execution and to improve program planning (Da-13, p. 11, underline in 
original) 
 
Lincoln provided a definition of evaluation that was wide enough to include different 
perspectives of evaluation. From here, the question, as noted in Joel Bernstein’s Report to the 
Administrator on Improving AID’s Program Evaluation, is how to tap into evaluator experience 
in a meaningful way. In many respects, Bernstein’s 1968 report echoed Gen. Lincoln’s 1965 
sentiments. Bernstein explicitly stated, on the first page of his report, that:  
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…the analysis and recommendations in this report are consistent with the findings of the Lincoln 
Report and they often repeat, more or less, conclusions and recommendations in made by Colonel 
Lincoln15. (Da-13, p.2)  
 
Bernstein, head of the Technical Assistance Bureau of USAID, had findings consistent with 
Lincoln, but pushed for something further: an evaluation system. For Bernstein, USAID’s 
evaluations tended to be ‘spotty and relatively crude’ and thus he called for a unified system of 
evaluation (Da-14, p.2). He likened evaluation to an ‘organism’, where the ‘parts’ had to work 
in tandem for the benefit of the ‘whole’. He stated:  
To have real impact, the program evaluation SYSTEM must be intimately interwoven into the total 
on-going activity of AID’s operations. Such a SYSTEM can be compared to a living organism. Like 
any organism, it cannot function well without efficient linkages between the parts…  
 
… At present AID has no program evaluation SYSTEM. It only has parts that could be fitted into a 
SYSTEM and give it the necessary dynamic and organic qualities, it needs a brain and nervous 
system in the form of the recommended explicit management structure for program evaluation. (Da-
14, p. ix, capitals in original) 
 
Bernstein’s call for a system, rather than piecemeal evaluations, was compounded by an 
amendment to the FAA in 1968 by the US Congress, which reflected concerns over the state of 
evaluation and stressed the importance of ‘modern management systems’ (Da-14).  In response, 
Bernstein provided recommendations and an overview of current approaches to evaluation. 
These included an outline of the merits of evaluation documents and processes put forth to 
remedy deficiencies in information, systems and organisation of data, such as:   
Project Appraisal Reports (PAR)  
A checklist on progress and an analytical narrative submitted for every non-capital project.  
 
Spring Reviews  
Review by top-management of key development activities, focusing on the main issues brought forth 
by comparative analyses of field evaluations studies and research reports  
 
‘Memory Bank’ 
Evaluative documents collected and clustered by subject for reference  
 
Evaluation Officers 
A set of ‘evaluation officers’ for the Administrator’s level, Regional Bureaus and Missions of 
USAID  
                                                 
15 Lincoln is referred to as a ‘General’ and a ‘Colonel’ in USAID texts. Lincoln had earned a General’s title during 
WWII, but requested the rank of Colonel so that he could qualify for a department post at West Point (Da-27). 
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The first example, PAR, was installed across USAID and replaced, in Bernstein’s words, ‘less 
evaluative’ status reports. Eventually, PAR was known as the “PAR system” in USAID and 
included all forms, procedures, requirements and constraints associated with reporting on 
project evaluation. Other related reports such as the Project Paper (PROP) and Project 
Implementation Plan (PIP) also intersected the PAR. In a way, Bernstein’s system provided a 
structured outlet for Lincoln’s description of evaluation experience. By 1969, however, after 
PAR’s installation, the Office of Evaluation in USAID wanted to know why PAR did not ‘work 
better’ (Da-18). Additionally, staff resisted using PAR, as some commented it was difficult to 
fill out as it consumed too much on-site management time, held questionable value to staff in 
headquarters and was redundant with existing management practice in USAID (Da-18).  
As such, the director of evaluation, Herbert Turner, advocated for a study of PAR thus far. 
Turner asked Fry Associates, a Washington based consulting firm, to undertake the review (Da-
18). This review led to the creation of the LF.  
 
Fry Associates: Revising the Project Appraisal Reports System   
 
Before USAID, Turner had worked under the Marshall Plan, America’s first model for wide 
scale ‘aid’ post-Second World War (Da-18). Turner pushed for better evaluations at USAID 
and, a year after its installation, advocated for a review of PAR. Fry Associates was 
commissioned to study PAR both as a system and as a report (Da-15). From 1969 to 1970, Fry 
Associates examined a sample of USAID missions and consulted a range of USAID staff. 
Overall, the aim was to improve evaluations and, in turn, modify PAR and related systems.  
For the study, Fry Associates appointed Leon Rosenberg and Lawrence Posner as their principle 
consultants. Given their mixed disciplines, each offered a unique angle on PAR and approach 
to evaluation. For instance, Rosenberg had come from a physics background, but was working 
in management consulting. Noted as a ‘genius’, Rosenberg obtained a masters in physics from 
the University of Chicago at the age of seventeen (Ia-4). By his early twenties, he was head of 
research and development at the astro-electronic division of Radio Corporation of America, a 
top manufacturer of satellites and related systems (Ia-1). Similarly, he also worked on the 
Polaris submarine’s nuclear propulsion prototype and various projects for the National 
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Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the US Air Force (Da-17; Ia-1). Rosenberg 
later moved from ‘science’ into management. He noted, reflecting on a past post with the 
Admiral Corporation, that:  
I soon realised that the opportunity for improvement was not our laboratory techniques, but in our 
management. I saw all kinds of incredible dysfunctional operations and waste. Slowly, but surely, I 
drifted into management instead of research. (Ia-1) 
 
At Fry Associates, Rosenberg’s switch gelled with Posner’s background. Posner was a Harvard 
Business School graduate, class of 1961. He then completed a PhD in Economics at Harvard 
University. He called his own thesis ‘odd ball’, as it dealt with Egyptian Agrarian Reform of 
1952 (Da-23). It was, however, his oddball thesis that propelled him into a career of foreign 
assistance to developing countries (Da-23). Ultimately, it was Rosenberg and Posner’s 
combined talents in science, management, economics and history that fuelled their findings on 
PAR and evaluation recommendations.  
In 1970, their study was completed and titled the Project Evaluation and the Project Appraisal 
Reporting System (Da-15). To conduct the study, the team under Fry Associates reviewed PAR 
documentation for sixty-three projects, visited regional project sites and interviewed two 
hundred personnel based in different positions across USAID. The team produced three 
volumes concerning PAR for USAID:   
Volume I summarised the study and recommendations  
Volume II detailed findings and recommendations 
Volume III contained an ‘implementation package’ (worksheets) for USAID 
missions to assist with cultivating a ‘mission-useful’ evaluation 
process 
 
In the reports, PAR itself was noted to be ‘too complicated’, especially since there was a lack 
of training and familiarity with evaluations amongst staff. They saw that complexity also arose 
because “questions are not asked in a way that makes the logic of evaluation clear” (Da-15, p. 
II-4). As such, in their view, the intended uses of evaluations were unclear, especially to 
missions, as they provided ‘redundant narratives’ in the PAR checklist. Overall, only the 
program evaluation office understood evaluation concepts, which unfortunately did not lead to 
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effective re-planning action for projects. Neither did staff relate their project actions to broader 
objectives. In this vein, the team stated:  
USAID project personnel are in the position of platoon commanders who don’t know what the 
company objectives are. They have been told to fight well and bravely, and on occasion they have 
been told to “take Hill 414”. But they have not been told that the company objectives are to create a 
salient comprising Hills 413, 414 and 415.  
 
Lacking such insight into the broader objectives, USAID personnel find it difficult to intelligently 
replan their projects and their personal efforts. And the ability to replan is key to effectiveness.  (Da-
15, p. II-9) 
 
The efforts of staff were compared to that of military personnel. The need for ‘objectives’ was 
coupled with a call to fit individual project objectives into broader USAID goals. The art of 
planning and re-planning started to become central to discussions on evaluations. More 
specifically, such findings diverted attention from ‘problems with PAR’ to planning and 
objectives as there was a shift away from a pre-set path of ‘evaluation for improved projects’. 
Here, they added planning and objectives as forefront, tying the ‘betterment’ of projects to 
something other than evaluations.  
For the Fry Associates team, the current state of evaluation, in the absence of planning or 
objectives, led to a lack of management responsibility. They noted:  
USAID project managers find it difficult to separate their manageable interests from the broad 
development objectives that are beyond their control. Thus, we were repeatedly told that there were 
no AID projects, only Host projects, and that AID has responsibility only for project input, not for 
results.  
 
Even where projects were relatively uncomplicated, USAID management avoided accepting 
responsibility for explicit outputs, because the ultimate result – development – was influenced by 
many factors not under USAID control (Da-15, p. IV-2) 
 
At this point, aside from a revised PAR, one way to make managers responsible was by setting 
objectives and allocating these objectives to managers. Revisions to PAR included a 
standardised box-like format that broke down activities of projects in relation to ‘outputs’ and 
possible factors influencing projects (i.e. timeframe, resources, costs etc.)  (Figure 1). At the 
end of the revised PAR, staff was asked to summarise the project in their own words as a 
‘narrative’ and compare their narrative to the stated project purpose. At this point, staff was also 
prompted to reflect on project progress in relation to USAID goals in an open-ended field in the 
PAR form which was guided by questions, such as: 
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 2. Does the evidence support your proposition that: 
a) Achieving project purpose will result in expected progress towards higher goals? 
b) Meeting output targets will achieve project purpose?  
 
Under the Fry Associates contract with USAID, PAR revisions were designed to clarify staff 
roles and objectives in relation to wider USAID goals. The Fry Associates team also stressed 
the need to simplify PAR and push for ‘mission-useful’ evaluations as part of ‘system 
requirements’. In their view, this involved re-orientating management thinking. 
 
Figure 1: Excerpts from the Revised Fry Associates PAR 
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In addition to revising PAR, the team provided an ‘implementation package’ which provided 
guidance material, worksheets and examples of templates and definitions to assist management 
and general staff. Worksheets were not formally part of the revised PAR yet reflected 
expectations of the Fry team, showing a ‘system behind the system’ (Da-15). Presented in draft 
form, a section of the worksheets was dedicated to ‘Clarifying the Logical Framework of your 
technical assistance project’.  
 
The Logical Framework: From Fry Associates to Practical Concepts Incorporated  
 
In Fry Associates reports, core operations and the mission of a project were presented as a 
project’s ‘Logical Framework’. An advisory statement and worksheet indicated that articulation 
of an LF is meant to counter lengthy evaluation reports and a lack of clarity amongst project 
staff. The third volume from Fry Associates noted:  
The most common obstacle to clarity in project documentation is verbosity. It is harder to write a 
crisp prose description than a lengthy treatise because crisp prose requires stripping down to what 
is essential and of highest priority.  
Most-worthy projects have multiple effects but can be restated in terms of a "main thrust" that is the 
raison d'etre of the project. The rest are useful by-product effects that should be sacrificed if 
necessary to protect the main thrust of the project. (Da-15, p. 1) 
 
As such, the LF was presented as a device that facilitated the ability to articulate the main parts 
and the purpose inherent in every project. And to structure the LF, the team defined and 
connected parts of a project in terms of a LF logic, namely ‘objectively verifiable indicators’,  
‘inputs’, ‘outputs’, ‘purpose’ and ‘goals’ (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: The Logical Framework in Fry Associates Report 
 
The illustrations of the LF made by Fry Associates under the USAID contract stressed the 
connectivity and transition between different parts of a project into a larger ‘sector’ or 
‘programme’ (see Figure 2). Depictions enrolled categories and devices such as cost and work 
schedules into the format (‘inputs’) and linked them to broader project ambitions.  Likewise, 
representing this ‘logic’, templates and examples for a ‘Logical Framework’ were presented to 
USAID staff (Annex 2). In these templates, the logic of the LF started to have a recognisable 
form – an empty matrix with headers on each axis. According to a LF trainer: 
None of the pieces of the LF are brand new. But putting it together in a way that visually was 
arresting, visually very powerful and having the interaction amongst cells in the LF, is powerful as 
well. A change in one cell can affect a change in something else. (Ia-4)  
 49 
 
Such worksheets and templates provided by Fry Associates, reflected depictions and definitions 
of a logic and supported a perceived aura of certainty and clarity around merits of projects, as 
the team assumption was that:  
Anyone who has a stake in the conclusions of the evaluation is unavoidably subject to the charge of 
bias. The problem disappears if you show that a well-informed  sceptic would come to the same 
conclusion –because there is objectively verifiable evidence that the project does or does not meet 
the pre-established standard of achievement. 
A four-tier hierarchy of issues has been developed to help USAID managers show they "know what 
they are doing" and that they run their projects efficiently. The logical framework for analysis of 
technical assistance projects puts labels on the four levels of management issues and on the linkages 
between them. (Da-15, p.2) 
 
In this way, the intention behind the LF was not only to communicate an implicit structure of a 
project, but also to commit to a common way of viewing and convincing others of project 
viability. In other words, judgement of a project became bounded by a logic (see Hall, 2012), 
rather than an unsystematic perception of experiences described by Lincoln and Bernstein.    
Additionally, in line with institutional and wider efforts in international development, the LF 
emanated scientific and management approaches. More pointedly, approaches were combined 
to refine judgement, as the team noted:  
Adopting the viewpoint of a ‘scientist’ as opposed to a ‘manager’ does not lessen management 
accountability – it simply clarifies the nature of that accountability and the distinction between the 
subjective and the objective. Production of outputs and achievement of purpose are objectively 
verifiable – thus, the only subjective element is Mission judgement that producing the former will 
result in the latter.  
Over the long-term, this should result in more responsible project definition and greater 
accountability – as management will be called upon to assess its judgements as well as its actions.   
(Da-15, p. IV-5) 
 
Confined by logics, science, management and so forth, judgement in evaluation started to be 
presented as increasingly visible, predictable and stable through the LF. As such, judgement 
reflected concerns of compliance to logic than as an expression of individual opinions.  
Notably, even though science and management informed the LF’s construct of judgement, the 
applicability and accessibility was thought to be widespread. The LF was presented to USAID 
as a way of thinking, a template that did not require a background in science or management. 
For instance, in notes to trainees, a LF handbook described:   
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The Logical Framework does not require a degree in mathematics or the use of computers. It relies 
on the user’s experience with development projects as well as a sense of what consistent good 
management and intuition. (Da-17, p. 4) 
 
As such, although it combined and mobilised other disciplines in its format, the LF was also 
outlined as a window to access evaluator experience. Rosenberg, the principal creator behind 
the LF and founder of PCI, stressed that in his team and within USAID, the LF was perceived 
as ‘neutral’. For instance, he noted:   
We had a PhD psychologist working for us who said, “Ah it’s a neutral projective instrument.” His 
name was Tony something, I forget. I guess it’s that also. I think the fact that it is neutral. It doesn’t 
force you into anything except thinking clearly about what you’re doing. It’s amenable to other 
forms of examination. (Ia-1) 
 
As such, the LF was viewed as comparable and equivalent to other forms of evaluation (or 
examination) and the neutrality was seen as an ability to be a guide, yet not of a strict structure, 
for articulating evaluator experience. Likewise, Rosenberg also highlighted that some of his 
staff used the LF not only for evaluations, but also to track their own personal development to 
chart out career goals (Ia-1).  
In this sense, the paradoxes of the LF – its incorporation of mixed disciplines yet its ability to 
be used by laymen and its structured system of logic contrasted with its perceived flexibility 
and general applicability to articulate projects and persons – fuelled its development, appeal and 
use within USAID.  
By 1970, draft LF worksheets and definitions provided to USAID turned into a separate 
consulting contract and a project (Da-18). Lead Fry Associates consultants – Rosenberg and 
Posner – created their own consulting firm called ‘Practical Concepts Incorporated’ (PCI) and 
secured the contract with USAID to refine the LF and roll out large-scale training which 
included project evaluation installation exercises (Annex 3) in Washington as well as in regional 
field offices. At one point, over 3,000 trainers had been ‘LF trained’ (Ia-3). Ultimately, PCI 
obtained a six million dollar worldwide contract to ‘train the trainers’ and secured an Indefinite 
Quality Contract with USAID (Ia-1). This contract would, in Rosenberg’s words, ‘magnify their 
effect’, as they became the preferred evaluation contractor for USAID (Ia-1).  
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At its height, PCI had an office in Washington, DC and branches in Bolivia, Costa Rica and 
Germany.  It also worked with over forty missions across USAID (Ia-1). Over time, permanent 
staff grew from twenty to forty and were supported by part-time employees as well as interns. 
In creating the PCI team, Posner had a vision for recruitment. One PCI trainer recalled: 
It was the most stimulating environment ever because Leon’s philosophy was you hire people of 
very different backgrounds, put them in the fields that they’re not experts in and see what kind of 
creativity that sparks. (Ia-2) 
 
Such diversity in disciplines, the same catalyst for the LF, fuelled PCI which had staff with ‘soft 
science’ and ‘hard science’ backgrounds, from sociologists to engineers. It was a blended and, 
at times, uncomfortable approach to fostering creativity (Ia-4). At PCI, Posner put field experts 
into work where they held no expertise, their contributions were to the flow of ideas rather than 
an application of their pre-set know-how (Ia-3).  
Through PCI, a knowledge base around the LF emerged as university courses, handbooks, and 
even expertise were developed on its evaluation principles within USAID and amongst other 
bi-lateral and international institutions (Ia-2; Ia-5). For example, when PCI was at its height, 
the University of Syracuse pioneered a PhD program on evaluation (Ia-1). While at PCI, 
Rosenberg designed the programme to revolve around the LF, as he told students: “there’s no 
better way to set up an evaluation, period. At least, I know of none and if you do, let me know” 
(Ia-1).  
As for materials, PCI actively produced reports and training manuals as part of their contracts. 
Such reports often contained additional reference materials or worksheets for missions or 
general staff to use. A notable report is PCI’s The Logical Framework: A manager’s guide to 
scientific approach to design and evaluation, authored by Rosenberg and Posner (Da-17). The 
guide is a tweaked version of the first LF introduced in the 1970 Fry Associates report and 
clarified the logic behind its recognisable matrix (Figure 3; Annex 4;5).  
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Figure 3: Logical Framework Template from PCI 
 
In addition to providing a sustained template for the LF, PCI as a mixed hub of talents and a 
contract powerhouse, cultivated a class of evaluation experts. The staff were part of the 
energetic world of international development and set trends in the field of its evaluation. Even 
after PCI closed down in the 1980s, former PCI staff still populated ‘evaluation work’.  For 
instance, Posner went to Germany to work for GTZ, the German bi-lateral aid agency that later 
introduced an adaption of the LF called ZOPP (Ia-4).  Likewise, another PCI-affiliate designed 
a module called The Use of the LF for Project Design Implementation and Evaluation for a 
graduate-level management seminar which lasted for fifteen years (Da-25).  
In some ways, PCI’s legacy of consulting continued though a former trainer, Larry Cooley. 
After PCI, Cooley co-founded a firm called Management Systems International (MSI) and, after 
PCI disbanded, MSI secured an eight year ‘project design’ contract with USAID (Ia-2). The 
MSI contract included the LF, to the point where some reasoned this firm, not PCI, created the 
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LF (Ia-2). In this sentiment, the trainer-turned-CEO reflected that MSI “became the legacy 
organization for the people and the products that PCI produced” (Ia-2).   
In this context, the spread of PCI expertise and education around the LF in the 1970s and 1980s 
facilitated its transfer from evaluating development projects within USAID to other agencies. It 
also spread the use of the LF as a NGO project template to apply for funding from aid agencies 
in the 1990s.   
 
The Logical Framework for Nongovernmental Organisations  
 
In the 1970s, other international agencies had adopted the LF. In 1975, for instance, the 
Canadian Agency for International Development (CIDA) combined the LF with their Results-
Based Management (RBM) approach for projects (Da-17; Da-22). Since then, agencies such as 
the World Bank, United Nations, German Technical Cooperation, European Union and 
Department for International Development in the United Kingdom (DFID, formerly ODA) 
adopted the LF (Biggs & Smith, 2003; Cracknell, 1989). 
Part of the adoption process by other agencies involved alternations to the LF template such as 
axis titles or the number of cells to reflect different agency reporting standards or demands. A 
PCI trainer reflected that the LF is amenable to such adaptation, he noted: 
Here’s what’s good about the various permutations. It’s an open source system. It’s a thinking 
system that you can bring other methodologies into, like cost benefit analysis. (Ia-4) 
 
Additionally, as bi-lateral and international agencies started to provide project funds as ‘donors’ 
to NGOs, evaluation devices as used by the agencies for their own projects were also applied to 
the NGOs they funded (Smillie, 1999). Some donor agencies in the 1990s, such as the EU and 
DFID, even structured their NGO project contracts based on the LF (Wallace et al, 2006; 
Bornstein, 2003). During the decade, the LF became a mechanism that linked donors to NGOs 
as a project template and report format. As such, the LF joined a larger practice of reporting and 
evaluation processes in international development. For instance, Wallace et al (2006) 
conceptualised three reporting flows in international development in which the LF was present 
amongst other forms of reporting: proposals created by NGOs to gain funds from donors, 
 54 
 
reporting requirements donors from NGOs and writing up on impact of NGO work to donors 
(Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4: Three Reporting Flows in ‘the Aid Chain’ 
 
NGOs were required by some donors to fill out an LF as part of a standard project proposal 
format as the decision to fund a NGO project was in part based on the quality and content of the 
LF. If the funding was granted, NGOs were at times required to collect data from the 
communities they serve and report project progress in line with the LF template. This led to 
other project uses of the LF for NGOs, including planning, monitoring and evaluating (Table 
1). Such uses were often mandated by agencies, but in some instances completed voluntarily by 
NGOs. 
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(Ebrahim & Fernando, 2013)  
Table 1: Uses of the Logical Framework 
 
Yet, in the late 1980s and 1990s, attitudes towards evaluation also shifted in that distinctions 
surfaced between evaluation and other accountability mechanisms and reporting processes. 
Evaluation and reporting methods were scrutinised for features such as overtly rigid, 
reductionist and technical (blueprint) versus a desire for inclusive, participation-led and open 
ended (process) (Howes, 1992).  Such a distinction, blueprint versus process, related to 
                                                 
16Risk management as a use is emerging and often less concrete in practice. See O. Bakewell and A. Garbutt, The 
use and abuse of the logical framework approach,” INTRAC, November, 2005, 
http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/518/The-Use-and-Abuse-of-the-Logical-Framework-Approach.pdf, 
accessed on April 18, 2013. 
 
 USE EXAMPLE OF POSSIBLE APPLICATION 
Designing 
Analysis of problems, objectives 
and strategies  
Identifying stakeholders (i.e. 
NGOs, donors and communities)  
 Template for brainstorming sessions   
 Starting and ending points for ‘problem-tree’ 
construction 
 Bringing together stakeholders for design 
workshops  
Contracting 
Part of agreements between 
stakeholders (i.e. donor and 
NGOs)  
 Appendix in donor proposals  
 Reference document for allocating partner 
responsibilities in agreements 
Planning 
Scheduling of tasks and use of 
funding  
 Activities listed in work plans and schedules  
 Budget costing per activity  
Monitoring 
On-going internal and/or external 
supervision and general 
monitoring  
 Inform monitoring system for a project or 
organization  
 Progress on indicators included in interim 
reports  
Evaluation 
Periodic or end-summary of 
actual versus intended results  
 Quarterly reports include progress on 
indicators and objectives  
 Final reports document success on indicators 
and reaching objectives   
Risk 
Management16 
Identification and analysis of risks   Assumptions column as a starting point for 
thinking about risks  
 Assumptions inform project feasibility 
studies  
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attributes of evaluation design, units and even the principal leaders of evaluation itself. For 
example, the unit of a capital project and technically based assistance were contrasted against 
community led initiatives and a sharing of local knowledge (Howes, 1992).  For evaluation, the 
process view represented “an important shift away from the focus on project inputs and outputs 
and the assumed mechanical link between them… ‘process’ provides a device for thinking and 
talking about a complex social reality in new ways” (Farrington et al, 1998, p.4). 
In this shifting evaluation context, attributes of the LF, which were perceived as neutral, 
technical or even informed by science or management were critiqued. For example, framed as 
part of externally required reports from donors in a study of South African NGOs, internal NGO 
managers felt multiple and onerous report formats distracted NGOs from their missions as well 
as favoured more professional NGOs rather community-based initiatives (Bornstein, 2003). In 
relation to the LF, specifically the matrix and logic were also criticised, as such features and 
attributes symbolised a `logic-less frame' (an illusion of logic is provided); ‘lack-frame' (an 
omission of vital aspects of a project) and `lock- frames (programme learning and adaptation 
are blocked) (Gasper, 2000b).  
Efforts to remake processes behind the LF and the LF itself arose, mainly to include forms of 
participation from community stakeholders and establish a link to other tools such as process-
based tools including the objective analysis tree17 (Aune, 2000).  As such, even though NGOs 
may still be required to use the LF, features of it were mobilised in different ways, from 
technical (blueprint) to open-ended (process). This is also reflective of PCI’s attitude of 
neutrality present in the matrix.   
This section highlighted the growth of expertise and the spread of the LF from USAID to other 
development agencies and NGOs. It further noted ways in which perceptions around the 
attributes of the LF shifted in line with changes in evaluation attitudes and demands. It lastly 
focused on how the LF was part of larger reporting processes for NGOs and how it was received 
and altered by the users.  
 
                                                 
17 Objective Analysis Tree is a project planning tool that helps to analyse and graphically break down objectives 
into smaller and more manageable parts 
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Discussion  
 
 
This chapter provided insights on the origins of the LF and its evolution within the field of 
evaluation. Notions of progress and experience were monopolised by politics, disciplines of 
science and management as well as the desire for a ‘system’. In addition, shifts within 
international development in the late 1950s and the creation of the organisation USAID in the 
1960s were closely connected to the desire for diverse expertise and supported the underwriting 
of technical characteristics in the LF.  
 
This chapter first explored how the distinction of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ countries 
spurred an effort to measure a nation’s progress, mainly from an economic standpoint. At the 
same time, the ability to intervene in a nation’s affairs was increasingly framed as capital and 
infrastructure projects. The ‘project’ gained traction as an administrative unit meant to facilitate 
the improvement of management practices for development intervention. Through development 
as projects, management and scientific expertise such as planning (see Drori, 2006)  were 
applied to foreign assistance efforts, a move reflective of political concerns around effectiveness 
of aid. By bringing new expertise into newly formed institutions such as USAID, a concern over 
the state of evaluation and the inability to access evaluator experiences of development projects 
arose. At this juncture, the effort to formalise evaluations could be viewed as means to 
democratize practices and engage stakeholders by providing avenues for evaluator participation 
which were otherwise absence (see Porter, 1995; 1996).  
 
The state of evaluations and the failure to communicate experience was framed as a problem in 
USAID. As such, efforts to assess evaluator experiences from varying backgrounds was 
undertaken, This led to the creation of the LF under a Fry Associates consulting contract. 
Similar to observations by Miller (1998), the LF’s ability to mix different disciplines – science 
and management – supported its uptake. This is also in line with the observation that changes 
within accounting occur in multiple sites and within arenas for action (Miller, 1998; Robson, 
1991).  
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However, the frame and logic of the LF operated in the domain of evaluation under a paradox 
of being perceived as both simple and complex. For example, the LF was viewed as something 
that could be taught to anyone as an accessible and user-friendly document, regardless of 
training or previous experience. Yet, at the same time, the LF’s creators presented it as an 
evaluation device driven by science and management with a per-set logic. This observation adds 
to our understanding of how evaluation devices, and accounting more generally, gain traction 
by reaching wider audiences through an open-ended format which is simultaneously simple yet 
complex.  In addition, the framing of the LF as a ‘neutral instrument’ speaks to its ability to be 
void of experience (i.e. neutral) and also constrain experiences of the evaluator. This illustrates 
how perceptions of neutrality and formality can create space, sites or arenas for action. 
Relatedly, Jordan & Messner’s (2010) found that a combination of flexible (incomplete) and 
inflexible (complete) performance indicators are desirable for managers. In this light, part of 
the pervasiveness and uptake of the LF was linked to an interplay of constrained malleability 
and ‘free’ interpretations.  
 
Overall, this chapter demonstrates how attributes of neutrality and formality of the LF evolved 
in response to larger political demands and shifts within international development. It also 
suggests that in taking over categories of experience and progress, neutrality and formality of 
the LF was mobilised in different ways, first as a way to access experiences of evaluators and, 
later, as a reference point to evaluate development and NGOs.  
 
In relation to the remainder of this thesis, this chapter introduced attributes of the LF associated 
with concepts of neutrality and formality, mainly its mixed origins and technical paradoxes. It 
also demonstrated that perceptions towards neutrality and formality shifted over time. In part, 
efforts of neutrality and formality permitted spaces of expression and action – whether it be for 
an evaluator in USAID or an NGO such as Sarvodaya. The next chapter will provide an 
overview of Sarvodaya and methodology used for fieldwork.  
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3 BACKGROUND AND METHODS 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of key events in Sri Lanka in relation to the role of Sarvodaya 
during the civil conflict and within post-conflict development efforts. It also outlines the 
qualitative research strategy used at Sarvodaya from 2011 to 2013.  
 
Background  
 
 
Sri Lanka: Sowing the Seeds for a Fragmented Society  
 
Sri Lanka is a small pear-shaped island off the southern coast of India. Since the early 16th 
century, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British colonised the island respectively, with the 
British colonising the entire island in 1815 (Wilson, 1988). Sri Lankan independence in 1948 is 
thought to be a by-product of Indian independence, as the transition from colony to nation-state 
is notably one of the most peaceful in world history. Through decolonisation and subsequent 
political shifts, the official name changed from Ceylon to the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka. However, the current boundaries of Sri Lanka’s nine provinces and twenty-five 
districts were kept intact, which is today still evident in the crude separations between regions 
and peoples and thus setting the stage for communal tensions. 
Sri Lanka is little in land mass, but has a population of 21 million and a density of 323 per 
square kilometre according to the World Bank, much higher than that of the UK for example. 
Except for the Veddas, there are no ‘indigenous’ Sri Lankans – all were settlers, with their 
histories tied to numerous cultures and to merchant trades. The current Sri Lankan society is a 
Rubik’s cube of cross-cutting languages, religions, ethnicities and castes. Most Sri Lankans 
subscribe to one of four religions: Buddhism (69.1%), Islam (7.6%), Hinduism (7.1%) and 
Christianity (6.2%) (CIA, 2012). Sinhalese, the majority ethnic group, form 73% of this 
population with the remainder comprising of Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils, Muslims, 
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Malays and Burgers. Subscription to the caste system varies per ethnic group, for example, 
Tamils inherit a delineation tied to Hinduism. There are, however, caste equivalents between 
ethnicities and, overall, social mobility is not hindered by caste. These differences, and their 
endless combinations, nurtured a fragmented Sri Lankan society that provided a fertile ground 
for decades of civil strife post-independence.  
Discernible ethnic rifts came soon after independence in the form of the Citizenship and 
Franchise Acts of 1948 and 1949, which stripped citizenship from Indian-Tamils (Daniel, 
1996). In 1956, the Language Act claimed Sinhalese as the sole official language, stipulating 
that all Tamils in civil service must learn Sinhalese in three years or face retirement (de Silva, 
1993). Though ethnic tensions were rising, the first case of mass civil unrest was decidedly an 
issue of class and caste. In 1971, disenfranchised Sinhalese university students and sympathetic 
soldiers rose against the government in a Marxist insurrection led by the Janatha Vimukti 
Peramuna (JVP), also known as the ‘Che Guevarists’ (Pebbles, 2006). The first insurrection led 
to the closure of schools, hospitals, police stations and a halt to other essential services, claiming 
thousands of lives. In response, the government instated a six-year emergency period, during 
which the JVP went into hiding and re-emerged as a legitimised political party. 
In 1972, the government adopted a new republican constitution, renaming the country as ‘Sri 
Lanka’ from the colonial name of Ceylon and removing numerous constitutional protections for 
minorities and checks on government power. In that same year, in response to the JVP 
insurrection, the government passed the Universities Act, which enforced ethnic quotas for 
university admissions that demanded significantly higher marks from Tamils than from 
Sinhalese. In combination with civil service restrictions, Tamils were increasingly in a worse 
position than their Sinhalese counterparts and shut out from the lucrative civil service. In 
response, throughout the 1970s, Tamil militant groups sprung up to protest against this 
discrimination. Their outbursts fell on deaf political ears as there were no strong Tamil parties 
in the government which was increasingly becoming Sinhalese-only. If anything, the situation 
worsened as clandestine acts of militant violence were met with disproportionate government 
retaliation. Then ethnic tensions, after almost a decade of uneasy existence, rose to a boiling 
point in 1983 (Pebbles, 2006).  
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On July 22, 1983, a group of Tamil militants called the Liberation of Tamil Tigers of Eelam 
(LTTE), ambushed and murdered an army patrol of thirteen soldiers, all of whom were 
Sinhalese. In response, Tamil communities and businesses were targeted by Sinhalese mobs, 
leading to mass riots mostly in the Colombo area; an episode now remembered in both 
communities as ‘Black July’ (Harrison, 2003). The government’s slow reaction to defend 
minority communities, insistent mass looting and an estimated 400 to 3,000 death toll led to a 
large exodus of Tamils abroad as well as fostered greater support for the LTTE and its 
recruitment amongst Tamils (Acharya, 2007). In addition, the call for a separate Tamil 
homeland ‘Eelam’ came to the forefront, forming the basis for the future operations of the 
LTTE.  The LTTE’s fight for a separate nation would drive Sri Lanka into one of Asia’s longest 
running civil conflicts, a war fought both on Sri Lankan soil and through LTTE networks in 
diaspora communities aboard. Later, segments of this one million strong Tamil diaspora would 
assist in financing the war, at times through NGOs, and circulating LTTE rhetoric across the 
globe.  
The 1980s tested Sri Lanka’s capacity to be ‘a nation’, as the government faced a full blown 
civil conflict with the Tamil LTTE in the North and a second insurrection from the Sinhalese 
Marxist JVP in the South (Rajasingham, 2003).  Complicating the situation, India took a 
duplicitous interest in Sri Lankan affairs. After 1983, Tamil militia were being trained in the 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu and, when violence persisted, Sri Lanka signed the Indo-Sri Lanka 
Peace Keeping Accord (1987-1990) at India’s behest. The accord aimed to disarm militia groups 
in the North through Indian peacekeepers rather than Sri Lankan soldiers who retreated from 
their barracks in the North to quell the insurrection in the South. By late 1987, the peace accord 
broke down as Indians were challenged by Tamil militias in the North and the East, whilst the 
government furiously fought the insurrection in the South (Rajasingham, 2003).  
By the 1990s, the government had squashed the southern insurrection, but the LTTE remained 
at large in the North as the Indian forces withdrew from Sri Lanka.  Tens of thousands of lives 
were lost, some of whom were key political figures. For example, the Sri Lankan President 
Ranasinghe Premadasa (1994) and the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi (1991) were killed 
by LTTE suicide bombers (BBC, 2012c). In the subsequent years, the resulting social, economic 
and cultural instability prompted a ‘brain drain’ of professionals and academics and further 
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asylum seeking in Western countries. In the North and some areas in the East, the LTTE took 
control over Tamil society and, in turn, replaced government administrative structures and 
services with their own.  
In the midst of this social unrest, there were two periods of peace, in 1994 as the government 
changed hands after seventeen years and, most notably, in 2001 with the signing of a Cease Fire 
Agreement brokered by Norway (BBC, 2012b). The terms of the ceasefire included establishing 
a Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which composed of representatives from Nordic countries 
(BBC, 2002). However, after a stalemate in peace talks and persistent militia attacks, the 
government unilaterally abrogated the agreement in 2008 (Fernando, 2008).  
Afterwards, the government relentlessly fought the LTTE; ignoring international pressure for 
ceasefires, disregarding claims of genocide and forging new international alliances. Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, the President of Sri Lanka elected in 2005, was credited for this shift in approach. 
In May 2009, the government declared an end to the civil war following the death of LTTE’s 
leadership. Regrettably, the last battles for LTTE strongholds in Kilinochchi and surrounding 
Northern cities were some of the bloodiest, with an estimated 40,000 death toll in five months 
(Harrison, 2012). The number of lives lost on both sides remains unknown; some report there 
were 100,000 deaths during the entire conflict, and others inflate or deflate the amount 
depending on the interests of the source (Harrison, 2012).  
Post-conflict, turmoil in Sri Lanka did not subside. Sinhalese cheers and public celebrations at 
the conclusion of the conflict were seen as jabs that proved an enduring undercurrent of 
hostilities. Tensions spilled into Sinhalese and Tamils communities abroad and self-proclaimed 
diaspora ‘Lankan (Sinhalese) Lions’ and ‘Tamil Tigers’ clashed; in some instances throwing 
acid, machetes and firebombs against each other (Macey, 2009). In addition, the government 
itself started to show cracks, as General Sarath Fonseka, the chief military commander during 
the conflict, was detained in 2010 on accusations of implicating the government in war crimes, 
treason and harbouring fugitives (BBC, 2012b). Rumours of corruption circulated, as Rajapaksa 
filled key positions with his relations and continued to benefit from the largest appointment of 
cabinet ministers in world history, 52 just in 2005 (Perera, 2012; World Records, 2008). 
One formal government response to quell international concerns was the Lessons Learnt 
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).  The LLRC was established as an independent inquiry 
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committee, a government effort after the conflict that was to be on par with international 
investigations. It was an in-country assessment of “the conflict phase and the sufferings the 
country has gone through as a whole” (LLRC, 2012). In March 2012, the 285 LLRC 
recommendations gained international legitimacy as they were endorsed over the Report of the 
Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka at the 19th United Nations 
Human Rights Council session. The home-grown approach is not without its critics, however. 
Amnesty International stated that the LLRC ignores “serious evidence of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and other violations of the laws of war by government forces” (TamilNet, 
2011). The Tamil National Alliance, the largest political party representing Tamils, has called 
for an international “accountability mechanism” for the implementation of the LLRC itself 
(TamilNet, 2011).  
In short, decades of post-independence tensions, even after the end of the civil conflict, are part 
and parcel in Sri Lanka (Figure 3). The conflict, though no longer physically manifest, is taking 
root in political avenues, some of which, like the LLRC, span into international arenas. The 
post-conflict scenario is riddled with mistrust and gaps in administration between the 
government and communities based in conflict-affected regions in the North and East. 
Overnight, the Tamil people in these regions found themselves under the purview of the Sri 
Lankan government, after decades of LTTE administration.  
In this context, local and international NGOs acted as a bridge between government and 
community interests. Yet, NGO involvement was also a source of tension, as there were 
government concerns that foreign NGOs previously supported the LTTE, and as such would 
prompt communities to mobilise against the government under the banner of human rights and 
good governance in post-conflict efforts.  With respect to these concerns, the military demanded 
that NGOs submit to government reviews and seek approvals when conducting projects in the 
North and East of Sri Lanka. For instance, in the North, the ‘Presidential Task Force’ (PTF), a 
government-appointed committee, has the authority to deny NGO entrance and, even after 
approval, change fundamental project details such as the lists of beneficiaries and activities.  
Similarly, a deep sense of mistrust of government interventions and administration has taken 
hold of communities in conflict-affected areas. Not only were communities cut off from 
government rule for nearly thirty years, but also post-conflict actions by the government – in 
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the setup of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps for instance – did not foster trust. After 
the conflict, IDP camps functioned not only to shelter displaced communities, but also to 
systematically vet Tamils under conditions of restricted mobility, limited international access 
and high levels of government surveillance.  
In this post-conflict scenario, gaps between government administration and communities 
continue to persist. Local NGOs, which are simultaneously able to reach communities and ease, 
to some extent, government restrictions are of importance (see Walton, 2008).  Sarvodaya was 
the largest such NGO in Sri Lanka.  
 
Sarvodaya: Reaching the People by Being Local  
 
Founded in 1958, Sarvodaya is the oldest surviving and largest grassroots people’s movement 
and NGO in Sri Lanka. It started as a small-scale tuition project between an urban school and 
rural villages and, by the 1960s, had developed into a village movement within Sri Lanka. Led 
by Ahangamage Tudor (A.T) Ariyaratne, the development model of Sarvodaya focused on 
people’s participation and evolved over time to include religious and revolutionary teachings of 
Buddhism and Mahatma Gandhi.  
The development model also promoted a holistic approach, whereby development was defined 
as a spiritual, moral, cultural and economic ‘awakening’. The concept of awakening was 
introduced by Ariyaratne. To ‘awaken’ was, in part, to link village efforts to broader policy 
interventions at the national and global level. As the movement grew, it advocated for a 
traditional decentralised form of governance that focused on village-level sustainability and 
independence, ‘the gama’18. It also established a network of localised centres for the delivery 
of projects across Sri Lanka. By the 1980s, given its history, reputation and alternative 
development model, foreign donors started to fund Sarvodaya chiefly as an avenue for reaching 
                                                 
18 Pre-colonisation, the basic unit for social organisation was the ‘gama’. Gama was a land tenure system, whereby 
large single castes would inhabit an area and preform their allocated occupation. Later these units, also known as 
‘the village’, became the chief building unit to ensure law and order. During colonisation, there were efforts to 
centralise power so as to make the diverse territories of Sri Lanka administrable. This led to disruption of the 
previous de-centralised distribution of power under the kings. Post-colonisation, there was an effort to bring 
ownership back to the village level with the re-establishment of government Gramasevaks, village leaders.  
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disconnected communities in conflict-affected regions. At this juncture, foreign funding also 
introduced the widespread use of reports and accountability frameworks into Sarvodaya 
(Chapter 4).  
From the start of the civil conflict in 1983, not only did the movement have access to cut off 
communities through their own local networks, but it was also able to build self-organised 
forums for community leaders, one of which was called the ‘Peoples Declaration on Peace and 
National Harmony’. The forum resulted in a peace declaration signed by community leaders 
and in addition, a separate approach and dedicated programme called the 3R– Relief, 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. The 3R programme partnered with other sections of 
Sarvodaya, yet focused on conflict resolution and worked mainly within communities in the 
North and East of Sri Lanka.  
That said, the movement also maintained a dialogue with government officials, which at times, 
was not easy given the political shifts and periods of unrest experienced in Sri Lanka. For 
instance, in the 1990s, the government viewed the founder of Sarvodaya as a political threat and 
perceived the movement’s village level discourse as tied to the JVP insurrection. Even still, the 
presentation of the movement as ‘local’ and ‘Sri Lankan’, rather than a foreign or international-
based organisation, has permitted it certain operational benefits. In relation to the civil war, the 
NGO was able to maintain its network of village centres and permitted access to areas restricted 
to other international NGOs. Furthermore, post-conflict, the government is not scrutinising 
Sarvodaya to the same extent as international NGOs in the PTF (Ib-11). Post-conflict, as a 
networked movement and a local NGO, some international agencies, NGOs and foundations 
such as NORAD (Chapter 5), Oxfam and the European Union (Chapter 6) have funded 
Sarvodaya development efforts in the North and East of Sri Lanka.  
For the purpose of this thesis, Sarvodaya is an ideal site to study dimensions of conflict in NGOs 
and the mobilisation of neutrality and formality in evaluation devices such as the LF. Given its 
history, the NGO has witnessed and been involved in the trials of the civil conflict (1983 – 
2009), the Marxist uprisings (1971, 1987) and the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), which have 
spurred on a vibrant and controversial NGO environment as well as donor interest (Figure 5). 
The nature and possible sources of conflict are evident in numerous ways and seen in: (1) the 
divide between local movement narratives tied to an alternative development model (as opposed 
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to foreign-led accountability frameworks); (2) the outright call for restoration of a fragmented 
society post conflict; and, (3) the need to coordinate a localised network of projects which 
operate within a larger paradigm of development.  
For examining the attributes of neutrality and formality tied to the LF, Sarvodaya presents a 
long and well documented history of development projects to study.  
 
 
Figure 5: Sri Lanka and Sarvodaya Timeline 
 
The next section will outline specific methods used to craft each of the following three chapters. 
 
Methods  
 
This thesis is based on sixty-nine in-depth interviews, eighteen meetings and participation 
observations over a three-year period with field staff, senior management and donors in 
Sarvodaya (Table 2). In addition, over five hundred pieces of archival material and project 
documents from Sarvodaya were collected and reviewed19.  
 
                                                 
19 For a full list of meeting and interviews conducted, see Annex 5. Documents referenced in this thesis are listed 
by type (archival historical documents and projects) in Annex 6.  
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Table 2: Summary of Fieldwork Interviews and Meetings 
 
The majority of this thesis is based on a case study of Sarvodaya (Chapter 4-6). This NGO is an 
ideal site for examining dimensions of conflict as well as exploring the use of the LF ‘in action’ 
as mentioned above. Noted by Miles & Huberman (1994), cases are determined by 
“phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (p. 25). Parameters of this case (i.e. 
geographic location, legal status, staff expertise etc.) set the possibilities of investigation within 
the NGO’s network and limited the scope of this thesis to selected projects which used the LF 
(see Stake, 1995). Similar to Covaleski et al's 1998 study of professionalism in major accounting 
firms, exploring the use of the LF in this manner helped to uncover and comprehend the 
‘substantive domain’ of the LF, rather than “examining the efficacy of certain theories or using 
particular research methods” (p. 305). Yet evaluation devices were neither treated as fixed nor 
stable. Within the LF’s substantive domain, underlying realities were viewed as “emergent, 
subjectively created, and objectified through human interaction” (Chua, 1986, p. 615). 
 
Collection: Field Visits and the Research-Work Dynamic  
 
To collect data, fieldwork was scheduled in four visits for extended periods from 2011 to 2013 
(Table 3). The timing and length of visits were influenced by the availability of staff within the 
NGO, the presence and timeline of projects that used the LF (i.e. project year-ends, donor review 
Phase 1             
December 2011
Phase 2                   
May to July 2012 
Phase 3                    
July to August 2013
Phase 4                         
December 2013 
Total          
(by type)
Executive staff 1 8 7 16
Project staff 1 13 13 1 28
District staff 3 2 5
Village level 6 6
Donors 3 2 5
Government 4 1 5
Other NGOs 1 1 2 4
Total interviews (by phase) 6 31 24 8 69
Meetings (by phase) 10 8 18
Sarvodaya 
Associated with Sarvodaya 
 68 
 
meetings, new project proposals accepted etc.) and personal constraints (i.e. teaching 
commitments, exam marking, university term dates etc.).  
 
Field Visit Period Purpose/Main activities 
1 
 
2 weeks  Surveyed possible field sites  
 Performed preliminary interviews with public and third sector 
agencies  
 Established contacts with Sarvodaya 
2 
 
3 months  Based in the project department of Sarvodaya in headquarters 
 Travelled throughout the North and East on project visits  
 Worked closely with project-based staff in Sarvodaya 
3 
 
2 months  Resumed previous function in the project department of 
Sarvodaya in headquarters 
 Travelled throughout the North and East on project visits  
 Liaised with executive staff and donors in Sarvodaya 
4 
 
2 weeks  Based in Sarvodaya Eastern district centre  
 Liaised with government agents and partner agencies within 
the Sarvodaya network in the East 
Table 3: Four Visits of Fieldwork 
 
Preliminary contacts and interviews were conducted in the first field visit and the following 
visits were used to gather the bulk of data collected. More specifically, visits two and three were 
for extended periods of time (2-3 months) and the final visit was to follow up on specific issues 
(i.e. interviews with government agents and staff in conflict-affected communities). That said, 
at a certain point data saturation in analysis took hold, where further collection became ‘counter-
productive’ and more evidence was not perceived to develop overall themes present in the data 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In this case, saturation became apparent when similar insights were 
given in interviews from one visit to the next and there was no new evidence available on project 
facts or uses of the LF in a specific context.  
In 2011, the initial visit was used to establish contacts in the Sri Lankan NGO sector, which 
eventually led to preliminary interviews with government officials and staff in NGOs. After the 
first visit, research access was granted from the executive director of Sarvodaya and, as part of 
the arrangement, two roles were undertaken for future visits, that of a ‘researcher’ and ‘worker’ 
based in the Projects Department within the Sarvodaya headquarters in Moratuwa.  
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Under this dual role, the opportunity to work with staff in their head office, travel to project 
sites, review project reports and even attend traditional NGO-led ceremonies facilitated an in-
depth understanding of the NGO’s operations and culture. Such research and work-orientated 
fieldwork cultivated “a period of shared practical experience between the participant observer 
and the ethnography’s subjects during which they had occasion to share at least aspects of a 
way of life” (Ahrens & Mollona, 2007, p. 312). Based at an office desk in the project 
department, the researcher was privy to conversations and joined the rhythm of the department 
and Sarvodaya. She was treated like a member of staff and travelled to distant project sites, 
sometimes leaving at 3:00am for an 8-10 hour drive to the North and East, and after a long 
drive, working on arrival in each project site only to leave the same or next day. At headquarters, 
she participated in Sarvodaya customs such as ‘tea time’ and saying brother (ayya) and sister 
(akka) when addressing other staff.   
Notably, the sharing of experiences during fieldwork was enhanced and eased by the 
researcher’s own cultural heritage as ‘Sri Lankan’. In some instances, pre-existing first-hand 
knowledge of social perceptions and norms around family, work, women and even etiquette 
were applicable in fieldwork. The researcher was also perceived in varying lights in the field. 
Some saw her as a fellow countryman belonging to ethnic, family and religious traditions 
predating her. Others saw her as a distant Westerner and, in the words of locals, an ‘old coconut’ 
with a brown outer layer yet white inside. In many ways, she was what Weston (1997) deemed 
a ‘Native Ethnographer’, “someone who moves, more or less uneasily, between two fixed 
positions or worlds… a hybrid who collapses the subject/object distinction” (p. 168). During 
fieldwork, being treated as native often put participants at ease and allowed the researcher to be 
accepted in formal and informal circles of work, friendship and family. Conversely in some 
instances, the researcher was isolated from others due to uneasiness from the perception of being 
western or being from the Sinhalese majority ethnicity.  
In many ways the research-work dynamic and the level of familiarity with the staff and 
organisation supported the identification of interviewees, allowed meeting attendance and 
provided unhindered access to archival and project documents. This study benefited from such 
exposure to Sarvodaya headquarters and their district offices. To supplement interviews, 
meetings and documents, a record of experiences was also kept by the researcher in the form of 
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photographs, handwritten notes (seven journals) and a typed journal (nearly one hundred pages) 
(see Spardley, 1980).  
In relation to interviews, the Director of Projects often referred interviewees and permitted the 
recording of meetings. Many interviews were also obtained through a snowballing effect, as 
interviewees were asked to suggest others (see Barman, 2007). Interviews were semi-structured 
and were conducted in diverse settings, from boardrooms to underneath trees, and lasted 
anywhere from 15 minutes to 2 hours.  
In preparation for interviews, a general guide was used (Annex 7). Yet, in the interviews 
themselves questions were asked based on real-time reactions and experience of the respondent. 
Overall, the approach used for interviewing was to probe on processes, rationales and histories 
on procedures, reports and other emerging devices around the LF so as to reach beyond party 
line interviewee accounts of what procedures and such ‘should be’ (Power, 2011). At the start 
of interviews a brief description of the researcher/research was given and then a request for 
permission to record the interview was made. At this juncture, the researcher presented herself 
as a novice, keen to learn from the experiences of the interviewee so as to deter interviewees 
from seeking validation from the researcher in the interview.  In the words of Van Maaen 
(2011), an approach of ‘childlike ignorance’ was used in interviews. This was done by asking 
interviewees for definitions of taken-for-granted evaluation concepts, drawings of the LF and 
even to walk through project documents and to explain sections of text or diagrams.  
In total, sixty-nine interviews were conducted and eighteen meetings were attended, some of 
which were in local languages of Sinhala or Tamil. As such, in some cases a translator was used. 
All interviews were transcribed, either by the researcher or a transcription service. Interviews 
transcribed by a third party were reviewed for accuracy and consistency.  
As for archives and documents, Sarvodaya had their own library with project, organisation 
documents and media dating back to the 1960s. Some staff also had their own personal libraries, 
sheets and reports they had collected over their years of service. For instance, the Executive 
Director had a collection of monitoring and evaluation materials from conferences, donors, the 
government and in-house productions. For reviewing archives, photocopies and pictures were 
taken of annual reports, financial statements, monitoring and evaluation documents, speeches 
and consultant overviews. Permission was granted to review and make electronic copies of 
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project documents such as government approval forms and letters, proposals, statistical reports, 
monitoring and evaluation formats etc. as a member of staff in the projects department.  
 
Analysis: From Field Collection to Reflection  
 
For collection and analysis, no prior theoretical framework was formally used. Collecting and 
analysing data was continuous and based on an “iterative process of moving back and forth 
between empirical data and emerging analysis [in an effort to make] the collected data 
progressively more focused and the analysis successively more theoretical” (Bryant & Charmaz, 
2010, p.1). Such on-going reflection is consistent with numerous qualitative studies in 
accounting (see Ahrens & Chapman, 2006).  
In respect to such processes and attributes of iteration, the collection and analysis of evidence 
occurred simultaneously and between field visits. For example, after interviews were conducted, 
reflections on how statements by interviewees fit or contradicted other accounting studies or 
theoretical frameworks that encompassed evidence thus far were written down in journals. In 
this way, collection and analysis occurred as an interplay amongst gathering, coding and memo 
writing to form on-going data driven themes, rather than fitting within a pre-set and highly 
structured paradigm of coding (see Glaser, 1992).  
As for analysis of interviews, participant observations and archives, reflection and synthesis of 
accounts was on-going and ‘messy’ (see Kornberger et al, 2011). Though there were three 
distinct forms of collection, analysis moved between sources. For example, facts and themes in 
interviews were cross-checked with observations and archives. On the other hand, observations 
and familiarity cultivated in the field informed questions asked in interviews and hinted at 
archives available. As such, collection and analysis were intertwined.  
That said, there were some nuances of how each source was distilled. For transcribed interviews, 
the researcher read through for facts, for example the NGO’s history and project start dates, and 
recurring themes. Here, themes were based on factors such as frequency in using catchwords, 
consistent citing of issues and affinity to other interviews, observations and archives. During 
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each field visit, themes emerged, and in cases where the same interviewee was interviewed 
multiple times, the researcher reviewed for changes in facts and outlooks. For themes, there was 
an implicit coding process, a gradual reduction of pages of material (see O’Dwyer, 2004) 
through reading (and re-reading) interviews and revisiting themes often. Identified themes 
extracted from interviews were compiled and summarised with key quotes into a Word 
document to review for ‘big picture’ categories of behaviour and attitudes (O’Dwyer, 2004). 
All interviews and summaries were printed out and stored in binders organised by phase. Within 
each binder, interviews were arranged by staff or non-staff positions (i.e. separate tabs for 
executives and the government).  
As for observations, memos, journals and pictures, they were stored in chronological order as 
hard and soft copies. Notes and thoughts were referenced during collection and analysis, and at 
times, were a reminder of the field away from the field. Additionally, archives collected were 
sorted by type (i.e. annual reports, consultant documents, media etc.) and within each type, 
materials were arranged chronologically.  
In this study, the iterative generation of themes eventually resulted in a ‘fit’ between empirics 
and social theories (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). Fit, however, was a product of an on-going 
reflective process (Klag & Langley, 2013). Generated themes, in turn, were gathered and written 
into the three following chapters. Overall, data and theories teased out contributions around the 
mechanics of assimilation, resistance and eventual reinvention of accounting within a grassroots 
movement (Chapter 4), ways in which accounting, via the LF, can facilitate forms of mediation 
between historically warring groups (Chapter 5) and become an artefact to be displayed 
(Chapter 6).  
As for challenges, the way in which evidence was collected had to be sensitised to thirty plus 
years of war, which interviewees and participants may have endured. For example, at the start 
of an interview, asking directly about the civil conflict was not well received and could make 
interviewees uncomfortable since revealing their political views could have social costs. The 
researcher navigated such issues through continued field visits for extended periods of time, 
which fostered familiarity and trust. Participants were also ensured of their anonymity in 
interviews. Limitations of this study include the researcher’s own inability to speak and read in 
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Sinhala or Tamil and difficulty to consistently reach all project sites in remote areas of Sri 
Lanka.  
 
Methods of Forthcoming Chapters  
 
Though inspired by data and analysis described above, each chapter is informed by their specific 
methods.    
The next chapter is based mainly on archival research in Sarvodaya headquarters. By reviewing 
over fifty documents from over the past fifty years, mention of the ‘donor consortium’ in 1985 
kept propping up as a theme. The event was of interest not only because it marked a massive 
expansion in funds and services but also because it documented attitudes towards the 
consortium, which went from hopeful to dismissive as time progressed. Writing often referred 
to notions of accountability and the need for reporting as well as a dichotomy between the 
‘movement’ and ‘organisation’ of Sarvodaya. As such, the researcher was interested in 
pathways ‘made’ for the LF to be introduced and ‘travel’ within Sarvodaya, especially within 
these dual identities of the movement and organisation. After identifying the consortium as an 
event of interest, staff with long service records (some being involved with Sarvodaya since 
1958) were identified and approached for an interview. Additionally, names of donor 
consultants and NGO staff listed in archival material were contacted and interviewed (if 
available) and a freedom of information request was put forward to the major consortium donor 
(CIDA) for documents related to the event. After the general theme of the consortium had been 
identified (and additional data collected), sub-themes were created within empirics related to 
the donor consortium.  
The next two chapters are based on post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction projects in 
Sarvodaya. The choice to write in this fashion was motivated by the ability to trace, understand 
and comment on ways the LF moved in a particular unit of action, that of a project, for its 
design. It was an effort to further explore and trace emerging themes of reconciliation (Chapter 
5) and displaying (Chapter 6) within projects 
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Both chapters focus on post-conflict development projects in the North and East of Sri Lanka. 
Yet, chapter 5 focuses on the mechanics of reconciliation and rebuilding through the LF in 
multiple projects while chapter 6 drills into one multi-year project and ways in which 
commonality is cultivated (or not) through the LF amongst eight partner NGOs, the host 
(Oxfam) and donor (European Union).  
For each chapter, hundreds of pages of project documents (i.e. proposals, budgets, LFs, 
monitoring frameworks, evaluation reports, PowerPoint presentations etc.) were reviewed and 
staff associated with each project interviewed. Interviews were conducted with staff at both 
‘national’ and ‘local’ levels given that projects were administrated by Sarvodaya headquarters 
yet work within conflict-affected communities was done by district and village-level centres in 
the North and East of Sri Lanka. 
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4     THE 1985 DONOR CONSORTIUM: THE STRATEGIC USE OF ACCOUNTABILITIES  
 
This chapter examines an event – the 1985 donor consortium - which propelled the grassroots 
people’s movement of Sarvodaya into a formal discourse of accountability. Typically, studies 
on accountability frame such formal and external efforts as ‘crowding out’ home-grown NGO 
ideals and practices of accountability (see: O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008; Dixon, 2007). This 
chapter argues that externally driven mechanisms and frameworks can be strategically used by 
internal actors to communicate and protect indigenous accounts and notions of accountability. 
In other words, formal and external accounts act as a conduit to ‘crowd in’ internal or local 
accountability cultures into stakeholder and management discussions. In this chapter, formality 
is understood as the structural difference between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ actors and neutrality 
is framed as the managerialisation of movement practices. In addition, this episode embodies 
how conflicts between internal and external actors arise through political, economic and cultural 
differences.  
To make sense of accountability in the NGO context, studies have explored where 
accountability calls originate from (internally from within the NGO versus externally driven by 
donors) and the directions for which information on accountability flows (upward to external 
actors or downward within the NGO or community network) (O’Dywer & Unerman, 2008; 
Ebrahim, 2002; 2003; 2005). Origins and directions of accountability have become an analytical 
window to study the concept and effects of accountability. Ebrahim (2003) studied five 
mechanisms of accountability – disclosure/reports, performance assessment and evaluation, 
participation, social audits and self-regulation – and found that processes and tools integrated 
and emphasized different kinds of accountability. For example, disclosures and reports meant 
to increase NGO oversight enabled upward accountability to donors, yet limited the potential 
for downward accountability.  In contrast, the process of participation supported downward 
accountability, rather than solely upward to donors. Notably, mechanisms supported multiple 
kinds of accountability (i.e. upward or downward), yet Ebrahim (2003) illustrated that 
mechanisms often favoured one over the other. In essence, kinds of accountability sought – 
internal, external, upward, and downward – have come to possess distinct features and are 
examined as divergent from a dominating or passive ‘other’, i.e. internal versus external or 
upward versus downward.  
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In this vein, target ‘audiences’, benefactors and the scope of accountability were associated with 
choices and trade-offs made between cultivating internal or external accountability mechanisms 
and frameworks. According to O’Dwyer & Unerman (2008), externally driven accountability 
differs in depth, time-scale and stakeholder engagement from more internal mechanisms or 
cultures of accountability. In their study of Amnesty International, the former focused on a 
narrow set of ‘investors’ and used short term performance metrics to define and report on 
success/failure (hierarchical accountability) and the latter desired broader stakeholder 
discussions and involvement (holistic accountability). Yet, due to pressures to garner 
investments and demonstrate brand legitimacy, management was inclined to prioritise external 
accountability frameworks and extraordinary members as well as investors rather than their 
ordinary membership and internal management. This trend towards more hierarchical 
accountability mechanisms was found to ‘crowd out’ set internal cultures. For instance, external 
emphasis on marketing successes countered an established norm of not taking credit for 
activities. Taking credit, in opposition to their ‘culture reticence’, was viewed by some as 
counterproductive to the NGO’s mission as lobbied governments may want to reverse their 
decisions given greater public scrutiny and advertising. In this sense, the type of accountability 
pursued by an NGO – internal or external – affected operations and organisation culture of the 
NGO.  
Thus far, narratives of accountability set external and internal as dichotomous to the extent 
where each co-exist and potentially overtake or ‘crowd out’ the other. For example, Ebrahim 
(2002) found that NGOs essentially ran two distinct control systems as donor reports were 
completed as a ceremonial act and, in turn, a separate information channel for desirable 
information emerged to satisfy internal requirements. The notion even of ‘balanced’ integrated 
accountability mechanisms (see Ebrahim, 2003) assumed types of accountability are stable and 
fixed ingredients which can be weighted as standalone units. Such observations suggest greater 
attention is required around the art of mixing or mimicking concepts or processes between 
different types of accountability.  
To address this gap, Dar (2013) countered the ‘western’ and ‘non-western’ accountability 
dualism by exploring the hybridisation of western/non-western practices in an Indian NGO. The 
study found that the western system of writing reports in English simultaneously subjugated 
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and empowered local NGO workers. To cope with communicating accountability in a foreign 
language, locals develop a hybridised form of accountability which positioned western accounts 
and the ability to converse in English as a proxy for workers participate and excel in local 
management circles. In this case, western (external) accountability did not overtake non-western 
(internal) knowledge, it altered and reproduced power structures found in the western world 
within a local setting. In essence, internal forms of accountability took on features of external 
accountability. The case demonstrates the blurring of internal-external divides, yet fails to 
explore how external accounts can take on traits of internal forms of accountability.  
In this respect, Chung & Windsor (2012) found that local fables, customs and beliefs were 
important entry points for teaching villagers about accounting and financial systems.  In their 
case, accounting principles were effectively taught by relating core messages to chapters and 
verses in the bible. For locals, the bible and the ideal of being a ‘good’ Christian represented 
their own internal system of accountability. This is an example of how internal forms of 
accountability can be leveraged to convey external expectations, however, little is known about 
how external accountability can be ‘changed’ based on internal accounts. To date, studies 
present the treatment of internal accounts as comparatively inferior or as a means to represent 
external accountability in local eyes.  
This chapter contributes to the investigation of the blending of internal and external 
accountability, yet also argues that external accounts can be refashioned to represent internal 
demands and cultures. Building on O’Dwyer & Unerman (2008), this chapter suggests that 
hierarchical forms of accountability present in external accounts can be recast by internal and 
external stakeholders to not only become more holistic (i.e. engaging more stakeholders) but 
also to protect indigenous forms of accountability. Unlike O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008), while 
the effort to be more accountable to external actors may displace ways of engaging more 
stakeholders, this chapter shows that this displacement can be a temporary effect and that modes 
of external accountability can be used by internal actors to protect as well as forge avenues for 
‘bottom up’ forms of expression in external and formalised management spaces.  
As discussed in this chapter, the advent of the 1985 donor consortium marked a shift towards a 
single accountability framework in the grassroots people’s movement of Sarvodaya. The 
framework was a by-product of a coordinated effort by donors to normalise funding 
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arrangements and support the entire movement. The DC funded the movement to the tune of 20 
million USD through multi-year grants for a decade (Swift, 1999).  
Through the DC, evaluation devices within the accountability framework encountered 
narratives and accounts that the movement held of itself. This chapter explores the interaction 
between these two forms of accounts, one based on accountability and another based on a value-
driven philosophy. At this juncture, evaluation devices were remade by donors and Sarvodaya 
to represent local practices and philosophies held by the movement. Even though the consortium 
came to an end after a decade, blended representations of accountability from the DC era are 
still used within Sarvodaya today. In this case, internal actors leveraged external depictions of 
movement ideals strategically as to include local knowledge into management discussions.   
This chapter contributes to the literature on NGO accountability in three ways. First, it is a 
historical case on the emergence of accountability. The chapter focuses on an event which led 
to the solidification of accountability within an NGO, rather than treating the present of 
internal/external accountability as stable and fixed. To some extent, this chapter furthers 
O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008)’s examination of the introduction of an external accountability 
framework in Amnesty Ireland. This chapter builds upon such studies on the emergence of 
accountability frameworks within NGOs by examining accounts of a non-western NGO and 
exploring ways in which indigenous forms of accountability were fleshed out and re-fashioned 
through external frameworks of accountability.  
Secondly, the chapter explores the composition of ‘indigenous’ accounts. Even though the 
presence of ‘internal’ forms of knowledge has been noted in the literature (see: Dhar, 2013; 
Dixon, 1998), little is known about the dimensions and premise such a system of internal 
accountability depends on. This chapter pays more attention to local forms of accounting and 
accountability unfiltered by western frameworks, such as the sway of personal relationships and 
incorporation of spiritual guidance driving local action and sense of consequence.   
Thirdly, the chapter presents a case where external accountability ‘failed’ and was disbanded, 
yet internal actors continued to communicate internal values through external mechanisms of 
accountability. Even in the advent of failure, this chapter suggests that actors within tracks of 
accountability – whether they be internally generated or externally driven – can strategically 
use ‘the other’ or opposing form to support their own perspective or view of a dominant form 
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of accountability. The introduction of a coordinated external accountability framework provided 
visibility on the NGO’s own indigenous accounts and attitudes towards accountability and 
provided a formalised avenue to incorporate indigenous knowledge into a management space.  
The remainder of this chapter will discuss findings on the strategic use of external accountability 
framework requirements to incorporate and protect local/indigenous forms of accounting. The 
first sub-section will describe the narrative around the origins of the movement and organisation 
of the NGO. It will also detail the kinds of ‘accounts’ kept by the NGO derived from spiritual, 
social, cultural (and later) economic teachings within the NGO family-based network. The kinds 
of accounts created were diverse and used visual representations of accountability around 
notions of, for example, family, sharing and tradition. The next sub-section highlights how the 
introduction of the donor consortium in the mid-1980s, as a coordinated attempt to fund the 
entire NGO, drove new depictions and techniques of accountability to fit this particular donor 
concerns and NGO operating rationale. It will highlight how the previous accounts of the NGO 
were refitted within the grammar of external accountability and challenges associated with this. 
This section, similar to other studies on NGO accountability, does demonstrate the domineering 
effect of external forces, yet also emphases ways the external accountability framework 
attempted to become ‘bottom up’ by incorporating local knowledge and the NGO’s own internal 
mechanisms of accountability. Finally, the last section demonstrates that even conflict within 
and collapse of the donor consortium in the mid-1990s, vestiges of mixing local/internal and 
external accountability lives on within the NGO. And, unlike previous studies, this chapter 
argues that features of the once oppressive external accountability framework – numbers, 
process-based progressions, visuals representations, tables etc. – can potentially become 
strategic resources for NGOs to protect local/indigenous knowledge by including them into 
management and accountability discussions with donors. Overall, this chapter illustrates that 
lines between internal and external forms of accountability can blur and that even in the event 
of framework failure, local knowledge can be positioned strategically to reflect internal values, 
yet speak to external stakeholders.  
 
 
 80 
 
Local accounts: personality, visuals and personas of Sarvodaya  
 
Founded in 1958, Sarvodaya began as an informal network of voluntary action. It was viewed 
as an organic entity and was defined internally as:  
…a living, growing movement for non-violent social change that each year attracts a steadily 
increasing number of people who see in it a path to the awakening of themselves, their families and 
their communities to their own potential to improve their lives and those of their fellow human 
beings  (Db-4, p. 4) 
 
 Localised accounts of Sarvodaya centred on governing through personalities and personal 
relationships, spreading the movement through depictions and displays of philosophies and 
maintaining two separate, yet linked, personas ‘the movement’ and the ‘organisation’.  
The founder of Sarvodaya, Ariyaratne was a central figure. It was his role as a teacher in an 
urban secondary school and his underlying philosophies which laid the foundation for the 
‘movement’ as it is understood today. In 1958, the movement did not exist, it was only 
Ariyaratne and his conviction that “living with communities could transcend activities and 
things, such as education, classroom, books, exams and could become an all-embracing 
educational process” (Db-31, p.167). The exchange programme he started between secondary 
students and rural communities in the late 1950s grew into a country-wide movement which 
now conducts village led projects, from building schools to paving roads.   
The story of Ariyaratne’s life is equally the story of Sarvodaya. Within the movement, the 
founding rationale has been attributed to Ariyaratne. ‘He slept on village floors’, one member 
recalled, ‘he led by example and he paved the way for the rest of us’ (Ib-11). His voice and 
image has become a brand and symbol of Sarvodaya. He hosts mass gatherings with 
communities, the government and media, his speeches were turned into booklets in local and 
foreign languages for distribution and his photo adorned the hallways all Sarvodaya offices 
(Field Notes, 2012). In the 1970s, Ariyaratne’s house was used as the movement’s base and 
now his residence is located in the heart of headquarters, where jointly conducts movement 
activities and entertains guests in his home and headquarters (Field Notes, 2012). In essence, 
there was no physical or, as illustrated later on, ideological separation between the personality 
of Ariyaratne and the movement of Sarvodaya. 
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Similarly, Ariyaratne’s marriage and children are also part of the fabric and explanation of 
movement rationales. The ‘organic’ approach cited by the movement which explains its 
unfettered and unplanned expansion into new service areas and locations across Sri Lanka is 
linked to his family. For example, the decision to expand into children services was explained 
by members through a fable around one of Ariyaratne’s sons. The fable was told as: 
After a village shramadana, as Ariyaratne and his family were driving away they realised that one 
of their sons was not with them in the car. They were frantic. They drove back and the whole village 
started looking for his son. Still no sign of him, someone realised that his son was playing football 
with the other boys of the village. The other boys were poor. They had no shoes and played naked 
in the mud. To match the other boys’ situation, Ariyaratne’s son had removed all his clothes and 
became one of them. He was unrecognisable. This is the moment when Ariyaratne realised that all 
children are of the same blood with the same needs. This marked the start of children programming 
in Sarvodaya. (Field Notes, 2012)  
 
For members, the inclusion of children services was recalled and recognised through the eyes 
of Ariyaratne and his moment of inspiration rather than the act of starting a child programme, 
putting up a building or even registering a legal arm for children services. The fables around 
Ariyaratne’s life have been used to justify and describe management and programmatic 
decisions in Sarvodaya.  
Even the movement’s founding philosophies are attributable to Ariyaratne. In publicly available 
reports, beliefs of the movement have been described by members as ‘a magnanimous thought 
born in the mind of one human being’, Ariyaratne. Educated in Sri Lanka and in the West, the 
former school teacher developed a complex set of philosophies which include Buddhism, Sri 
Lankan traditions and Gandhism20.  
                                                 
20 The term ‘Sarvodaya’ originates from Ghandi’s interpretation of John Ruskin’s text on political economy, Undo 
This Last. “I am determined to change my life in accordance with the ideals of this book”, Ghandi stated, and he 
construed three essential lessons:  
1. That the good of the individual is tied to the good of all  
2. That the lawyer’s work has the share value as the barber as much as all have the same right of earning 
their livelihood from their work 
3. That a life of labour, i.e. the life of the tiller of the soil and the handicraftsman is the life worth living (p. 
29)  
Ghandi, invigorated by Ruskin’s thoughts and conclusions, commented: 
The first of these I knew. The second I had dimly realised. The third had never occurred to me. Undo This Last 
made is clear as daylight for me that the second and third were contained in the first. I arose with the dawn, ready 
to reduce these principles to practice” (p. 29). 
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Through Ariyaratne’s -proclamation and in name, Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka is an extension of 
Ghandi’s tradition. Rather than ‘uplift all’ or ‘welfare of all’, he tweaked the phrase to 
‘awakening of all’. The adjustment reflects the literal translation of Buddha’s title, ‘awakened 
one’ or ‘enlightened one’ (Db-34).). This inclusion of Buddhism, in name and works, is thought 
to mirror ingrained religious traditions in Sri Lanka dating back to 230 B.C. and the current 
prominence of Buddhism amongst the majority of Sri Lankans. Though there are religious 
undertones, Sarvodaya was open to all Sri Lankans regardless of ethnicity, caste, class or 
religion.  This is an important distinction in this context such identities have been used to fuel 
tensions between communities and even structure customs around marriage21 and employment. 
In this sense, the movement identity was designed to surpass all societal categories and 
functioned to counter existing divides. Ariyaratne sought to create a ‘new account’ of citizens, 
he noted: 
Don’t recognise [differences]. When they ask, “Are you Sinhalese, Tamil or a Muslim or a 
Christian?”, say “No, you are a human being”. Being a human being you have a body. What is a 
body? You have various organs and you reduce them to a basic minimum, and you are nothing but 
hardness, liquidity, air and heat in space. That is your body. (Ib-34) 
 
The overarching philosophy of being ‘human’ and elements was presented to bind members to 
a common existence, rather than contribute to ‘differences’ which had political, social and 
economic implications within Sri Lankan society.  
In the framework of being a human, Ariyaratne defined an awakening paradigm that framed 
and motived development. He described ‘levels of awakening’ that advance from ‘human 
personality’ to ‘human society’. These levels define works as intervening from the individual 
                                                 
In 1908, Ghandi translated and paraphrased Ruskin’s work into his native tongue, Gujarati. The title of the 
translation was Sarvodaya, a compound expression he created based on ancient Sanskrit roots: sarva (all) and udaya 
(uplift). ‘Uplift of all’ and ‘the welfare of all’ are the two interpretations used in Ghandi’s future writings. Infused 
with Ghandi’s ideals, the term transitioned from describing concepts of equality to becoming a ‘movement’ in 
Indian society. Sarvodaya movements, led by Ghandi’s followers propped up across India to facilitate a “fuller and 
richer concept of people’s democracy” (p. 30) post-independence.  
 
21 For example, distinctions were made between different ‘castes’ in Sri Lanka. Caste is a hereditary social structure 
which determines occupation and marriage prospects at birth. ‘Lower’ castes were not permitted to marry ‘higher’ 
castes and employment such as cleaning would be allotted to lower castes. The first ‘Sarvodaya’ effort in 1958 
was an exchange of students and teachers between an urban school and low caste village. This kind of mixing was 
unheard of at this time in Sri Lanka’s history (Fernando, 2008).  
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to the world, meaning that development is not a localised affair, it stretched beyond island 
boundaries. The levels are as follows: 
Paurushodaya, awakening of the human personality 
Kutumbodaya, awakening of the family 
Gramodaya, awakening of the village 
Nagarodaya, awakening of the city 
Deshodaya, awakening of the nation 
Vishvodaya, awakening of the universe  
‘Every human being has the potential to be awakened to reality’, Ariyaratne contended, and 
‘human beings and society should be awakened simultaneously at these levels’ (Db-34, p. 142). 
In each level, there are intellectual and spiritual capacities that work towards ‘moral, social, 
cultural, economic and political’ transformations. Thought of as a holistic approach, Ariyaratne 
further defines transformation characteristics, he listed:  
Moral 
Nobler level of human intra-personal relationships, where respect for all persons irrespective of their 
caste, race, religion, nationality, or social status is maintained in one’s thoughts words and deeds 
Cultural 
A pattern of living where the sum of total material and spiritual needs satisfaction leads the 
community to a contended and peaceful society where we have a ‘no-poverty’ and ‘no-affluent’ 
society  
Social 
Progress in sectors such as community participation, community leadership, community education, 
community health, community integration, basic human rights and duties and peace. Bringing about 
the improvement of all these sectors is social awakening.  
Economic 
Build communities to satisfy basic and secondary human needs, reducing exploitation to a minimum 
by cooperative endeavours and also by safeguarding environmental and ecological cleanliness and 
sustainability.  
Political 
A political order where people’s maximum engagement in decentralised participatory democracy is 
ensured (Db34, p.106) 
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It was an alternative development model, as progress was framed as a process of awakening 
people, communities, nations and the world through moral, cultural, economic and social 
interventions. Here, the notion of awaken and awakening extended to not only the village but 
also other levels of city-wide, country and global efforts. Yet, the main conceptual emphasis 
remained at the village level. For example, the ‘100 village awaken’ effort of 1967 turned into 
a scheme to awaken 1,000 villages in 1975 (Db-4). The main guiding principle remained a 
holistic approach encompassing moral, cultural, economic and social aspects. Such beliefs 
promoted a form of accounting based on situating action with the philosophical framework of 
awakening and transformation set by Ariyaratne. In his writings, Ariyaratne admitted that these 
are ‘lofty ideals’; upheld through a larger confidence that grandiose visions or ‘dreaming big’ 
have the potential to be real if thrown out into world (Db34, p. 106).  
Movement accounts cut across management decisions and, in some cases, reframed staff and 
financial issues into a discourse of upholding principles. A member with over thirty years of 
service to Sarvodaya fondly recalled how Ariyaratne’s allowed her to bring her child into work 
in the 1970s. “I didn’t have access to any childcare,” she noted, “and Mrs. Ariyaratne brought 
a crib into the office so that my child could stay with me. In that way, we are a family” (Ib-51). 
This extension of family into the workplace also included the application of religious 
philosophies to management decisions. A cited example by members when discussing fraud 
was a prior incident dealt with by Ariyaratne. One member described:  
Long ago, it was discovered that a management team member which was very close to Lokku Sir 
(Ariyaratne) had stolen money from Sarvodaya. We were gathered all together and Sir confronted 
him. The member cried and was ashamed, and eventually Sir forgave him, even promoted him to a 
higher post in Sarvodaya. This was Sir practising kindness and forgiveness, this is the Sarvodaya 
way. (Field Notes, 2012)  
 
This instance illustrates how Ariyaratne’s interpretation of the movement set an operating 
rationale for members based on his philosophies. In the above case, kindness and forgiveness 
were virtues which provided a structured mode of reflection and logic for action amongst 
members.  
Overtime, such philosophy logics and rationales were accompanied by visual aids which were 
displayed within villages and offices. For example, in line with beliefs on levels of awakening 
and transformations, the village was the starting point for shramadana, which was the ‘sharing 
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or gift of one’s time, thought and effort) or volunteerism (Db-34). The notion of gifting inspired 
‘shramadana camps’ between villages. After the first camp in 1958, shramadana camps became 
the basic unit for delivering services and the point of transformation at the village level within 
the framework of awakening. As such, statistics on the number of villages, camps and 
participants were tracked by members as they started to symbolise the possible scope and effects 
of Sarvodaya (Annex 8).  
Furthermore, templates were developed to outline processes and activities within shramadana 
camps. Templates later explained and accompanied the founding story of village realisation 
where Ariyaratne’s group of teachers and students assisted a poor and low caste village in 
195822. For example, the template below (Figure 6) was included in reports to outsiders and 
used within offices to describe what philosophies were.   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
22 During school vacations, the group would convene to tutor students existing in dire village straits. In due course, 
this style of group exchange spread to other villages and was called Shramadana, meaning the gift of one’s time, 
thoughts and efforts (v, p.143). When practicing Shramadana, participants later subscribed to four objectives of 
individual personality awakening and four objectives for community awakening. The sets of objectives were based 
on Buddhist teachings: Brahma Viharas (or Sublime Abodes) and Satara Sangraha Vastu. The four Brahma Viharas 
objectives for the individual are as follows:  
1) Cultivate metta (loving kindness) towards all beings and do no harm 
2) All actions should be an act of karuna (compassion)  
3) The completion of a task leads to muditha (dispassionate joy) in the mind 
4) Service with upekkha (detachment from loss, gain, success or failure) 
In conjunction with the above, the four Satara Sangraha Vastu, or principle for group conduct, are promoted. They 
are: 
1) Dana (sharing) 
2) Priya Vacana (pleasant language)  
3) Arthacharya (constructive action) 
4) Samanathmatha (equality in association)  
Groups were taught these objectives, living in a village for a few days or weeks.  
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Figure 6: Structure of ‘awakening’ in shramadana camps23 
 
In Sarvodaya, such visual depictions of the processes behind philosophies gained traction. 
Eventually, Ariyaratne devised stages of progress known as the village development 
scheme/graduation model to tabularise what ‘awakening’ at the village level included. The 
scheme clarified attributes and activities of awakening and also combined economic factors of 
development with social and moral values. Ariyaratne felt it was important to define economics 
within the parameters of awakening, given pressures created by the fall of socialism and the 
opening up of Sri Lankan markets in the late 1970s (Db-4). Partly, the model was an attempt to 
differentiate Ariyaratne’s economics from the economics of the West (Db-4). As such, initially 
the five stages of village development for awakening stressed an integrated approach to progress 
                                                 
23 Figure 6 is a template found in material dating back to the 1960s, but is still used today within Sarvodaya. The 
template is used to describe the processes of transformation which occurs within shramadana camps.  
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(Annex 9). Progress, in Sarvodaya’s model started with gathering communities together to 
create feelings of familiarity.  The introduction of stages placed activities such as shramadana 
camps within a larger village development ambition and, by defining stages in this manner, 
substance was given to the concept of awakening. Notably, the role of economics was not 
paramount in this iteration of the scheme. Economics was useful to fund activities, but not as a 
core activity in itself to bestow upon villages.  
The sway of personality and use of depictions occurred within two personas of Sarvodaya: the 
movement and organisation. The movement became a registered organisation in the late 1960s 
and gained charitable status a decade since the first shramadana camp. In 1972 it became a 
corporation called the ‘Lanka Jalitka Sarvodaya Shramadana Sangamaya’ or Lanka National 
Sarvodaya Shramadana Group by a special act of parliament. This act was made solely for 
Sarvodaya – its own incorporation act – and bestowed powers and a legal framework to pursue 
and realise its objectives, such as economic development. Partly, formal registration was meant 
to expand services and provide access to greater amounts of funding from international donors 
(Db-6; Db-8).   
At first there was no apparent difference between the original movement and newly formed 
organisation of Sarvodaya. Yet, gradually a distinction arose, where each came to represent 
different ambitions as a consensus formed that: 
With hindsight, the creation of the legal entity also created a dichotomy resulting in a movement on 
the one side and an organisation on the other with the latter’s growth not always accompanied by a 
growth of the former. (Db-11, p. 4)  
 
Ultimately, the organisation of Sarvodaya gained a different character than the movement of 
Sarvodaya. To make sense of the difference between the movement and organisation, the former 
was considered ‘very innovative and inspiring’ and the latter simply a legal entity. In other 
words, the movement was presented as something that could not be controlled or channelled 
and although the organisation could deliver on movement aims, it was at the same time ‘not the 
movement’.  
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Overtime, internal explanations of the differences between the movement and organisation 
emerged. One of which was an ‘input-process-output model’, where ‘the ‘output’ of the 
organisation is the ‘input’ for the movement. This was further described as:  
What generates, sustains and expands the movement are the activities of the Sangamaya 
[organisation]. It is also a characteristic of a movement that once set in motion it can maintain its 
own momentum unless there are retarding forces to impede its progress. Once a critical mass is 
reached it may overcome any impeding forces and continue to grow. (Db-11, p. 15)  
 
Such discussions represent an emergent distinction between the construct and aims of the 
movement and the organisation of Sarvodaya. This also eluded to possibilities in which the 
organisation and movement of Sarvodaya could be mobilised in different ways and as separate 
entities. Differences were partly a result of international donors as their involvement opened up 
movement and organisation accounts to donor expectations and scrutiny.  
International donors were interested in not only the alternative development model of 
Sarvodaya, but the fact that it represented a non-partisan avenue for international funding. This 
was of particular interest given the political instability and the onset of civil war in the 1980s. 
Formalising Sarvodaya’s status as an organisation was essential as donors and the government 
needed the legality of an organisation. That said, funds were put towards movement ambitions 
and activities. And, when donors became involved in the organisation-side they found 
discrepancies in their notion of proper accounts and ways in which the movement accounted 
and narrated progress. For instance, early consultants found that Sarvodaya lacked up-to-date 
and proper management, mixed up district accounts with economic project accounts and 
improper cost accounts, etc.  
However, donors also found that Sarvodaya was “better than any other organisation as it has 
the possibility to carry out proper economic surveys so as to map the needs and possibilities of 
village societies” (Db-6, p. 3). Here, it was potential (and the chance to develop potential) rather 
than proper accounts that sustained donor support. 
Issues with reporting included a limited to a lack of expertise and also a particular internal view 
and reluctance to reporting (Db-3). For donors, though the capacity to conduct economic 
interventions overshadowed issues with reports and accounts, they would also have to contend 
with Sarvodaya’s own view of economic development, which was part a holistic model tied to 
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the movement of Sarvodaya. For instance, when introducing a new economic programme called 
Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise for Development (SEEDs), Sarvodaya noted:  
So the movement fully agrees with the views of our partners [donors] that the time is ripe for the 
movement to launch upon scientific and concrete economic enterprises with a view to generating 
incomes that would make the movement less dependent on donor agencies and achieve our objective 
of economic welfare of man.  
However, it is the view of the movement that this should be done without inflicting any adverse 
effect on the visibility of the movement as non-violent, non-aggressive, social revolutionary 
movement, primarily interested in improving the quality of lives of people in every respect, 
beginning with the most downtrodden in the country.  (Db-6, p. 3)  
 
As Sarvodaya included economic interventions in line with donors, it also was adamant that 
interventions be reflective of the ‘movement’, in substance or its recognition within 
communities.   
Such feelings towards reports and the need for proper accounts for donors to continue funding 
Sarvodaya set the foundation for the 1985 Donor Consortium. This section illustrated how 
accounts of Sarvodaya were more narrations of around personality and templates for recalling 
the movement within communities. At this time, internal accounts were fluid, family-orientated 
and experience based. Then, the call to be accountable as an ‘organisation’ resulted in a need to 
develop reporting as well as focus on donor interest in economics. The following section 
outlines how the DC of 1985 was introduced to address divides in expectations, closed certain 
gaps between the movement and the organisation and changed the attitude towards reports.  
 
The 1985 Donor Consortium  
 
For donors, Sarvodaya’s reach throughout Sri Lanka and its alternative development 
philosophies blended into donor calls for ‘bottom-up’ development and the anti-modernisation 
discourse of the 1970s (see Ingham, 1993). An estimated fifteen donors funded individual 
Sarvodaya projects by the 1980s (Ib-63). Even with reporting difficulties, donors were still keen 
to support Sarvodaya since it was a central entry-point for development work in war torn regions 
of Sri Lanka. To some donors, admiration of Sarvodaya’s alternative model and network 
surpassed the need for proper accounts, as it was said:  
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Its non-violent approach survives in sprit of adverse, trying and dangerous conditions, as well as 
provocation to depart from its long term development path. In a country of war, it is a beacon – a 
different model. It must be supported in spite of and because of the problems it encounter. There is 
no other national alternative.  (Db-13, p.5) 
 
For such donors, the working ideals, conditions and resilience of the movement amidst the civil 
conflict made Sarvodaya an ideal – and possibly only – candidate for funding.  
One funder, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), had supported 
Sarvodaya for over a decade via other international organizations (Smillie, 1999). By 1985, 
CIDA had shifted to fund movements and civil societies in developing countries directly (Db-
33). In turn, CIDA then considered direct support for two Sarvodaya projects and sent a CIDA 
consultant to assess if either was worth funding given past encounters and administration issues 
(Ib-63). 
In 1984, the CIDA consultant visited Sarvodaya in Sri Lanka. He first learned about movement 
philosophies and program structures. For the former, he physically lived in the movement, 
staying at the house of Ariyaratne. He also became part of everyday routines – meditations, 
meals and travels. For him, the act of living in the movement enabled him to understand it; the 
movement started to ‘flow in his blood’ (Ib-63). He also understood that for donors who only 
viewed reports and did not benefit from the experience of living in its boundaries, the movement 
could be construed as a personality cult rather than an empowering development process (Ib-
63).  In this sense, he realised that there was a wider impact that could not be reflected in the 
reports sent to the donors.  
That said, such gaps were matched by chaotic program management within Sarvodaya (Ib-63; 
Ib-64). For multiple donors, senior management was not able to produce proper reports and, in 
one case, staff had submitted a full project report to the wrong donor (Ib-63). At the time, 
Sarvodaya lacked the capacity to trace donor funds to their funded projects and deliver detailed 
project reports in a timely manner (Ib-63; Ib-64).  
On the other hand, the CIDA consultant found that staff had the skills to produce reports and 
prepare budgets but multiple project requirements from numerous donors diminished the value-
add of applying such skills. For instance, except for a three year grant from NOVIB in the 1970s, 
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all budgets were based on their individual donor projects (Db-8). From the dishevelled state of 
reports the consultant assumed that staff did not know how to budget, but staff countered:  
We know all about budgeting, the problem [is that] the budget is worthless, it is meaningless because 
the owners [donors] pick and choose. They cherry pick and we have to go with whatever they will 
buy. (Ib-63)  
 
From this point, issues in reporting were not framed as only difficulties in the movement, but 
also systematic deficiencies in understanding and funding the movement. For donors, 
importance was placed on individual projects, and in turn, other parts of the movement ended 
up unfunded and reports did not make sense in relation to the entire entity. For instance, donor 
preferences for education and credit facilities translated into no funding for other efforts such 
as youth exchanges. For the consultant, such donor practices signalled that “everyone liked 
Sarvodaya, but no one was willing to look at the whole” (Ib-63). 
 
The Donor Consortium: The Ethos, Budget and Programmes  
 
After such observations, the consultant, with Ariyaratne’s consent, proposed that Sarvodaya’s 
donors commit to multi-year grants which fund all of Sarvodaya’s projects and core costs in a 
single budget. Together, Sarvodaya and its donors would create and agree upon three year 
budgets, and in turn, the donor cohort would fund all programs for a given year. 
Funding all of Sarvodaya was thought to correct deficiencies of project-based funding, as staff 
had stated that numerous and multiple requirements affected their ability to provide proper 
accounts and reports. However, the DC conceptualised Sarvodaya as development activities 
which can be funded and did not account for the movement aspects of Sarvodaya. However, in 
line with the consultant recommendations, the DC still sought to accommodate the movement 
aspects by, for instance, allocating line items in budgets dedicated to the movement. Through 
the DC, the distinction between the organisation of Sarvodaya as funded programmes and the 
movement became more pronounced in reports.  
For the CIDA consultant, this effort required political buy-in from donors; a process that proved 
difficult at first (Ib-63). Yet, by 1985 four of Sarvodaya’s main donors stepped forward: 
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Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Overseas Development Agency 
(ODA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Nederlandse Organisatie 
voor Internationale Bijstand (NOVIB). Since the 1970s, these bi-lateral development agencies 
from Canada and Europe have financially supported Sarvodaya. As major contributors, they 
had agreed to coordinate their funding. Some focused on particular areas such as education and 
emergency relief and others provided funds to support all projects and operational costs.  
Led by CIDA, the four donors decided to create and support a common Sarvodaya budget, in 
which they assumed responsibility for 70-75% of budget expenditures (Ib-63). Likewise, 
smaller or less interested donors funded the remainder of the budget. This effort was called the 
‘Donor Consortium’ (DC) which began in 1985. It was the first time that donors examined and 
funded the whole of Sarvodaya (Ib-63).  
Through the DC, three major programme areas of Sarvodaya were supported: Lifeline, SEEDS 
and Relief, Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Reawakening (RRRR) (Annex 10). These 
programmes worked within Sarvodaya’s development model, especially Lifeline as it set up 
and guided villages from stage 1 to stage 5 (self-reliance) of their graduation model. The other 
programmes developed specific areas (economic, emergency relief, education etc.) and were 
brought into different stages of the graduation model.  
The DC covered all programme and core costs as well as committed additional funds to 
Sarvodaya. From 1972 to 1992, contributions from the four major donors significantly increased 
(Figure 7).   
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(Db-36)  
Figure 7: Contributions from Four Main DC Donors from 1972-1992 in Sri Lankan Rupees 
 
Aside from funds, the DC also was committed to developing staff technical and management 
skills. Here, a single DC budget also included a single donor reporting system for planning, 
monitoring and evaluating programmes and the organisation. The advent of a single 
accountability framework was presented as an opportunity for Sarvodaya. For instance, 
Ariyaratne described the DC as a new era for improvements, he stated:  
… in reality, only from 1986 October 1st, have we been in a position to seriously improve the 
professional skills of our workers and I leave it to our Monitors and Evaluators, to speak frankly 
about the successes and failures of this attempt during this short period. (Db-8, p.4) 
 
The Donor Consortium’s Accountability Framework  
 
Earlier, to learn about the movement and progress made, donors stayed at Sarvodaya and in 
turn, visited villages and lived with the communities to experience progress first-hand (Ib-35). 
Before, donors relied on trust to facilitate Sarvodaya-donor relations, with the advent of the DC 
‘technical matters and legal obligations’ such as internal control now gained importance (Db-
21; Db-33).  
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This call for accountability was important for all donors in the DC. They felt that due to the 
scope and nature of Sarvodaya, accountability was essential and noted:  
Given the size of Sarvodaya in terms of its expenditure and the extent of its capital assets, it is 
imperative that the organisation be extremely accountable. Its critics will attempt to discredit 
Sarvodaya on many fronts, because that is the nature of development, especially in trying times. 
Sarvodaya must continue to strengthen its accountability, not because donors require it, but because 
it protects the real work that Sarvodaya wishes to undertake. (Db-13, p. 38)  
 
To respond to such demands for accountability, the DC included more than simply budgets; it 
required a series of reports linked to DC budgets. At the behest of the DC, representatives from 
the four major donors would consult on planning, monitoring, evaluation, finances, results and 
even organization structures. There were also yearly DC meetings held with donors and 
Sarvodaya to discuss progress made, create the budget, review monitoring and evaluation 
reports and release funds. The DC also created monitoring and evaluation teams comprised of 
representatives from each of the four major donors. The teams would produce ‘progress reports’ 
by visiting programme sites, interviewing staff and making recommendations on programme 
and organisation operations. Often, teams prepared reports for the DC and presented findings at 
the DC meeting held with the Sarvodaya’s management. To oversee communication between 
donors and Sarvodaya, the DC appointed and funded the position of a ‘Donor Liaison Officer’ 
(DLO). Overall, the DC proposed a single accountability framework for Sarvodaya and centred 
its activities on a three year budget (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: The Donor Consortium Accountability Framework 
 
The next two sections focus on the manner in which the DC changed the external accountability 
framework to simultaneously navigate Sri Lanka’s political landscape and reflect the ideals of 
the Sarvodaya movement. The third section outlines how the end of the DC informed the 
production and circulation of western-local blends of accountability within the Sarvodaya 
network. 
 
The Movement in Numbers: Setting the Tone through Accounts 
 
The DC’s accountability framework communicated the movement in relation to the spirit of 
accountability, rather than represent the fluid nature of the movement. For the DC, the 
accountability framework presented the movement and organisation of Sarvodaya strategically 
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through accounting techniques. This was mainly motivated by an effort to focus funding in line 
with projects (rather than ideologies) and to navigate Sri Lankan’s turbulent political landscape.  
For rolling out their accountability framework, the DC engaged directly with narratives and 
accounts Sarvodaya presented of itself, whether it be attitudes towards reports, development 
models made or the scope of the movement.  Members did not believe in limiting movement 
activities or villages, for them, the movement functioned to ‘grow organically’. The DC sought 
to limit the expansion of the movement to emphasis project funded and their targets .To direct 
attention towards programmes, the DC decidedly constrained organisation scope and proposed 
an ideal number of 5,600 villages. They noted:  
It is important to maintain this perspective as donors argue for “program focus” as Sarvodaya 
continues to extend its influence across the nation. The donor funded development program and the 
movement are not in this team’s view, incompatible. Nor are they easily or sensibly separated one 
from another. Once again, it is worth reiterating that many aspects of what might be described as 
movemental activities are equally sensibly described and fundable as developmental ones.  
 
There is, however, a distinction to be drawn not so much between movemental and development 
aspects of programme, but between donor funded and other aspects of Sarovdaya’s work. Donor 
funded aspects of the work carry with them the burden of accountability. Years ago, when smaller 
amounts were given monitoring was limited strictly to performance in those particular projects. The 
advent of the consortium funding has changed this fundamentally. (Db-15, p.4) 
 
At this point, the movement started to be problematized based on DC funding objectives. The 
DC stressed the difference between funded programmes and other parts of the movement or ‘the 
rest’ of Sarvodaya. The increase and totality of funding was matched by a call for more 
accountability in relation to what was accounted for as ‘the movement’ and narratives of the 
movement itself.  For the DC, their programmatic aspirations and scope were forefront. The DC 
started to account for the movement, sifting and separating narratives from projects. This effort 
became part of monitoring and evaluation practice in the DC, as noted in a DC monitors report:  
The monitors have discussed at length the distinction made in the evaluation between the movement-
oriented aspects of Sarvodaya and development functions. For Sarvodaya, these are intimately 
interrelated. Sarvodaya is a value-based organisation, and these values (e.g. the sharing of 
community labour – shramadana camps’ non-violence; observance of human rights) are essential 
parts of the development process. They are the movemental aspects of the organisation that members 
‘believe in’ or ascribe to.  
 
From a financial point of view there are aspects of Sarvodaya’s work which extend beyond the 5,600 
core villages and which could also be described as ‘movement-oriented’ activities. Sarvodaya 
believes that these are part of the development process as well and does not agreed these should be 
separated from the ‘core’ programme. (Db-13, p.4)  
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The DC predefined target of 5,600 villages set the stage for filtering movement values and 
practices. The ‘core’ was not the movement and its philosophies from a monitoring and 
evaluation perspective, it was the target number of villages. In essence, their modus operandi 
centred on movement and its philosophies to the extent that targets could be achieved.  
As the DC progressed, the movement was no longer a narrative that motivated an expanding 
network of activities. Parallel to the constraints on expansion through targets, the movement 
also started to be represented in numbers and accounting techniques. One DC report highlighted:  
Most donors and monitors have not taken an express interest in the movement aspects of Sarvodaya 
for two reasons. First, the movement does not consume great amounts of the Sarvodaya budget. 
Secondly, there is a sense of religion and perhaps even a hint of politics about the ‘movement 
aspects’ of Sarvodaya, which donors are reluctant to support.  
 
Because donors have not paid much serious attention to this aspect of Sarvodaya, the movement has 
perhaps been misunderstood, underestimated and too quickly dismissed. (Db-12, p.2)  
 
The DC framed the movement as attributes which consumed minimal resources and as a set of 
undertones to be avoided (religion and politics). At this point, the movement consumption of 
resources on the budget side – its number and proportion to other activities – rationalised less 
management attention. Here, reference to the movement as a budget input reflected earlier DC 
concerns over performance. The limit on villages, and in turn the sprawling nature of the nature 
of the movement, was coupled with an effort to measure the movement itself.  
The view of the movement shifted from ideals which supported targets to gaining actual 
figures which could be inputted into calculations and, in turn, decision making processes. For 
example, in 1990, DC monitors led to the creation of a ‘movement budget’ (Db-13). The 
budget for the movement was follows:  
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Santhisena (Sinhala/Tamil Youth Exchange)                                  455,000 Rs 
Santhisena Leadership Training         146, 900 Rs 
Shramadana International        1,121,000 Rs 
National Amity Program  
(Peace Marches, National Peace Camps, videos, publications)       735,000 Rs 
Total          2,920,900 Rs         
In this budget, the activities identified as ‘movemental’ were youth exchanges and leadership 
training, international branches, peace marches and media. While the DC previously stated that 
the movemental and development functions were interrelated, these activities were framed as 
part of the Sarvodaya belief system and ‘budgeted out’ of the DC core funded budget and 
‘budgeted in’ to its own separate movement budget.  Notably, even though the DC’s 
representation of the movement was not included in the core budget, the DC monitors argued 
that since the movement budget was small in comparison to the core budget, funding it would 
not adversely impact the DC or put funded activities at risk.  
The impetus to measure the movement in relation to funded activities became more pronounced 
in the late 1980s. From 1989 to 1993, the government targeted Sarvodaya. Under the Prime 
Minster, and later the President, Premadasa (1978-1993), a task force called the ‘Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry in Respect of NGOs’ was established. Only a week after Premadasa was 
sworn into office, Ariyaratne was questioned by the government’s Chief of the National 
Intelligence Bureau and had to complete a questionnaire from the Bribery Commissioner.  At 
the behest of Premadasa, an in-house government audit team of financial records and 
development activities was set up within Sarvodaya. Staff were also interviewed by the 
Commission, and in some instances, disappeared. By 1991, eight death threats had been made 
on Ariyaratne and his family. Sarvodaya’s weekly radio programme was cancelled and negative 
media was broadcast with headlines like, ‘Profits from Sarvodaya through the Sale of Children’. 
In this period, Sarvodaya had to contend with political pressures which affected their ability to 
conduct activities and personally survive (Db-16).   
The DC acknowledged such political pressures and noted that “it is a well-known fact that every 
instrument of the government was used not only to undermine Sarvodaya but also to completely 
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paralyse it” (Db-20). Due to political attacks, the DC started to pay greater attention to the 
movement, mostly to make sense of what their funds supported, as the Commission fostered 
‘considerable uncertainty among consortium members about exactly what concerns the 
Government may have about the proved capacity of Sarvodaya in providing development 
assistance at the local level or the role of NGOs in general” (Db-15, p. 39). This operating 
context propelled the DC to justify and present their involvement with the movement within 
their rationalised accountability framework.  
For the DC, there was an effort to distance themselves from perceived political controversial 
parts of the movement. This was meant to protect funded activities from certain aspects, mostly 
political and religious. For the DC, the objective of poverty alleviation, and not support of the 
movement per say, motivated and guided how the DC connected the movement to development 
works (Ib-34). Through the budget, the movement was ‘taken out’ from a financial perspective. 
In the words of a DLO…  
I would say that was how they [the DC] could demonstrate they were only funding the organisation 
because that’s the money they give, and that was what it was to be applied for. If it was applied for 
anything else, or if it was used for anything else, they could say Sarvodaya had broken the terms of 
the contract, so it wasn’t them. But that’s why they needed the quarterly reports back, to demonstrate 
the money that they’d applied was all being spent on that programme and not being used for anything 
else. So yes, it was a safety mechanism for them. (Ib-64) 
 
As such, the accountability framework put forth was a form of protection for the DC. And, the 
use of budgets and follow up reports were important as proof for demonstrating funds were used 
towards DC funded activities, and allowed the DC to avoid the politics around Sarvodaya.  
 
The movement was represented in different forms to fulfil the demands of the DC. Initially, 
focusing on set targets (i.e. number of villages) was central. This eventually led to the movement 
being seen as a factor in monitoring and evaluation practices. The DC tracked to what extent 
the movement further their targets and idea of performance. This evolved into measuring the 
movement itself. As such, the movement was quantified through accounting techniques and 
presented in different ways against a backdrop of political turmoil and oversight. Through the 
DC, the sweeping and unplanned movement of the 1950s gained strategic traction through 
mechanisms such as targets and budgets. In many ways, the movement of Sarvodaya was 
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mobilised and rationalised with reference to programmatic objectives instead of solely 
philosophies.  
 
This section demonstrated how the concept of the movement became refined through an 
evolving accountability framework. The next section will focus on how pre-existing 
understandings and depictions of Sarvodaya were revamped through the eyes of the DC. The 
process blended traditional approaches with the emphasis on targets and programmes of the DC.  
 
 
Revision of concept and depictions to fit an accountability framework  
As the consortium progressed, the DC’s accountability framework became a lens to view 
internally generated models of progress. This section outlines two aspects of internal accounts 
which were combined with ambitions and constraints of the DC accountability framework: the 
concept of the poor and graduation model of village development.  
Reframing the Poor  
The DC sought to channel funds and projects to the poorest in line with its emphasis on poverty 
alleviation. The movement, however, had no definition of the poor. The poor, under 
philosophies and the holistic model, may possess many dimensions, for example, moral, 
spiritual, social, economic and cultural deprivation. In the context of shramadana camps and 
their graduation model, the poor were even considered as a resource to be mobilised. For 
instance, for setting up shramadana camps, Sarvodaya noted: 
Even the poorest of the poor will have within themselves certain spiritual moral, cultural, social, 
economic and institutional resources. We make a beginning by trying to awaken their consciousness 
as to their own capacity for change. Harnessing of these human, material and non-material resources 
is a skill that has to be developed by all those who are desirous of reaching the poor with the intention 
of helping them to uplift themselves. (Db-20, p.3)  
 
Under the internal development model, the poor contributed to the development process. More 
importantly, economics was but one of many factors contributing to poverty (i.e moral, cultural, 
social etc. aspects also existed).  
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In contrast, the DC held a different notion of the poor for funded projects. For the DC, of the 
5,600 villages supported in 1990, donors had no sense of how monies were (or were not) 
channelled to the poor or the poorest (Db-13). The DC noted: 
But who are the poorest and the not so poor? They can be identified in a variety of ways, e.g. 
landholding, welfare eligibility, income, nutritional status of children, and to a greater or less degree 
of complexity. (Db-13, p. 3) 
 
For the DC, none of the ways mentioned included Sarvodaya’s moral, cultural, social or spiritual 
dimensions of poverty or resources. In this vein, the DC started to tease out an avenue for 
defining the poor, one that happened to exclude parts of the movement.  
Mainly, the DC discussed the poor as an economically-deprived population. For the DC, the 
poor were economically deprived or excluded from the market; the poverty of economics 
triumphed poverty of the mind described by Ariyaratne. The DC recommended differing 
methods for defining the poor, such as the lack of income generation, land ownership, market 
access etc. The DC also wanted to identify the poor by conducting surveys of villager attributes 
(i.e. household income, employment, property ownership) and create a baseline of data, rather 
than by the poor being singled out through personal referral systems in the movement network 
(Db-13). As the poor became recognisable, the DC also suggested they hold higher positions in 
village councils to redress power imbalances between the poor and the affluent, perhaps 
educated, council members. In such ways, the concept of poor started to take form, and gain 
substance as a group of people to target development projects.  
For works, the introduction of ‘the poor’ as an independent variable shifted the focus of funded 
projects. For example, the orientation changed for DC funded Relief, Reconstruction, 
Rehabilitation and Development (RRRD) project.  The project, focused on communities 
affected by violence, started to tease out the most afflicted populations by gender, age and 
ethnicities. Such physical characteristics started to intersect with economic standings, for 
instance, widowed women were equated with fewer capacities for income generation. In this 
trend, the DC encouraged the movement to start collecting information, through baseline 
surveys, building bonds between faces and features of capital. Monitors also notably separated 
the poor from workers, stressing that ‘every rupee that does not have to be spent on workers and 
their associated costs is a rupee that can be spent on the victims of violence that this program is 
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intended to serve’ (Db-12, p. ix). In such ways, the DC cut through the fabric of unity preached 
by the movement, making patterns and stitching together relations based on notions of poverty 
and labour. 
The concept of distinguishing the poor from the worker sliced across the movement’s notions 
and feelings of family. ‘People and human relationships were given priority over abstract 
principles’, Ariyaratne explained, and the movement ‘…united a community by a living 
memory of ethical and moral values and their non-marketable codes of conduct’ (Db-34, p. 
145). For the movement, the original purpose of shramadana camps was to promote feelings of 
family amongst diverse class, ethnic and caste-based communities. Even in office settings, there 
was a sense of family-hood and shared traditions, as members addressed each other as ayya 
(‘brother’) and akka (sister) (Field Notes, 2013).  
Cultivated feelings were coupled with families being introduced and raised through the 
movement’s network. It was not uncommon, for instance, that members met their life partners 
through the movement’s activities and married with the blessing of the founder (Db-31; Field 
notes, 2013). In line with family, most members had been exposed to the movement through 
pre-school programs and had grown up with the movement (Ib-42; Ib-45). The separation of 
poor and worker ignored the subtle family ties made through small and large acts within the 
movement.  
For the DC, such close ties were difficult to navigate, to the extent that uncertainty arose if the 
movement itself was in the best position to define ‘the poor’ and if workers had the desired 
capacities to serve the poor. At this time, there had to be balance between the DC definition of 
the poor and Sarvodaya’s ideals. As noted by the DC:  
…there is the consistent recommendation that SSM should direct its efforts more specifically 
towards the poor and the poorest. This is accepted by Sarvodaya and by the Monitors. It is a matter 
that requires clarification, however, not least because there may be confusion arising from the view 
within SSM that Sarvodaya means the “awakening of all”, consequently that the organisation’s 
collective efforts, i.e. both economics and non-economic, should be directed toward the whole 
village community. For many reasons, not least to limit potential conflict between programmes, 
there must be agreement within Sarvodaya as to a common target. (Db-13, p.3)  
 
DC monitors suggested that independent consultants could define the poor and, in turn, the staff 
should be revised to meet the ends of such a definition (Db-15).  
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Overall, the DC observed an inflated work force, often large numbers with low pay. In 1990, 
there were 4,000 fulltime workers, the majority of which received less than half of standard 
market wages - this is in addition to 4,000 fulltime volunteers (Db-35). Based on DC 
recommendations, village level staff was reduced by 50%, with other cuts at the district and 
headquarters by the end of August 1991 (Db-15). As such, in advocating more professional 
qualities, the DC cut staff of which in 1988 only 25% were trained professionals. The rest had 
volunteered or grown up with Sarvodaya.  
This trend was quite strong at the district level, as the DC recommended that the district level 
staff be reduced, from 912 to 512 in 1991, and a new cadre of ‘super gramadana’ employees 
should be cultivated (Db-15). The DC emphasised the need for career professionals who have 
been ‘duly trained and selected on the grounds of their competence to carry out the tasks 
required’ (Db-15, p.5). Partly, staff that simply said ‘yes sir’ as the members at the district 
centres or staff that listened to meetings but did not turn discussions into action were targeted 
(Ib-64). In such ways, the DC sought to inculcate a structure of accountability though staffing 
arrangements as greater numbers of workers and styles of working often did not propagate their 
ideal of accountability. 
For making sense of the poor and poverty, the DC innovated around the category of the poor 
and added more prominent economic factors for measurement. This, in turn, resulted in a 
particular way of accessing the poor, which required more professionalised staff. That said, 
changes to the concept of poverty led to a reconfiguration of worker-poor distinctions.  
 
Innovation on the Graduation Model  
 
In addition to flushing out a definition of the poor, the DC also modified Sarvodaya’s graduation 
model to fit within their ideal of results. Predating the DC, the graduation model was developed 
by Sarvodaya and used to structure programmes such as Lifeline and SEEDS. The graduation 
model was divided into five stages, in which the fifth stage represented village ‘self-reliance’.  
For the DC, the graduation model was important as it provided a benchmark for measuring 
results around funded projects and programmes. However, the DC sought certain kinds of 
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information which was in line with their expectation of funded activities. This approach 
contradicted the internal purpose of the graduation model, which was to act as an aspirational 
guide, rather than a framework to collect information. That said, the DC emphasised refining 
the model by stressing the importance of appropriate indicators to measure results.  
In the early 1990s, the DC placed greater attention on the graduation model, specifically 
developing indicators. For the DC, indicators became a new prism for funding choices, not the 
philosophies of the movement. The nature of development efforts undertaken were revised 
within indicators constructed at each stage. Notably, the DC reflected on difficulties in 
classifying villages, in hindsight, from stages 1 to 3. Even still, the DC pushed for indicator 
development. “Indicators are an absolute requirement for they make us all wrestle with 
answering very important questions,” a DC member noted, “and serious efforts should be made 
in tackling them” (Db-18). As such, movement staff were confronted with the task of devising 
indicators, recasting past experiences on village works and committing to concrete signpost of 
progress. Guided by the DC, the DLO noted staff were “still struggling with understanding the 
concept of ‘graduation model’,’ and that they had difficulties in “understanding the kind of 
information the consortium is seeking” (Db-18).  
For example, in a DC indicator workshop staff were asked to devise a target number of 
completely self-reliant villages (stage five), and the DLO found that staff predictions were well 
above realistic figures, 250 versus 150 villages (Db-18). It was evident to the DC that Sarvodaya 
did not hold much information on villages that have graduated through stages four and five. 
When asked for data on villages, Sarvodaya provided a list of 166 villages they were working 
in and, without any indication of stage or progress (Db-18). Movement staff saw indicators as 
aspirational rather than part and parcel to predictable targets. In some ways, such a view of 
indicators reflected the movement motif to think beyond limits, or as Ariyaratne said, ‘throw a 
vision out into the world and see what happens’ (Ib-34). For members, the role of management 
tools for the movement was to articulate a dream, not control for possible realities. 
Additionally, the DC sought a greater link between the model and other reports, such as strategic 
plans (Db-18; Db-22). This effort pushed the DC to unpack the definition of ‘stage five’ (self-
reliance) and separately examine the ‘inputs’ and the ‘outputs’ of the model itself.  
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The DC found that very little evidence existed that villages were achieving stage five, they 
noted:  
In conceptual terms, the final stage of village level development explicitly includes the target of self-
reliance for the societies and the continuation of their activities. This aspect of sustainability is 
hedged by greater uncertainty, however, not least because very few villages have yet attained stage 
five as found by Sarvodaya. Inevitably, therefore, it is not yet possible to demonstrate exactly what 
stage five sustainability means. (Db-15, p. 8) 
 
The DC initially mapped out phases and ‘inputs’ needed within each stage. Three phases were 
devised:  
Phase Programme Main activities 
Phase A 
 
Lifeline  ‘Gramadana worker and pre-school supervisor 
Phase B 
 
Lifeline  
Rural 
Enterprise 
Programme 
(REP) 
 ‘Social inputs’ from GW and pre-school supervisor 
continue 
 Includes educating villagers on systems and procedures of 
credit and savings 
Phase C 
 
REP   REP is the main programme  
 REP expands and increases loans and savings in the village 
 
The use of input phases helped to organise programmes and also raised two questions:  
 First, at what point does REP initiate activities in a village? 
 Second, during phase B who has overall responsibility for the various Sarvodaya inputs to a village 
– Lifeline’s District Coordinator or REP’s District Manager?  (Db-13, p. 8) 
 
Such questions emphasised responsibility and transition from one programme to another. They 
also motivate the DC to draft specific output indicators, such as: 
 Establishment of an active mothers group which includes a minimum agreed % of the eligible 
women in the village  
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 Execution of shramadana camps in the previous twelve months involving not less than an agreed 
number of person days input from villagers (set in relation to the number of target households) 
(Db-13 p.9)  
 
Notably, inputs were based on programmes and, the timing of programmes, led to drafts of 
output indicators to signal completion of a phase. From here, the DC also started to set out 
expectations of when villages should progress, for instance after five years villages were 
expected to graduate and 10% of the 4,300 villages served in 1991 would graduate in less than 
six months (Db-13).  
In addition to a focus on inputs and timing, that same year the DC drafted a ‘village development 
matrix’, in which the four stages (rather than phases) were organised based on 
activities/expected state of villages at each stage (output) (Annex 11).  
Unlike phases based on inputs, the intention was to use the matrix to cost out contributions staff 
made within each stage (Db-13). It was a tool for understanding progress and for budget 
management (Db-13). For understanding inputs, the DC initially focused more on coordination 
than cost. It was only in the next year that inputs and outputs started to be included and analysed 
within a single format.  
By 1991, the DC tested the model. Their monitors and staff in Sarvodaya’s Poverty Eradication 
and Empowerment of the Poor (PEEP) programme surveyed 2,000 villages that possessed 
markers (i.e. village groups, shramadana camps etc.) within stages one to three of the model as 
well as 814 villages in stage four. Then, they designed qualitative, such as gramadana worker 
perceptions, and quantitative measures within stages. The use of measures was to define 
progress at each stage, yet the group also accounted for the need for flexibility as each village 
was different (Db-17). Partly, this effort was to predict if villages would progress from one stage 
to the next, as the DC noted that their draft model with measures “employed a mathematical 
approach to calculate and predict numbers of villages that will graduate, lapse or drip out in 
stages one to three” (Db-17, p.67).  
This study reassessed villages based on qualitative and quantitative measures, which in turn, led 
to a level of comfort in predicting village progression.  The DC and Sarvodaya felt that: “fine 
tuning of the model is a necessary next step and the development of a total framework of the 
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graduation process might be a useful aid” (Db-17, p. 41).  As such, they drafted an ‘analytical 
framework for the graduation model’ (Annex 12).  The framework   outlined goals, objectives, 
strategies, inputs and outputs for each stage of progression. It was unlike other previous drafts 
or templates in that it combined inputs and outputs, so that there was a linear view of transition 
from a goal to expected outputs.  
Such an extension of the graduation model reflected previous calls for a more ‘integrated 
approach’ for graduation, as the DC noted:  
…there is a need to take an integrated approach to planning and phasing of Sarvodaya’s different 
operational programs, which themselves are expected to promote and pursue the holistic 
development process at the village level. At present there is no such integrated approach: different 
programs seemed to be planned relatively independently of each other.  
 
...Of course, it will never be possible to develop a technocratic model capable of complete accuracy 
in presiding the phased requirements of different programs: Sarvodaya deals with people, as 
individuals and as social groups. Nevertheless Sarvodaya has devised its own process model and it 
has now further sufficient experience at least to being to take a more structured approach to its future 
planning, and vigorously pursue the work already done in the past. (Db-15, p. 34) 
 
For the DC, the graduation model represented an opportunity to coordinate programmes and 
bring in experiences from past villages to create a more structured and predictable model.  
This section explored how the concept of the poor and graduation model of Sarvodaya were 
reframed to fit within the DC’s mode of accountability. The concept of poor was aligned with 
an economic concept of poverty, rather than spiritual. Furthermore, the definition of poor guided 
the investment of resources and countered a culture within Sarvodaya where ‘the poor’ were 
actually members of the movement. As for the graduation model, the philosophy based 
aspirational stages were recast into an evaluation device which would ‘measure’ progression 
within set targets. The model was also used to create benchmarks and a sense of realism when 
devising plans for village activities and programme scope.  
In essence, the DC’s external accountability framework assumed attributes of the local 
narratives and accounts. Such efforts by the DC and Sarvodaya worked to diminish the 
distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ forms of accountability. In this regard, the next 
section will discuss how the DC fell apart, in part due to gaps between external expectations 
and internal sentiments on reporting.  
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The end of the donor consortium, not mixed evaluations 
This section highlights accountability concerns from the DC and pressures faced by Sarvodaya 
which contributed to the end of the donor consortium in 1995. The use of the accountability 
framework and its communication of the movement as well as the revamping of central 
movement models led to tensions within the partnership. For the DC, difficulties persisted in 
getting members to deliver on agreed upon targets as well as the failure to instil proper internal 
controls and financial reports processes. At the same time, Ariyaratne encountered increasing 
feelings of dissatisfaction from his membership over the formal nature of the DC. Yet, as 
explored later on in this section, the end of the DC in 1995 did not end the use of formalised 
depictions of movement ideals and their use in management discussions and reports.  
 
The beginning of the end of the donor consortium 
Throughout the DC, differences in contracting and communication between DC members and 
Sarvodaya staff surfaced. The DC’s proposed limit of 5,600 villages was not followed by 
Ariyaratne (Ib-64). With DC funds, Sarvodaya kept expanding into new villages and was not 
able to provide detailed information on village progress within their own graduation model (Db-
18). The importance placed on targets by the DC was not shared equally with Sarvodaya. For 
the DC, it became clear that decisions made were negotiated with a section of members and did 
not reflect feelings and ensure commitment of the whole movement. After meetings, discussions 
were held with staff and agreed changes made to the programme or activities, but as one DLO 
found… 
…When they [movement staff] went away, people carried on working the same as they had done 
before. So you had like a dual pathway; the donors coming in, having a discussion with people at 
Sarvodaya and agreeing all the things, and the rest of the people at Sarvodaya would carry on doing 
what they were doing. The two didn’t always link up. (Ib-64) 
 
Moreover, as one DLO reflected, the accountability framework was seen as ‘western’ and 
reports required did not fit within the typical structure of ‘work’ for members (Ib-64). The DC’s 
framing of accountability focused on plans and following through action and analysis of set 
plans or targets, but he noted that…  
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… the majority of people in Sarvodaya didn’t work that way. They worked on knowing what they 
were trying to achieve, and reacting to situations and opportunities to try and achieve that. So it was 
very much more a feeling what would be right at this time approach rather than really targeted, 
focused approach.  (Ib-64) 
.   
In this sense, members of the movement did not internalise external accountability requirements 
in the manner the DC had expected. The DC assumed that accountability itself was a rationale 
common grammar for undertaking programmes. This perhaps explains difficulties the DC faced 
in rolling out internal controls and financial reporting processes within the movement. Within 
the accountability framework, internal controls and financial reports were presented as a 
window for gaining ‘meaningful’ information on programme activities. Proper controls was 
linked tracking funds, and in Sarvodaya, CIDA representative felt that…  
What was most worrying concerns the statement that the lack of proper internal financial controls 
resulted in their inability to correlate the release of funds with the work carried out in relation 
intended activities, and that due to these internal control weaknesses, losses and misuses of resources 
may occur. The central question was on internal control.  (Db-21)  
 
The lack of internal control was thought to reflect possible losses in resources. For internal 
controls and reporting, the quality of information was also in question. For the DC, it was not 
‘just a matter of generating an array and flow of information for the sake of doing so,’ and for 
the movement if it ‘had a random, uncoordinated, irrational approach to its work programming, 
then any management information that may be generated will itself reflect that randomness’ 
(Db-15, p.24).  
In addition to expectations and gaps in internal controls, there were difficulties in obtaining 
financial information and statements. In general, auditors found it trying to account for the 
movement and organisation as a whole from a financial perspective. Belongings of a village 
often overlapped as part of the movement, thus audit testing and analysis had to separate the 
village from Sarvodaya. For example, auditors of the 1995 financial statements conveyed that 
‘Sarvodaya’ had been adopted by numerous entities throughout Sri Lanka (Db-23). The use of 
the name was not ‘for accounting purposes’, it was more so to be part of an ideal. As such, it 
was difficult to discern the scope of assets and liabilities which were part of the movement, 
organisation or another entity which took on aspects of Sarvodaya.  From a financial 
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perspective, contradictory requirements were set since the DC sought a “total view of all the 
organisation”, yet auditors were unable to pin down a concrete object or organisation to audit 
(Db-22).  
 
The end of the donor consortium  
Gaps in communication, internal controls and financial reporting contributed to the end of the 
DC. By the mid-1990s, the DC restricted funds to programmes as an acceptable form recourse 
to get information on results. This was a shift in DC practices, as prior attempts to limit funds 
in exchange for ‘forms of accountability’ were viewed internally within the DC as politically 
motivated24 Yet this perception shifted near the end of the consortium as the DC felt that 
withholding funds could be a means of signalling the importance of accountability. The quest 
for reports such as financial statements and results according to set targets were thought of as 
reasonable as highlighted by a DC member. He noted:  
I do not think these demands are excessive – the only real surprise is that these are not issues on 
which we dug our heels several years ago (yes, I understand the history and also see how these issues 
crept up rather than leaping into view fully grown). If we back off now, we have lost all a) credibility 
with Sarvodaya and the other donors and b) hope of accounting for our funds. So the answer to your 
question is that we are going to be tough and insist that our criteria are met before we release any 
further funds. (Db-25) 
 
The push for accountability evolved within the DC from a flexible approach to a hard-line 
requirement. The rhetoric of learning and partnership around accountability was replaced with 
a desire to demonstrate and enforce the framework from the DC. For the DC, not providing 
reports raised questions as to if Sarvodaya was serious about the partnership. In 1995, the DC 
noted:  
                                                 
24 For example, ODA withheld funds from Sarvodaya until requested reports were provided; yet such a decision 
arose speculations amongst Sarvodaya and other donors that the choice due to tense diplomatic relations between 
the UK and Sri Lanka at the time (Db-15). Even though ODA seemed to only be concerned about Sarvodaya’s 
performance and wanted to review its assessments of projects, other donors in the DC stated that:  
ODA’s position is unacceptable. The withholding of funding for an organisation of the size and 
report of Sarvodaya, particular after several years of close involvement with it, cannot be 
justified in the current circumstance.  
(Db-15, p. 15)  
At this juncture, withholding funds was frowned upon by fellow DC members and Sarvoaya (Db-15). 
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… it seems we were optimistic about their ability/intention to comply with the requests of   the 
donors. I would be interested in knowing from you whether you think it’s their inability or rather 
that they think they can stand us down without consequence.  (Db-25) 
 
The tactic of withholding funds frustrated and infuriated Ariyaratne and his members. And, in 
response to the withholding of funds, Ariyaratne threatened to use Sarvodaya’s international 
branch in the Netherlands to stage a hunger strike in opposition of NOVIB (Db-26).  
Internal tensions and disdain for the DC rose at Sarvodaya. With the introduction of DC’s 
accountability framework, Sarvodaya’s staff became disenchanted with the movement. As part 
of their service, many staff agreed to receive less than market wages - a sacrifice accepted due 
to their belief in the philosophies and method of the movement (Db-34). For some, the DC and 
the monies received made the movement ‘lose the idealism and the voluntary spirit that flows 
from it’ (Db-34, p.9). The ways in which the DC reframed (and re-questioned) thirty-two years 
of the movement based on short evaluation visits caused some members to push back (Db-34). 
Some left, in part due to the political oversight, and others threatened to hand in their resignation 
to Ariyaratne (Field Notes, 2013).   
By September 14, 1995, the DC came to an end as, “everyone was in agreement that the 
consortium, as it is now organised, has outgrown its purpose” (Db-26). By the end, 
accountability became journey rather than a destination. The DC noted that, “although the 
Sarvodaya world is still far from perfect, reasonable and acceptable accountability appears to 
have gone into this exercise.” (Db-27).  
 
The DC ended, but the practices are still there 
 
Even though the DC failed, the practice of bringing in the movement into formalised discussions 
with external donors was still prominent. The evaluation devices and representations of the 
movement which members revolted against became commonplace for partners, strategic 
planning and reporting processes. The purpose, however, was not to emanate the same 
principles or attitudes of external accountability, it was to serve and protect the interests of the 
movement.  
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After 1995, relationships with certain donors continued on a project to project basis. Donors 
such as NORAD and NOVIB maintained relationships with Sarvodaya and even introduced 
new management practices such as the Logical Framework25 in the late 1990s.  
The introduction of new mechanisms after the DC was coupled with continuing of expertise 
from the DC. In 1992, while the consortium was still in place, Ariyaratne’s son became the 
‘secretary of planning’. Currently the general secretary of Sarvodaya, his son, emphasised that 
the 1990s were crucial in establishing a ‘systematic’ planning procedure (Ib-2). Before 1992, 
the movement’s vision prompted planning on an as needed basis and in the form of ‘work plans’ 
for a short period of time. Even post consortium, Ariyaratne’s son thought that systematic 
planning aided in the consolidating or ‘tracking’ all the works, from the number of villages 
reaching Grama Surwaj to the potential villages for further involvement. He equates this 
exercise to tapping into future possibilities to being a self-reliant organisation, generating its 
own income. It is in this spirit that a strategic plan was made for 1995 to 1998, a year after the 
consortium ended.  
The DC’s phase based approach was refitted to work within the local context and ambitions. 
The 1995-1998 strategic plan, recast the past and possibilities of the late 1990s into three 
‘phases’.  The first and second phase retroactively describes the ‘beginnings’ of Sarvodaya and 
mid-1980s. The former was notably slow albeit strengthened through a mass volunteer base 
and, the latter, spoke to rapid expansion, donor involvement and the resulting downsides of a 
‘supply-orientation’ and dwindling interest in levels of awakening. The third, applicable for the 
period in question, sought to find a middle ground between phrase one and two, namely bringing 
back ‘demand driven’ development. Here, the framing of three ‘empowerment processes’ - 
social, economic and technical - reflected beliefs and also formed the basis for administrative 
‘divisions’. This was an attempt to ‘plan’ based on beliefs as administration units.  
                                                 
25 The former DC member, NOVIB, introduced the LF to Sarvodaya in 2000 (Db-29). The adoption of the LF was 
natural for Sarvodaya. The General Secretary noted that the existing use of indicators in the organisation made the 
LF an extension of knowledge held in the organisation (Ib-2). Similar to the DC, NOVIB trained staff to use the 
LF, and also published handbooks translated into Sinhala and Tamil. As discussed in the next chapter, this was 
critical to the LF becoming a core tool for reconciliation in post-civil war Sri Lanka. Currently, the LF is used at 
Sarvodaya, often as a requirement from donors for funded projects.  
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There were also innovative ways of engaging sponsors through this administration of beliefs. 
In this strategic plan, donors were encouraged to sponsor components, either ‘adopt’ a district 
through the lens of social empowerment or fund any of the three administration lines. In addition 
to this creative allocation of funding, Sarvodaya promoted its own commercial enterprises – a 
printing press and an export company for village handicrafts – to start generating its own 
income. In this case, the setting up of administration lines of activity and accountability were 
also a means to commercialise and market movement ideologies in a manner palatable to 
donors.  
In between the 1995-1999 and the 2005-2010 strategic plans, the sophistication of planning 
exploded as environmental scans, SWOT analyses and Logical Framework took root.  For the 
Logical Framework, NOVIB, a Swiss NGO, sponsored a training session and even translated 
their own Logical Framework handbook into Sinhalese and Tamil in the late 1990s. 
Interestingly, NOVIB later promoted a ‘results based framework’ in which, in the words of the 
current Director of Projects, donors would ‘buy the results’26.  
In contrast to 1995-1998, the 2005-2010 strategic plan is an exemplar of this novel management 
connection. Aided by consultants, Sarvodaya articulated a ‘strategic planning process’ (Figure 
9) and the entire plan is thought to feed into their three spheres of consciousness, economics 
and ‘governance’ for holistic development (Figure 10). 
 
                                                 
26 In this approach, to guarantee funding for works, activities would have to yield certain outcomes. For example, 
a compost training session targeting 100 farmers would need to produce100 farmers who could skilfully compost. 
The donor, in this illustration, would then evaluate on a spot basis the extent to which training has been successful, 
reimbursing monies spent on activities afterwards. This is different from previous donor procedures of giving 
funding and then, after the fact, Sarvodaya submitting descriptive reports. RBM involves a high degree of 
systemising, as targets, activities and results must be articulated beforehand and reporting must fit this streamlining 
rationale. NOVIB, after introducing RBM, retaught the Logical Framework as complimenting this approach. In 
this respect, in the early 2000s, new harmonising instruments and rationales colonised the ‘planning space’, 
contributing to a seamless appearance between ideals and management practice. 
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Figure 9:  2005-2010 strategic planning process 
 
Similar to 1995-1998, there are lines of empowerment that organise works, however, at this 
point the original three expanded to six: spiritual, social, technological, legal, economic and 
political. In the strategic plan, each empowerment line had a detailed listing of all involved 
parties, summary of results and a SWOT analysis. All these observations are referenced to an 
overarching situation analysis, evaluation report and commentary on the 2000-2005 strategic 
plan27. This evolution of strategic planning demonstrates a combining of technical aspects of 
the DC and new external mechanisms of accountability with philosophies of the movement. In 
essence, management by philosophies rather than management by numbers gained traction in 
Sarvodaya.  
                                                 
27 This comparative of the 1995-1998 and 2005-2010 strategic plans was intentional, as the researcher was unable 
to access other plans such as 2000-2005 and the 500 year plan.  
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Figure 10: Three spheres for strategic planning 
 
Reports and plans leveraged targets, activities and results to operate within a belief framework. 
Internally, Ariyaratne’s son adopted his father’s philosophical transformations and levels of 
awakening as a form of administration (Figure 12). For example, the development model and 
philosophies of the movement were turned into concrete management objects which were used 
in presentations to donors and volunteers to communicate ideals and their style of administration 
(Annex 13; 14). One depiction of the development model echoed standard technical templates 
used by management consultant firms (Figure 11).   
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28 
Figure 11: Sarvodaya development model 
Even after the DC, management teams used a technical approach and depictions to communicate 
the movement to outsiders. Processes such as strategic plans and evaluation devices were 
refitted to work within the context and ambition of the movement. The legacy and approach of 
the DC lived on through partnerships and expertise which was fostered during the DC decade. 
The effort to ‘measure’ viewed internally as altering the meaning of the movement became a 
conduit to express and fortify the movement through a common management language.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 A representation of the development model from the General Secretary’s presentation on Making Communities 
Disaster Resilient; The Sarvodaya Approach in May 2012. Also included are dimensions of social, economic and 
technological empowerment.    
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Discussion  
This chapter provides an in-depth examination of Sarvodaya’s 1985 DC and highlights the 
nature of internally generated accounts of an NGO.  
Through the DC, efforts to make sense of both movemental and NGO dimensions of Sarvodaya 
were included into an external accountability framework. At times, the movement was framed 
as a political force, which resulted in overzealous government oversight. In order to avoid 
politics and emphasize their development programmes, activities deemed too political such as, 
peace marches, and leadership training were reclassified as ‘movemental’ and relegated as side 
notes to actual funded programmes. The DC mobilised their single accountability framework in 
different ways to highlight (or conversely, underplay) the movement in relation to its funded 
development efforts. For example, the movement was sectioned out and described in a budget 
form, and then compared to the DC’s entire funding portfolio, the movement was proved not to 
be the focal point of funds, and thus relieving pressure on the DC. In this instance, the DC 
underplayed their involvement with the movement through financial numbers and relied on their 
financial representations of the movement within formalised structural arrangements to 
demonstrate their non-partisan position. As such, formality provided distance within situations 
of rest and potential political conflict.  
In a similar way, Sarvodaya capitalised on two discourses around the accountability framework 
– one of eagerness and willingness to improve management and the other downplaying the role 
of planning and other reports in the wider quest for ‘awakening’. This use of switching between 
different discourses is similar to findings by Ebrahim (2002), where NGOs maintain two 
channels for providing information, yet this also illustrates multiple discourses and that the 
ability to switch can be a resource for NGOs. In this particular case, Sarvodaya was able to cater 
to both the interests of local and informal circles in Sri Lanka and participate within 
conversations with the DC to access funds.  
The external accountability framework confronted values and philosophies developed since 
1958. For the DC, the desire to obtain information on set targets became a catalyst to innovate 
on existing practices. For example, the graduation model of Sarvodaya was redefined and 
drafted to fit with the DC’s single accountability framework.  Unique to Sarvodaya, the 
graduation model took on new purposes through the DC, instead of as an aspirational symbol, 
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the model was refined to interrogate the achievement of results and even predict the graduation 
of villages. In this sense, the model became a new formal lens for Sarvodaya to view their 
informal and philosophy driven efforts. In this vein, unlike O’Dwyer & Unerman’s (2008) 
study, the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ accounts blurred to create something 
new from the perspective of both worldviews. This blurring speaks to the productive elements 
of compromise in organisations (see Chenhall et al, 2013) and frames frictions between internal 
and external actors as a motivating force.  
By the end of the consortium, DC restrictions and withholding of funds coupled with internal 
resistance to comply with DC requirements, resulted in conflicts between the DC and 
Sarvodaya, and eventually, the end of the DC framework. However, even though the DC ceased, 
experiences and models from it carried onto future projects and relations with donors. It was in 
this period of transition that strategic planning as well as evaluation devices were internally 
refined to reflect movement philosophies. In this case, the failure of the DC provided an 
opportunity for Sarvodaya to reclaim and remake evaluation devices in light of their own values. 
Reflecting on Kurunmäki  & Miller (2013),  failure helped make the movement malleable in a 
way that fitted Sarvodaya, and it was in the battle over accounts that a kind of concurrent 
visibility around movement values (see Chenhall et al, 2013) and effort to retain values in 
evaluation devices arose.  
This chapter provides an in-depth examination of Sarvodaya’s 1985 DC. Similar to O’Dwyer 
& Unerman (2008), a distinction rose between internal accounts presented by Sarvodaya and 
external donor expectations on performance and reporting. However, unlike O’Dwyer & 
Unerman (2008), the imposition of the DC’s accountability framework did not solely result in 
mission drift; nor was the framework used predominately satisfy donor requirements. In the 
case of Sarvodaya, evaluation devices were used to grapple divergent demands between internal 
and external accounts that resulted in a change in the very nature of accounts themselves. In this 
sense, to mitigate conflicts with future donors and represent movement ideals, formal and 
neutral accounts of philosophies were produced by internal actors. Neutral representations 
produced by internal actors within formal reporting frameworks valued the movement as a 
source of knowledge and expertise. Counter to some previous studies, this strategic use of 
external frameworks to make internal forms of accountability visible suggests that over reliance 
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on accounting can be helpful (Rahaman et al, 2010; Neu et al, 2009). However, this chapter also 
cautions that such reliance is useful to internal actors if they are in control of the motivation 
behind frameworks, i.e. imperfect aspirational figures rather than measuring perfect results.  
In this case, the ‘mission’ of Sarvodaya was not necessarily demoted (see O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008), but communicated and mobilised in new ways. As mentioned earlier, to counter political 
attacks and oversight, the DC represented Sarvodaya’s ambition of mass awakening into a 
concrete number through a defined number of villages. This effort was meant to section off as 
well as de-politicise funded projects from controversial aspects of the movement. The 
movement was expressed as a budget and given a figure which symbolised its consumption of 
resources. Low consumption in this case was used to justify the DC’s diversion of funds to parts 
of Sarvodaya that led or encouraged the movement. Here the movement took an alternate form 
through numbers, one that was not deemed a significant political threat to the DC funded 
projects. The accountability framework neutralised controversial aspects of the movement 
providing a technical language that redefined accounts and movement boundaries. This 
reaffirms Porter (1996) that objectivity can provide an overarching platform for communication 
and contestation in society and extends his analysis into a specific intra organisational setting.  
Such observations imply that by becoming well versed in the aspects of neutrality and formality 
present in evaluation devices, organisational actors can represent themselves in multiple new 
ways to satisfy internal or external demands. This ability to redraw and switch identities to 
create accounts and boundaries challenges notions of stability afforded to accounting entities. 
For instance, it is understood that the boundaries of entities are made through accounts and 
change29 (Meyer, 1973; Miller, 1998; Llewellyn, 1994). This chapter demonstrates that 
identities of external and internal are not fixed and that different forms of accountability can be 
mobilised at various junctures to produce fluid representations an entity. Overall, this chapter 
                                                 
29 For example, Llewellyn (1994) noted that entity boundaries are founded on ‘thresholds’ and ‘binding structures’. 
Llewellyn (1994) stated that 
 
“Thresholds were financial reporting which charts the physical/spatial and financial limits of the organization 
through the quantification of assets and liabilities. Therefore, it defines, through processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, the boundaries of the organization as a physical, legal and financial entity… [and] boundaries not only 
function as thresholds; they also, by acting as binding structures, produce and reproduce the internal unity of the 
organization. Internally the boundaries of an organization bind organizational time and space or create “time-space 
zones” (Llewellyn, 1994, p.11-14).  
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highlights how a variety of accounts or worldviews can be strategically made formal and neutral 
in order to serve specific internal and external interests and form objects to enact accounting 
upon.  
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5 THE TRANSITION FROM CIVIL WAR INTO PEACEFUL PROJECTS  
 THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK IN SARVODAYA    
Following three decades of a protracted and often violent civil strife, in May, 2009, the Tamil 
separatist forces surrendered, thus ending the LTTE effort for a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. 
This chapter examines the methodology, processes and procedures employed by the GoSL and 
the implementation of initiatives, with the cooperation of Sarvodaya. It will also explore the 
unfolding of a Sri Lankan state into previous LTTE domains and how administration techniques 
potentially ‘gave voice’ to newly acquired communities. This chapter frames formality as NGO 
reporting structures and processes set up by the government after the war. In addition, the LF 
as a technical paradox (Chapter 2) will be highlighted and shown to produce simplistic and logic 
representations of complex and emotional community experiences. Developing on the previous 
episode, situations of conflict manifest in this chapter as the prominence of historic social unrest 
within the scope of current project management considerations.  
This chapter explores how accounting sets in motion dreams and schemes to articulate 
aspirations of the state in relation to local actors. According to Miller & Rose (1992), complex 
and varied bureaucratic ideas and practices actuate individuals and groups to align themselves 
with the goals and objectives of the authorities. As such, ‘the state’ is not a centralised system 
of political power, it is a web of administrative techniques which link autonomous selves to 
wider rationales of economy and citizenship in society.  
In addition to examining the dissemination of political and economic ambitions through 
accounting practices, some have highlighted accounting’s conscription of numbers to ‘make’ a 
state (Scott, 1998; Miller & Rose, 1992; Miller & O’Leary, 1987). For Scott (1998), in the 18th 
and 19th century contours of nature and society were made legible and reorganised based on 
standardised formulas of administration. For example, forests were viewed through a fiscal lens 
of revenue needs of the crown, and to maximise revenues, forests were subject to official 
scientific management rather than local knowledge. In this case, the construct of annual timber 
revenue yield supplied a figure for making sense and drawing forest borders. Scott (1998) 
illustrated that states were a result of coherent planning efforts, and similar to Spence (2010), 
‘numbers’ held value in setting state directives. In a study of the creation of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain in 1707, interests of divergent English and Scottish actors were made known 
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through estimations of a particular number, the ‘Equivalent’30. The Equivalent was the amount 
of financial compensation given to Scotland for taking on both higher taxation levels and a share 
of English pre-union debt. The union was a political programme set by complex estimations of 
revenues and debts by the English. To promote acceptance of the union, even present values 
were politically leveraged in the name of ‘the union’. Such complexity was intended to mystify 
the idea of the union for unsympathetic actors; yet accounting calculations and numbers also 
turned into challengeable objects for debate. In essence, accounting made objects and ‘things’ 
within a state tangible and had the potential to be a reference point for assorted actors in 
discussions and attempts at consensus.  
In the same vein, some have studied the use of accounting to redefine groups of people as 
citizens within a state (Neu & Graham, 2006; Neu & Therrien, 2003; Neu, 2000). Neu & 
Therrien (2003) examined how aboriginal communities in Canada existed as perpetually 
‘stateless’ and outside of Canadian society. According to Neu & Therrien (2003), accounting 
and other forms of bureaucracy potentially eliminated or refitted aboriginal existence, they 
noted:   
“Stateless” is a bureaucratic definition; the problem of what to do with stateless people is a problem 
of modern governance, and consequently, the “solution” is primarily a bureaucratic one, whether it 
lies in the direct extermination of individuals or in the slow procedural elimination of their life-
support systems or with their total cultural assimilation (p.12)  
 
In this context, identifying stateless as a problem paved the way for ‘solutions’ such as 
classifying and documenting aboriginals via consensus surveys and introducing the concept of 
purchasing land counter to a spiritual view of nature. As a result, aboriginals were required to 
conform to fit within the mechanisms of a state, rather than indigenous cultures and scripts of 
governance. Similar to Alawattage & Wickramasinghe (2008), individuals and groups with 
shared histories and views were described and analysed through accounting in order to cater to 
ambitions of ‘foreign’ insiders and outsiders. For Alawattage & Wickramasinghe (2008), estate 
workers on tea plantations in Sri Lanka were disciplined through accounting-based controls 
such as book keeping. In this setting, labour controls evolved from colonial legacies and 
                                                 
30 The Equivalent’ was part of the treaty of 1707 which was set to combined parliamentary structures of England 
and Scotland and create the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain’.  
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western markets – a hegemonic tyranny of power - and, as such, maintained a status quo 
unrepresentative of local estate life.  
While both studies highlight accounting’s dominance in defining and structuring social life, 
Beirschenk (1988) also demonstrates that margins and its contents established by accounting, 
such as ‘the project’, created opportunities for negotiation amongst diverse actors in the 
development context. In a study of cattle farming in Benin, Beirschenk, (1988) found interests 
conveyed by stakeholders such as local tribes, donor agencies, government and national staff 
were rationalised with reference to the scope and terms of the project. Forms of negotiation 
were limited to the grammar of target groups, cost benefits and participation set within the 
project and, as the project continued, multiple realities held by diverse stakeholders eventually 
affected the local power dynamics.  
So far, scholars have examined accounting as a tool for coaxing individuals and groups to self-
regulate and align their ambitions with a state or foreign ideal. From the union of the United 
Kingdom to tea estates in Sri Lanka, accounting has played a key role in promoting views of 
the state. Additionally, numbers and the confines of project boundaries have been discussed as 
bringing actors together, yet also restricting possibilities to envision local contexts. An 
underlying theme in such studies is the imbalance of power and accounting’s role in the 
preservation of dominant interests. Yet, to date little is understood about how excluded or local 
communities absorbed by the state gain meaningful representation through accounting.  
In this chapter, accounting ‘solutions’ such as the prominence of numbers rather than context, 
replacement of local knowhow with technical speak and limited spaces for negotiation are 
understood as advantageous for communities in former conflict zones. This chapter argues that 
accounting potentially supports and reframes community attributes - ideology, race, caste, 
religion etc. – which have come to symbolise resistance against the state. The chapter further 
proposes that accounting provides a common grammar and framework for communities to 
meaningfully communicate with state and non-state stakeholders.  
To explore this potential, accounting is framed as a ‘technique of neutralisation’. The concept 
of techniques of neutralisation was developed by Sykes & Matza (1957) during their study of 
juvenile delinquency. Sykes & Matza (1957) found that delinquents valued social norms. 
Hence, to commit crimes counter to accepted norms delinquents rationalise their behaviour 
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through a series of strategies31. For delinquents, Sykes & Matza (1957) noted, ‘techniques of 
neutralisation’ temporary rationalise acts which contradicted widely held societal values and 
norms. In relation to this chapter, techniques of neutralisation are of interest since the concept 
connects perceptions of deviance to ways of justifying deviance to fit within societal norms. In 
addition, the ability to ‘neutralise’ deviance as to function within societal norms is useful and, 
in this chapter, comparable to efforts made to moderate separatist communities in the North and 
East of Sri Lanka within the dominant government paradigm.  
For this chapter, framing accounting as a technique of neutralisation furthers the exploration of 
how communities previously fighting against the state started to participate in discussions with 
the state. Through accounting, this chapter proposes, ‘deviance’ and previously ‘deviant 
communities’ have the capability to present rational and neutral accounts of their experiences 
in a format palatable to the state. Since it is paramount to operate within the confines of the 
framework sanctioned by the state,  this chapter demonstrates, reports, strategic plans, indicators 
and, more specifically, the Logical Framework mobilised by Sarvodaya and communities in a 
manner which does not contradict or threaten state authority or even the vision of a united 
country.  
                                                 
31 Matza & Sykes (1957) created the following methods by which, they believed, delinquents justified their 
illegitimate actions: 
 
 Denial of responsibility. The offender will propose that they were victims of circumstance or were forced 
into situations beyond their control. 
 Denial of injury. The offender insists that their actions did not cause any harm or damage. 
 Denial of the victim. The offender believes that the victim deserved whatever action the offender 
committed. 
 Condemnation of the condemners. The offenders maintain that those who condemn their offense are doing 
so purely out of spite, or are shifting the blame off of themselves unfairly. 
 Appeal to higher loyalties. The offender suggests that his or her offense was for the greater good, with 
long term consequences that would justify their actions, such as protection of a friend. 
 
There are five methods of neutralization generally manifest themselves in the form of arguments, such as: 
 
 "It wasn't my fault" 
 "It wasn't a big deal. They could afford the loss" 
 125 
 
In line with the previous chapter, this analysis highlights how accounting concepts and tools 
can strategically represent the goals and interests of stakeholders. This examination is directed 
at projects undertaken in CACs on topics such as good governance32.  
This chapter argues that perceptions of formality and neutrality of the LF were leveraged and 
mobilised to foster wider stakeholder participation. Contents inputted into the LF joined a 
central system of government reporting and, by GoSL review, were formally vetted and 
approved. Established after the conflict, this system – the PTF - required NGOs to submit 
project all project proposals and documentation to a committee established by the GoSL. In 
addition to its role in overseeing CACs, this process provided an opportunity for the 
communities to represent their grievances, views, ideas, desires and ambitions to overcome the 
violent past and develop sustainable communities within the government paradigm. In order to 
obtain evenly tempered and sensitised responses from communities, the neutral administrative 
format of the LF was invaluable in observing the communications of the residents as published 
in the GoSL review of reports. This chapter provides some insight into how communities 
expressed their fears and desires through a seemingly moderate and neutral administrative 
format of the LF.  
This chapter has three main implications on the study of accounting. First, it demonstrates how 
features of accounting which have been described as problematic for local communities can, in 
some instances, be helpful. Second, it explores the potential to leverage accounting mechanisms 
of control and procedures in order to represent local communities. Third, the desirability of 
‘formality’ and ‘neutrality’ is also underlined given the context in which this study takes place, 
former conflict zones.  
The next section in this chapter will explore the state of communities in the North and East of 
Sri Lanka. This section demonstrates how emotional tensions and experiences of war have 
                                                 
32 Good governance is a broad term to represent desired values and processes which promote human rights, the 
rule of law, effective participation, multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, transparent and accountable 
processes and institutions etc.  A resolution (2000/64) issued by the Commission of Human Rights identified the 
key attributes of good governance as transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness 
(to the needs of the people). The platform of good governance is used by NGOs to apply for funding and is a 
concept which informs the delivery of services. (For more information see:       
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/GoodGovernance/Pages/GoodGovernanceIndex.aspx)  
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impacted the style of management in these communities. It also highlights how management 
and project staff strive to communicate local needs through formal and informal methods. 
The remainder of this chapter will explore how a discourse of reconciliation, rehabilitation, 
good governance and other notions tied to peace are constructed and leveraged to represent 
community interest through evaluations, monitoring, indicators and numbers of the LF. Donor, 
manager and community level sentiments will be highlighted, mainly from projects in the areas 
of education (War Child Holland, Save the Children and Mine Risk Education), health (United 
Nations), infrastructure (EU-Oxfam) and rights awareness (Swiss Solidarity). In this context, 
this section underlines how the LF sets out possibilities to formally communicate local 
aspirations through efforts to collect data with the LF format as a reference point to convey local 
needs within broader stakeholder discussions. The final section provides an in-depth exploration 
of the adaptation of LF as an essential tool for data gathering and the establishment of 
meaningful communication in a three year reconciliation project called Finding a Solution 
Together (FAST).  
 
Development Post-Conflict: Tensions and Surveillance    
 
The Sinhala State’s war of genocide destroyed the peaceful life of the Tamils. It turned the Tamils 
into refugees in their own homeland, ruined their nation’s social and economical infrastructure and 
plunged them into unprecedented hardships. While our motherland, caught within gruesome Sinhala 
military rule, is destroyed, Sinhalisation of our historic territory is going on under the pretexts of 
High Security Zones and Free Trade Zones. This naked Sinhalisation proceeds by the hoisting of 
Lion flags, the erection of Sidharthan statues, the renaming of Tamil streets with Sinhala names, the 
building of Buddhist temples. Sinhala settlements are mushrooming in the Tamil homeland.33 
 
On November 27th 2007, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE publicly reflected on 
decades of Tamil existence in Sri Lanka - a Tamil motherland confronted with the domination 
of  a ‘foreign’ economy, culture and religion. Nearly two years later, on May 9th 2009 the civil 
conflict ended through a military effort by the Rajapaksa government and Prabhakaran was 
                                                 
33 Excerpt from ‘Heroes’ Day’ speech by LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on November 27, 2007, Retrieved 
from  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/07nov24ltte.htm 
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killed.  His death symbolised the defeat of the LTTE, but not a finale to views driving the 
conflict since the 1980s. The conflict ended. Perceptions of Sinhalisation did not.  
For three decades, some regions were under LTTE rule and others experienced LTTE and GoSL 
administration, due to territorial gains and losses between the two sides. In the territories 
controlled by the LTTE, the LTTE operated all administrative facets from schools, roads, their 
own NGOs and a judiciary in line with the LTTE ideology (Ib-34). At times, separatist 
aspirations held by the LTTE and communities were similar.  
With the termination of the war, all Northern and Eastern communities were administered by 
the GoSL and became part of ‘Sri Lanka’. Although the war was over, a sense of conflict still 
remained among some. For locals, underlying views of defeat of a Tamil group and unfairness 
were prominent, as one manager in the East noted:  
Right now the conflict is over, the peacebuilding scenarios are now brought up, but we [Tamils] 
don’t have something to cope with that peacebuilding, the reconciliation part. When we see the 
Sinhalese or Muslims, we get angry because we [Tamils] don’t have anything, we have lost even 
the war actually. (Ib-58, sic) 
 
In this instance, the victory over terrorism declared by the government was not shared by all 
communities. For some, it was a defeat which resulted in new discussions of ‘peace and 
reconciliation’. Although all communities (Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims) were victims of 
the conflict and suffered loss of lives and property, the Tamils were directly affected because 
the LTTE was firmly entrenched in the Tamil areas. Therefore the wars were fought mostly 
in areas occupied by the Tamils.   Countless Tamils lost family, friends, houses and their 
livelihoods (Ib-39). The damage left behind from the final phases of the conflict was 
recognisable from the state of mind of locals, in this light, one donor explained: 
Their minds are not cleared yet and they can’t do cultivation and they don’t even have their own 
house. They are just looking at broken buildings and having a tarpaulin sheet in the corner. It will 
take time. It’s not something that will change immediately. (Ib-54)  
 
The basic infrastructure of neighbourhoods, families, shelter and livelihood were disrupted. The 
aftermath of the conflict impacted the collective well-being of communities and displaced 
nearly 300,000 people from their homes. The uprooted existence of displacement prevented 
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locals from engaging routine activities such as earning income or sending their children to 
school (Field Notes, 2012).  
Individuals affected by the conflict became ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs) and were 
relocated by the government from their ancestral lands and homes to camps. Due to the fear of 
former LTTE cadres regrouping for continuing terrorist activities, the GoSL took extreme 
measures to thwart this possibility by keeping the IDPs in secured camps, and releasing only 
those who have been deemed as “non-terrorists” (Field Notes, 2012). 
On an estimated 700 hectares cleared forest in the North of Sri Lanka, the government set up 
the ‘Manik Farm’ which provided temporary shelter for 250,000 IDPs. The world’s largest 
refugee camp, the government initially restricted the movement of civilians and did not permit 
them to leave the premises. Within the camp, IDPs faced government forms of administration. 
The government established an ‘intake’ system in which individuals were interviewed, assessed 
for proof of identity and allocated shelter within a camp zoning scheme (Ib-48; Ib-60). Separate 
zones, were built to provide all amenities from healthcare to schools for residents who had been 
cleared of terrorist activities and others were designed by the government to vet and rehabilitate 
former members of the LTTE and sympathizers of the LTTE (Ib-48). It was reported that in 
some instances, people disappeared and were not heard from again (Ib-60). The former 
symbolised continued terror as international organisations were not permitted by the 
government to oversee operations and methods used to rehabilitate in these zones (Ib-60).  
Parallel to (and after) the Manik Farm, the government maintained a strong military presence 
in the former conflict zones. In these areas the military established outposts.  Although Sri 
Lankan army soldiers lived amongst communities, it was apparent that a feeling of mistrust 
existed between the groups. The GoSL took strict measures to ensure that the cessation of 
violence would hold and the army was used to enforce these rules.  As, for example, 
immediately after the conflict, public gatherings of men were banned since the Government 
feared a resurgence of the LTTE (Ib-37).  
The GoSL also initiated a commission called the “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation 
Commission” to find an agreeable solution to all parties concerned. It was noted, "the process 
of reconciliation required a full acknowledgement of the tragedy of the conflict and a collective 
act of contrition by the political leaders and civil society, of both Sinhala and Tamil 
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communities." Though highly critiqued by international organizations and Tamil communities 
within and outside of Sri Lanka, the LLRC was used as a mechanism to shape government, 
community and NGO efforts (TamilNet, 2011).   
The relationship between the GoSL and several foreign NGOs were not very cordial, and 
sometimes even antagonistic34. The liberated areas still being considered as unstable, the 
government tasked the military to monitor NGO activity. The government, in many instances, 
were hostile towards foreign NGO involvement as there was a perception that the LTTE had 
used NGOs to channel funding and separatist propaganda. In addition, NGOs aided in the 
production of death tolls and displacement figures; which were politicised estimates that 
supported LTTE propaganda claims of government genocide.  
At the end of the conflict in 2009, the government restricted NGO access to some former LTTE 
territories. Here, the military enforced security measures government such as mandatory 
checkpoints which impeded and delayed the humanitarian work of the NGOs. As per guidelines 
imposed, the military visited NGO project sites, interviewed potential beneficiaries from the 
efforts of the NGOs and worked alongside local Government representatives (Field Notes, 
2012; Ib-37). Overall, the end of the conflict marked the beginning of new forms of knowing 
and administering communities based on the reconstruction plan of the GoSL. The focus was 
resettlement and reintegration via the provision of services. The application of these policies 
invariably exposed individuals to mistrust, ongoing tensions, lack of empowerment and fear of 
the future.  
Given this scenario of mistrust, NGOs functioned as an intermediary between Tamil 
communities and the government. To some extent, communities trusted and confided in NGOs 
since some staff were from similar cultures and sympathetic to the grievances of the 
communities. NGOs, such as Sarvodaya, had a repertoire with local leaders which predated the 
conflict, and were well positioned to understand and communicate the needs of the communities 
to GoSL. These factors and the discourse of ‘participation’ in the development sector supported 
the incorporation of local views and their ‘mind-sets’ as within the scope projects. As such, 
communities considered projects as an avenue to address immediate needs as well as articulate 
                                                 
34 See http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/sri-lanka  
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struggles and frustrations faced under the government and its bureaucracy. In this vein, a project 
manager from the Manik Farm stated:  
There is a difference with conflict-based projects. We have to mainly consider the local context 
their [community] behaviours their views about the future.  
… 
This information can be captured because we are talking with them, we know some of the people 
and we can ask, they are sharing with us, that kind of thing. That point is very important I think 
when we are doing any kind of project or any kind of implementing. We have to give more 
priority, that means more than 30 or 40% we have to think about their thinkings and their 
experience, their ideas. (Ib-48, sic)  
 
The community re-building efforts proposed by the government lacked consultation and 
empowerment of communities, and this position aggravated locals. It also, as noted above, put 
NGOs in a position to engage with locals and capture their ‘thinkings and experience’.  
In this sense, access to local aspirations and needs were granted to Sarvodaya. Taking local 
views forward, effort was placed on coordinating communities which, in the words of the 
Director of Projects, posed a challenge of “meet[ing] these people and bring[ing] them to a 
common goal, and a planning framework and having a way to move forward” (Ib-37).  Part of 
the challenge involved the government, as each project was appraised based on its contribution 
to the overall policies of re-construction program of the government. Since NGOs were also 
subject to government surveillance and restrictions, a balance had to be struck between 
government expectations of project deliverables with the authentic and urgent needs within the 
communities. In this light, one senior manager stated:  
It’s ridiculous, you know, because even myself, if my phone is tapped by the military, if some 
military says to me, “Take care of yourself.” You know, it’s threatening. At my level I can say, “I’m 
a lawyer, whatever.” But you know, another innocent person, they will not be able to say that. 
At the same time, there is a lot of space and need for good governance in the North and East, even 
participation. But I don’t know how people are ready to fill the gap because their serious structures 
are not fully established. (Ib-41) 
 
In this vein, engaging in development activities was sensitive for staff as well. The influence of 
the government included even established NGOs and those involved in post-conflict work relied 
on their expertise and requested for policies to streamline their operations and conduct 
meaningful participation.  
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In addition to government limitations and oversight, good governance projects in the North and 
East were potentially problematic for the organisation. While preparing proposals and reports 
regarding good governance interventions, a senior manager also noted:  
In the case of good governance, I need to be a little bit careful with my wording. If I say, “This 
government does not do anything” that can be a problem. So, now I’m thinking of [the] words, 
the formats and if they [words and formats] have a lot of critics. I’ve got to be careful of the 
wording because that would make trouble, and not only for me but for the organisation.  (Ib-41) 
 
Even though reports had to be sensitised to government positions, reports were also a form and 
process which brought together communities, the government and development efforts.  
In May 2009, the President of Sri Lanka appointed a 19 member PTF for Resettlement, 
Development and Security in the Northern Province. The PTF was given the authority to prepare 
strategic plans, programs and projects to resettle IDPs, rehabilitate and develop economic and 
social infrastructure of the Northern Province. One of the responsibilities of the PTF was to 
liaise with all organizations in the public and private sectors.   
 
The PTF became an established a project reporting requirement for the NGOs operating in the 
North (Ib-38; Ib-48). For NGOs, project proposals were submitted to the PTF and, in turn, their 
committee approved each proposal, NGOs were required to submit project reports to the PTF 
and local government bodies in order to operate in certain areas. Among other requirements, 
the PTF focused on types of interventions organised, beneficiary lists and financial information 
(Annex 15).  
The PTF was a reporting bottleneck by which the government monitored views of communities 
and NGOs. It was an extension of a formalised reporting system between donors, NGOs and 
communities, providing a tracking mechanism from the funding agencies to the fund recipients. 
The feedback obtained from the communities were forwarded to the PTF and the PTF used this 
information according to support their objectives and not necessarily the priorities of the 
communities.  
With the existing system of reporting, it was therefore problematic to communicate the needs 
of the community to the government, due to the bureaucracy and the reporting methodology. 
To overcome this obstacle, Sarvodaya used the LF to reach and articulate local viewpoints.   
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The following section will discuss how a particular accounting method, the LF was used to 
further and frame community interests and, more importantly, how it became a tool for 
representing local experiences and aspirations. First, an examination of the LF in three post-
conflict projects will be provided: Mine Risk Education (MRE), CIDA and Swiss Solidarity 
(SS). The discussion will highlight the role of the LF in collecting data and applying expertise 
to represent locals (MRE) and its use to develop and format linkages between legal frameworks 
such as the LLRC relevant to local views (CIDA/SS).  
 
Data Collection and Community Frameworks  
In the late 1990s, the LF was introduced into selected NOVIB projects in Sarvodaya. Decades 
later, due to its success, some donors made LF reporting mandatory for the projects they funded. 
At times, it was also voluntarily used by Sarvodaya staff to plan, monitor and evaluate projects 
(Ib-34; Field Notes, 2012), making it de facto standard at Sarvodaya.  After 2009, the LF was 
relevant for certain good governance, reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in the North and 
East of Sri Lanka. Mainly, versions of the LF were part of, inter alia, proposals, budgets and 
final evaluations with donors such as Oxfam, the European Union, Norad, Swiss Solidarity, the 
United Nations and War Child Holland.  
Given the post-conflict context, the LF was part of a formalised system of reporting which 
brought together the government, NGOs and communities. At times, the LF itself represented 
a ‘system’ for expression. For example, in an effort to promote community-based enterprises 
the LF was thought of as a window to communicate the economic position of locals to 
government officials, since documents would be reviewed by said officials. Reflecting on the 
way the LF was taught to locals, a project manager emphasised:  
…we used the LF and brought it to the people so they can express their views to the government 
and policy makers. When we bring communities to this place [where they can express their views] 
through the LF, they have some motivation and the government agents can decide what is to be done 
with at least some technical input from communities. (Ib-59)  
 
For this project, the manager framed the LF as a way to transfer local views to authorities. It 
was a conduit for making sense of economic decisions and presenting desires from the local 
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market. In addition, thoughts from communities entered government purview as ‘technical 
input’. As such, the LF itself and its perceived technical nature were valued.  
In other projects, the technical nature of the LF manifested in two ways. First, through how the 
LF trained staff to collect data and ‘think’ in terms of data (MRE) and, second, in the linking of 
the LF to other frameworks (SS/CIDA).  
For the former, the MRE project which focused on demining and educating communities about 
mine fields and risks leverage reports such as the LF to document realities on the ground. For 
instance, one of the objectives of the Mine Risk Education (MRE) project was to increase access 
to information at the community and policy levels on the existence of land mines in the North. 
This was central to demining and establishing safe zones as clear sense of where mine fields 
were located became known (Ib-31). To achieve this objective, emphasis was placed on 
collecting accurate information, and the act of collecting was framed as a community effort.  
The MRE proposal stated:  
Through the establishment of close relationship and integration with the community members, we 
will be able to gather data from community members and disseminate the information to the proper 
stakeholders. Mine and UXO information, safe and dangerous area information, new mine field 
related information, mine victims related details and other child protection related information such 
child rights violations and child abuses. This information will be gathered during the house to house 
visit by MRE team.  (Dc-1) 
 
The project hinged on reliable information, partly due to the lack of proper maps and files 
documenting the location of landmines from the LTTE and government (Ib-31). In this sense, 
communities were mobilised to collect raw data and link it to other themes of development and 
aspects of their lives such as child protection. The format to which locals inputted information 
included the LF, as templates were created for communities in Tamil which were part of a larger 
LF monitoring plan from the donor (Annex 16).  
Going forward, the volunteers and local mobilisers became more involved and claimed 
ownership of the reporting process. At an MRE meeting held in Tamil, staff and volunteers 
expressed that their new project manager was helpful because he shared and promoted the 
collection and monitoring framework with them. One stated:  
Earlier we didn’t know the proposal even. Now Myron [the project manager] came to explain, brief 
the proposal and budget. The activities, divide the activities, divide the group. Each and every group 
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they have some goal and achievement. Every group has targets, for example case studies, community 
mapping… the staff and volunteers are telling that this is good for us to develop everything. In future 
we can achieve our target in an easy way. Earlier we didn’t have anything. We weren’t aware about 
the proposal and budget and everything. Now, we are in a structured method. (Ib-6) 
 
The inclusion of communities into the processes behind the LF provided a sense of direction 
for volunteers and staff, many of whom were locals. In addition, conversations in Tamil around 
targets, indicators and activities were coupled with Tamil35/English documents supporting the 
LF. In this sense, communities became part of the reporting system even at the granular level 
of collecting information according to their personal schedules. In addition, the format of the 
LF became accessible through Tamil/English versions and locals were keen to learn more about 
the ‘direction’ methods such as the LF provided. The proposal, budget, case studies, targets etc. 
were part of the grammar of the LF and were viewed by locals as a ‘structured method’.  
In addition to ‘collecting data’, the LF was linked to other comparable and complementary 
system formats and frameworks to broaden and validate community interests. For instance, 
CIDA and SS supported a project to collect community views and initiatives that fit within the 
government’s LLRC recommendations.  According to the LLRC report, the main purpose of 
the committee and document was to ‘inquire and report’ on events between the ceasefire in 2002 
and end of the conflict in 200936.   
                                                 
35 The use of Tamil to discuss and collect data to fill western LF templates was not uncommon. For example, a 
similar project from Save the Children relied on translated versions of the proposal and LF which mixed both Tamil 
and English to guide staff and communities (Ib-30). 
36 More specifically, the LLRC report outlined:  
i. The facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement 
operationalised on 21st February 2002 and the sequence of events that followed 
thereafter up to the 19th of May 2009;  
ii. Whether any person, group or institution directly or indirectly bear responsibility in this 
regard 
iii. The lessons we would learn from those events and their attendant concerns, in order to 
ensure that there will be no reoccurrence  
iv. The methodology whereby restitution to any person affected by those events to their 
dependents or their heirs, can be effected  
v. The institutional, administrative and legislative measures which need to be taken in 
order to prevent any recurrence of such concerns in the future, to promote further 
national unity and reconciliation among all communities, and to make any such other 
recommendations with reference to any of the matters that have been inquired into under 
the terms of these Warrant.  
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Referencing in the LLRC, projects trained communities within parameters of the LLRC37 to 
express their concerns. The projects focused on locals creating their own action plans, LFs and 
even budgets for community initiatives. The project manager who was responsible for training 
locals to design LFs, noted that this was useful since: 
Due to the war, people in these areas are not fit to face anything - no direction and afraid to 
express their views. Planning and making projects is important, it gives them a way out. In the 
North and East, their minds are like water – going everywhere with no shape – and, in this project, 
the “Logframe” is the bottle to give them some form. (Ib-49)  
 
Similar to the MRE project, the LF was perceived as ‘“empowering” communities. Teaching 
the LF to locals was viewed as a tool which enabled to establish a structured form of expression. 
This prompted managers to encourage locals to construct their own LF which aligned with the 
government’s LLRC. Locals submitted their LF to donors for funding and, given government 
oversight, connections made to the LLRC was a form of protection (Ib-30). Even though some 
locals had limited expertise and knowledge of the LF ‘logic’, somehow locals managed to 
partially fill out templates. This was recognised by managers and, to mitigate difficulties around 
western based concepts and language, LF templates were also prepared in Tamil and Sinhalese 
(Annex 17). That said, managers were more concerned with relating local experiences to the 
LLRC, rather than preparing a comprehensive LF.  “It’s not perfect,” a manager stated, “but 
they [locals] do it, just to have something concrete in line with the LLRC” (Ib-50).  
The LLRC was an avenue for locals to reference a government platform in order to describe 
their own aspirations. For example, one LF template referenced ‘harmony and co-existence’ 
within the framework of human rights, rather than separatism or dissatisfaction with the 
government (Figure 12). In the LF, harmony and co-existence were coupled with locally driven 
                                                 
(Dd-3, p. ii-iii)  
 
37 The LLRC also explicitly noted a role for NGOs and other civil society actors to work with communities. As 
such, ‘people-centric devolution of power’ was central which, in Sarvodaya’s view, meant:  
The real issue of sharing power and participating in governance is the empowerment of the people 
and making the political leaders accountable to the people. The effective functioning of the 
democratic system together with a consensual framework of devolution will also provide the 
answers to the grievances of minorities.  
(Dc-4, p. 30)  
 
 136 
 
activities of child protection, banners, handouts and workshops on human rights. This was a 
method for matching Government discourse and, at the same time, funding activities which 
would otherwise be viewed as challenging the Government, an example being ‘awareness’ 
programmes around security forces.  
 
 
Figure 12: Swiss Solidity Logical Framework Model on Human Rights 
 
The LF promoted a technical link between government mandates and desired activities at the 
community-level. The framing of local interests as a technical exercise was further solidified 
by costing out goals, objectives and activities in the LF. The concept of human rights was 
quantified so that an assigned would signify a position in a pre-determined scale. Similarly, 
other management formats (such as budgets) were also quantified (Figure 9). There were a 
series of templates which mixed Tamil, Sinhalese and English, yet a constant perception of a 
‘logic’ and system was promoted in training (Ib-34). For this project, communities were 
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educated in all types of reports, from the LF to proposals, in order to construct their own 
formalised system which used Government frameworks to represent their local interests. This 
localised system appeased Government authorities as documents such as the LF used of the 
LLRC and also reports were subject to Government approvals. For example, a budget which 
was prepared based on a LF was signed off by different layers of authority within Sarvodaya 
(village, district and head office) and subsequently submitted to local Government authorities 
(Figure 13; Field notes, 2013).  Through the process of making LFs ideas at the community 
level became increasingly formalised into management and, later Government, in a format that 
ensured a high possibility of approval. 
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Figure 13: English and Sinhala Budget for Communities 
 
This section provided examples of how the LF was used to structure and engage communities 
in collecting data on their own experiences and it illustrated how the LF supports a technical 
link between community interests and government platforms such as the LLRC. Through data 
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collection and preparing reports, communities formally presented their ideas and experiences 
for rebuilding in a manner receptive to the government. 
The next section will provide detail of the FAST programme - a reconciliation and 
reconstruction project funded by NORAD. It will also expand on the LF format as a venue to 
engage communities and how the LF and other frameworks formed a formalised report 
ecosystem.  
First, it will outline the reporting mechanics of FAST and frameworks used in the project (LF 
and results framework). Second, it will highlight how the reporting frameworks were used to 
construct and present a particular concept relating to peace and conflict. Mainly, it will explore 
how the manner in which peace and conflict were communicated through qualitative indicators 
and how such indicators became a proxy for development efforts. Third, this section will explore 
how the LF and other framework form a flexible yet structured method for measuring and 
reporting on communities.  
 
Finding a Solution Together with the Logical Framework  
 
In 2009, Sarvodaya submitted a ninety-seven-page proposal to NORAD for the Finding a 
Solution Together (FAST) programme, a project for peace, reconciliation and good governance 
under Sarvodaya’s Deshodaya office. The project was approved in 2010. It lasted from January 
2011 to December 2013, requiring financing over the three-year period to the amount of 
13,305,678 NOK38. The proposal requested that NORAD cover 90% of project costs.  
The proposal describes the historical legacy of conflicts, gaps in citizen engagement, economic 
and social disparities, low female and youth involvement and the lack of a ‘rights based’ 
approach to promote human rights in Sri Lanka. The proposal also integrates comments from a 
past project, NORAD’s Community Empowerment for Peace, Reconciliation and 
Development, referencing its midterm review report repeatedly. 
                                                 
38 As of 15.19.2014, 13, 305, 678 NOK is equivalent to 2,063,836.80 USD.  
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This project was motivated by Sarvodaya’s levels of awakening’ beliefs, as the 260 villages 
selected were those that reached Grama Swaraj (self-reliance) under Sarvodaya’s five steps (see 
Chapter 4). These villages were from all twenty-five Sri Lankan districts, including five in the 
North and three in the East, a testament to Sarvodaya’s vast national network.   
FAST was divided into six phases, each lasting six months; the first set focused on education 
and dialogue, and the remaining phases on good governance, reconciliation and sustainable 
peace. Plans and their implementation were ‘phase based’ as a strategic choice was made to 
incorporate lessons learnt from monitoring the first phase into subsequent phases.  
To oversee the project Sarvodaya headquarters originally assigned the Director of Partner 
Coordination (also the creator of the proposal) to the main management position; however, the 
role was later designated to the Deputy Executive Director. Including the director, there were 
four staff members in the headquarters, and many indirect staff enrolled from specialised 
independent units, districts and other supporting departments involved in the project. Segments 
of the project had been contracted to other entities within the Sarvodaya network such as 
Sarvodaya Legal Services Movement, Sarvodaya Women’s Movement and SEEDS, all of 
which were included in the original proposal. 
As part of the proposal and monitoring framework, a LF was created in consultation with 
communities and with no direct guidance from NORAD. According to a project manager, 
NORAD expected certain results, yet did not provide formal guidance due to their own donor 
philosophy (Ib-45). In this project, the LF was created and used alongside of other mechanisms 
such as a results framework, action plan, budgets etc. The following section will explore the use 
of the LF in this organisation and community context.  
 
Reporting and the Logical Framework  
 
Sarvodaya designed FAST by using a LF and the Results Based Framework. There is an explicit 
‘mixing’ of these two approaches in proposal documentation, each arising from a ‘participatory 
process’ (Figure 14). Based on a people-centric vision of development, communities were 
 141 
 
consulted when making elements that fed into the LF, such as objectives and activities. In turn, 
consultations passed onto headquarters at the national level.  
 
 
Figure 14: FAST Project Formulation 
 
According to the proposal, the project goal, benefits, intermediate results and outputs were 
based on a LF approach and Results Framework (Annex 18; Figure 15). Both ‘frameworks’ are 
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included in proposal appendices and were developed with the assistance of external consultants 
from PRINCE2 and Management Systems International, UK and US based firms, respectively.  
The ‘goal’, also referenced as the ‘outcome’, was that “citizens engage positively with each-
other and with the local and national governments to further stabilise the peaceful Sri Lankan 
democracy”. In achieving this goal, there are three milestones of ‘benefit’ (impact) points and 
three ‘intermediate results’ (with a list of outputs under each). In this format, the intermediate 
results are the delivery categories and outputs are the concrete actual deliverables of the project 
(i.e. people’s forum, vocational training etc.). The stated benefits and intermediate results are 
as follows:   
Benefits (Impacts)  
1. Increased social cohesion reduces vulnerability, exclusion and 
discrimination  
2. Government is accountable, transparent and has integrity at all levels.  
3. Issues relevant to all citizens, including minorities, are addressed by the 
local and national governments 
Intermediate Result 
1. Barriers to political participation reduced for all groups including 
minorities, women and youth. 
2. Opportunities for involvement in governance at all levels increased 
3. Reconciliation between ethnic and social groups advanced 
 
In this mixing of ‘frameworks’, it was difficult to discern where LF started and where the 
Results Based Framework ended. The two had been streamlined, at least in documentation, 
where the ‘results’ appearing in the Results Framework are present in the LF itself. This 
harmonisation based on ‘result lines’ was not limited to the LF. For example, the budget uses 
intermediate results as expense categories and, in this vein, there were two budget versions- one 
provided all detail of expenses under intermediate results and the other summarised the budget 
of expenses per intermediate result (Annex 19). In a way, there was a blurring between 
documentation and methods, which produced more streamlined report formats, such as budgets 
and action plans, by activity lines. Through the combination of diverse methodologies, the 
project for people’s participation gained solid boundaries of the limits and expectations in a 
language of results.  
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Figure 15: Excerpt from FAST Logical Framework 
 
Collection and Analysis through Frameworks  
 
Similar to other projects, there was an effort to collect data on the state of conflict or attributes 
such as ethnicity, gender and land ownership that are thought to give rise to conflict. These 
attributes then became a way of making sense of the impact of FAST and a foundation for 
filtering out the dichotomy between conflict and peace. According to NORAD consultants, a 
model that is an extension of data collected through the prism of the LF and results framework 
had the potential to map conflict. In a previous report to NORAD and Sarvodaya, stated:   
Qualitative changes in people’s minds over time on key challenges for Sri Lanka, regarding ethnic 
harmony, the view of the “the other” and the ability to self-governance and self-reliance are poorly 
documented. A more systematic approach could make it possible to document changes in accordance 
to the overarching goal of the organisation of the Norwegian supported project… 
It would be useful if Sarvodaya undertakes conflict mapping to draw up a conceptual model of 
conflicts and to have a shared reference for diagnosis of the cause, nature and possible solutions to 
conflict. Again, the team find it useful to develop qualitative indicators linked to participants change 
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in understanding of conflict and conflict resolution in general and the national conflict in particular. 
(Dd-2, p. 29)  
 
In response to previous donor comments, FAST made an effort to document information related 
to conflict. The project aimed not only to change the lives of locals, but also to establish a way 
of framing and measuring ‘qualitative’ changes related to conflict itself. Mainly, attributes 
related to the causes of conflict such as ethnicity, religion, income or even gender were coupled 
with concepts of peace and reconciliation and tracked through another project. Moreover, the 
way the Director of Partner Coordination described the project was through attributes of 
communities and attributes mapped a path for peace. He noted: 
Finding a solution together –FAST – you can say briefly. And, what is the goal of the project? The 
goal of the project is to make sure that all ends positively with each other and with government to 
further stabilise the peaceful Sri Lankan democracy. That is why we always use for this finding a 
solution vehicle. This is not only an act of civil society, this is not really an act of government, but 
we all have the majority, minority communities and in all these companies, we all are trying to find 
a solution to this.  
So this is the framework of the projects. So the highest project result is peace and with local and 
national governments, we have intermediate results, the first result is various political points of 
participation for all the groups including minorities, youth and women. We have really considered 
about this minority issues and youth issues and women issues. (Mb-2) 
 
The way FAST was described was to take on attributes and impose the project framework and 
vision as a reflection of society. This was notable as many locals in the North and East did not 
have a sense of the concept of reconciliation– what it meant for locals or what it looked like in 
practice (Mb-2). The project in itself was not a contributor to peace; however, it defined and 
delivered peace by carving the path for it.  
One of the main activities listed in the LF - Deshodaya Forums (DF) - perpetuated the collection 
of information and a sense of being a ‘solution vehicle’. The project hosted 41 DFs, which were 
open public gatherings for locals to express their views. DFs were used to collect information 
on attendees – ethnicity, religion and gender – and the turnout of attendees was matched with 
attributes from conflict-affected groups (i.e. Tamils, Muslims and women) (Ib-34). 
Furthermore, DFs were used to identify community leaders and also provide an opportunity for 
locals to propose community level action plans. The forums also invited key stakeholders such 
as government officials and experts, and were framed as a safe venue for discussions. The venue 
was mainly a space created for conversation and action, something that had been restricted after 
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the war (Ib-35). Noted by the Director of Partner Coordination at the first year review meeting, 
the space was both unstructured (to solicit views) and guided (to provide direction). He stated:  
The project wants active participation’ – which means to have elected officials more accountable to 
communities – they did this [in DFs] by having a structure that based on the programme and ‘open 
ended’ for participation  
For this activity, people had a lot of fun, because what we do is we take all this, I mean if we select 
a basic question and we invite all the members related to this basic question and then we ask 
questions from there. What is your capacity? What do you do and what are your challenges? So we 
try to get rid of the controversial solutions to deliver the peaceful solutions. (Mb-2) 
 
Even though the project framework only sought to solicit community feedback in an open-ended 
manner, it also functioned as an implicit structure of how conversations around reconciliation 
and peace should be framed and presented.  Questions posed in the forum guided the 
construction of peace by locals, and this construct fit a larger system and logic of the LF. In 
these ways, the definition and application of peace was narrowed.  
In this project, such a direction of peace based on attributes was illustrated through reports and 
graphs in presentations to reflect participation. In a first year review meeting with NORAD and 
different levels of Sarvodaya, the Director of Partner Coordination highlighted that attributes as 
well as proportion mattered. He noted in his presentation of results that:  
So you can see the graph, the sort of participation of religious leaders. Even though it’s not at the 
national level, it’s another condition you need to have, sort of people, mainly the proportion of 
Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Christian priests.  
Overall, the outcome of the activities in the religious committees are formed and they are involved 
in so we can identify social issues. (Mb-2)  
 
To conduct such a peace effort, the project defined what peace was through attributes and also 
by turning attributes into statistical references (example through graphs that showed results 
progress).  
This project used its framework, which included the LF and its iterations, to chart out a path for 
transforming conflict into peace or reconciliation. As noted in the project’s review meeting:  
Now we have established a frequent discussion and action strategy on the ground and this structure 
has been based on recommendations for strengthening reconciliation, and changing the mind-sets of 
people, international or district staff who promote participation. We have staff trained and trained 
staff had volunteers who adopted with baseline survey. All this that has been a favourable experience 
of all the people. (Mb-2)  
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In absence of a clear path to reconciliation, the intervention used the project framework to 
provide an outlet and avenue for participation and analysis of progress in relation to 
reconciliation and peace.  
This approach was well received by NORAD and as a testimony,   a NORAD representative 
said the following in their final review of year two meeting:  
So our understanding is that you have a very detailed system to collect information from the ground 
levels and throughout the organisation which obviously makes it very important tool for you to 
monitor and steer the participants… 
…we specifically like that you have segmented your data based on gender and ethnic groups or 
religion geography. We think that’s a very good way of presenting it because it makes it easier to 
understand the depths of the results in a very physical way, in a way used for reconciliation, in the 
case to use awareness of participants. That I think is very good and we think that’s the way to 
continue, the segmented data. (Mb-2) 
 
In this meeting, the donor representative was able to understand and derive conclusion regarding 
reconciliation as presented by Sarvodaya through the data collection process. Additionally, 
frameworks played a central role for donors in unpacking and categorising people in relation to 
the effort of peace building.   
The next section will elaborate on ways Sarvodaya addressed concerns around indicators and 
how these indicators existed outside of the LF and as a reference point to discuss wider results.  
 
Making Connections: Indicators and Revisions  
 
In discussions with NORAD and project staff, the use of activities and indicators became 
forefront. Taken from the LF, the indicators were part of an effort to connect data attributes to 
‘results’. And thus, indicators were presented as a reference point. For instance, donors noted 
in their first project review meeting that:  
However its maybe a little difficult to read the results when you come up to the more results level 
and we would like to refer to the proposed indicators that are in the annex one of the document , the 
main one that programme was started. Maybe hear from your reporting going forward, if it’s possible 
to relate the data you have collected to those indicators. (Mb-2)  
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The indicators were from the original LF submitted at the proposal stage. Indicators became a 
focal point of discussion in this donor review meeting and, later, amongst project managers.  
In this meeting, the donor asked for a few summarised indicators instead of the complete, long 
list of indicators included in the annex of Sarvodaya’s final report for year one (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16: Excerpt from FAST’s List of Indicators  
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The use of many indicators, as noted by the Director of Partner Coordination, was a way of 
finding and making connections to the concept of peace at the community level. He noted:  
For all our indicators, the connection is not very strong [to the ground], it is just very raw. So I think 
it’s a matter of time. Next time we will connect it much more directly and also to the baseline data 
coming from the survey and the indicators. 
So I think in a year or two we’ll most probably have the base connection. But we wanted to – we 
picked up already so that we are ourselves become disciplined enough for relating all the outcomes, 
outputs, leads, definitely when there’s an outcome. (Mb-2) 
 
In a project situation where peace and reconciliation were ill defined, the purpose of many 
indicators was part of an attempt to make connections and associations to illustrate progress. 
This was also problematic as the vision of ‘Deshodaya’ guiding the definition of peace in 
Sarvodaya did not hold a consistent connotation amongst staff, partly, because the idea itself 
was the brainchild of one man, Ariyaratne (Ib-36). The director noted that ‘Deshodaya could be 
everything’ and that his interpretation was ‘good governance and rights’ in the Sri Lankan 
context. However, there were no means to validate this framing without Ariyaratne. For the 
director, the perpetual use and witling down of indicators into LF outcomes, outputs etc. aimed 
to reflect some community reality.  
Indicators and activities in turn became central documents in the project. The indicator sheets 
were used extensively by project managers; at meetings, discussions and field visits (Field 
Notes, 2013). The project manager also revised the list of indicators with the help of the director 
to make distinctions based on what an ‘activity’ is and what an ‘output’ is or an ‘outcome’ in 
the indicator list. Indicators existed inside and outside of the LF format, the latter without the 
structure of the LF.  There was an effort to also translate indicators and activities into Tamil and 
Sinhala to make the project more accessible in districts and to various community leaders 
(Annex 20). Translations of activities and indicators were presented within a consistent matrix-
like format, which at times also had English, and were accompanied by other translated material 
such as newsletters. Over time, indicators and activities altered their orientation (to outputs and 
outcomes etc.) and also changed their substance through translation to fit within the local 
context.  
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In addition to local exposure, indicators became a focal point for ensuring buy in from the 
government. For instance, in order to obtain approval and support from the government, a Legal 
Services officer noted that: 
…the indicators need to be sensitised to them [the government], since for some of our activities, like 
the part of the legal services movement, really need the government officer’s support, because the 
documentation is finally issued by the government. (Mb-2)  
 
The use of indicators in this way facilitated an understanding of the role of the project and shift 
in interventions from solely emergency relief to good governance. As one meeting attendee 
noted:  
The indicators and project is literally what will help them [the government] understand the role we 
played before 2011 was different. It was mainly humanitarian and emergency relief and now, these 
activities are much more broad in consideration of the long term. (Mb-2)  
 
 
In this sense, indicators not only collect information for approval, but also can send signals to 
the government, in terms of the type, content and magnitude of work undertaken and eventually 
accomplished. In this process, there is interplay between sensitised and desensitised indicators 
and data. For instance, the Executive Director noted that the collection of information on gender, 
ethnicity and religion was part of being sensitive to factors that contributed to the conflict (Mb-
2). The Director of Partner Coordination trained managers to think about attributes in meetings 
and while undertaking the project. For example, in a meeting with the project staff, the Director 
began the discussion by asking all members to talk about their projects. However, he realised 
that many members were not ‘framing’ their answers in relation to the structure outlined in the 
proposal. In his words, they would simply ‘talk’ but not ‘report’. To make meetings productive, 
the director reformulated his questions and asked ‘What were your results? Tell me what you 
did and what were the outcomes?’ He found that this method was the most useful way to solicit 
relevant information. In this way, indicators and results were reverse engineered from 
communities to fit a pre-set framework.  
Moreover, the process of making staff and the project sensitive to government constraints was 
an effort to desensitise and normalise at the society level (Mb-2). The director noted:  
The first time we analysed data, it was sensitive information, I now I think at the society level there 
is desensitisation, for example, we can talk about gender in villages and it eventually becomes simple 
guidance. To the point where gender becomes naturally part of our society. (Mb-2) 
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As planned, the manner in which data was collected and mobilised was part of a process of 
making connections and neutralising the attributes of conflict in society.   
In 2013, a series of informal meetings were held between the director and the lead project 
manager. In these meetings, the list of indicators refined over time was put back into a LF 
format. The director and manager brainstormed ways to make indicators fit the LF logic. One 
draft from a brain storming session was as follows: 
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Figure 17: Brainstorming Back into the Logical Framework 
In this way, indicators were ‘put back’ into the LF (Figure 17). This process hints at the 
flexibility of the LF—it can be taken apart and then put back together. It also speaks to staff 
interests in organising data that had been collected based on an inflexible perception of the LF’s 
logic and format.  
This section explored the way the LF was used and how it was taken apart based on its ability 
to collect information according to the indicators. It also illustrated how indicators became a 
pivotal point for making sense of the data and sending signals about the kind of development 
interventions that were undertaken.  
 
Discussion 
 
This chapter explored how communities and wider stakeholders previously outside of state 
purview leveraged the LF to represent their interest in the bounds of government administration.  
In this context, the LF was used as a methodology to represent and structure community 
interests. For example, creating LFs at the community level enabled a framing of local concerns 
within a discourse of human rights and activism which was palatable to the government’s LLRC 
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doctrine. Lewis (2007) and Power (1996) noted that formalised systems of accountability 
displaced ‘informal relations of trust’, yet in this instance, formal frameworks such as the LF 
supported possibilities to build trust amongst communities, NGOs and the government. The 
remnants of the LTTE administration and underlying ethnic tensions polluted informal relations 
between actors to the extent that locals relied on formal systems and methodologies to express 
and present their aspirations. In addition, use of the LF and other management formats provided 
an entry point for donors, diverse NGO staff and the government to interact and incorporate 
community interests. In this sense, contrary to previous studies (Lewis, 2007; Power 1996; 
Power 1997), formal relations supported possibilities to foster trust and cultivate informal 
relations. This is consistent with Porter (1995) in that quantification within society can be 
mobilised to ‘coordinate activities or settle disputes’ since reliance on numbers ‘minimises the 
need for intimate knowledge and personal trust’ (p. ix). It also extends Porter (1995) by 
suggesting that numbers and systems potentially developed feelings of familiarity within 
situations of conflict faced by NGOs. Individuals from different ethnic groups were able to 
collaborate within the project space and, as explained in the next chapter, the formal expert roles 
associated with reporting (i.e. project manager, donor etc.) enabled individuals to present and 
mobilise their identity as ‘project members’ rather than focusing on characteristics of ethnicity 
or caste.  
Furthermore, NGOs and communities rallied around the messy and imperfect process of 
creating systems in line with the LF in CACs. This is an extension of studies which illustrated 
that states were made legible through figures produced by calculations (see Scott, 1998; Spence, 
2010). However, in this context, an emergent methodology rather than particular numbers 
fostered stakeholder engagement and learning. In this sense, formality and neutrality of 
‘bureaucratic solutions’ (see Neu & Graham, 2006; Neu & Therrian, 2003; Neu, 2000) supplied 
a system of expression which, to some extent, preserved community voices. For example, 
practices such as engaging CACs in collecting data on landmines and creating LFs facilitated a 
greater understanding of planning and structure which was, subsequently, exported into locals 
lives through Tamil report templates and, in the SS/CIDA project, used as a springboard to 
develop their own projects. In addition, the messiness and imperfection of the LF noted in the 
back and forth creation of LF indicators resonates with findings from Jordan & Messner (2012).  
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While the methodology of the LF notably reinforced the perception of a ‘system’, staff and 
locals generated and used LFs in a very flexible manner. For instance, indicators of the FAST 
LF were not fixed, they evolved with the project and, to make sense of indicators, managers 
removed them from the LF into a separate document, related them to other concepts (i.e. results 
based framework) and put them back into the LF matrix. In this sense, similar to Jordan & 
Messner (2012), flexibility is valued.  
In addition, for the LF special attention was paid to the wording and to transforming the realities 
of communities into ‘governable deviance’ that fits the government’s paradigm. This chapter 
illustrates how Sarvodaya avoided words that placed the government in a negative light, just as 
communities were introduced to words, phrases and ‘logics’ of the LF in order to describe their 
own situation in a convincing manner. The efforts around indicators and objectives seem to 
facilitate the diffusion of tensions in this scenario. In the process of rolling out a LF 
methodology, locals and NGOs came to define their identities (i.e. ethnic, gender caste, regional 
etc.) in relation to specific categories of existence such as beneficiaries and activists. This 
approach, to some extent, erased controversial labels of government supporters or terrorist 
sympathisers within the reporting space and replaced it with calculated forms of knowing 
communities and development. These findings extent Beirschenk (1988) by highlighting that, 
in scenarios in which social conflicts persist, categories potentially liberate communities and 
enable participation considering their local identities are deemed controversial.   
Furthermore, the technical paradox of the LF supported locals in representing and mobilising 
their interests. This observation adds to literature on accounting in development organisations 
as it illustrates that formats are not limited to being used in English and can be modified to 
represent local needs (see Dar, 2014). In the same vein, the LF acted as an entry point for 
discussions with the government. Given the gaps in administration and lack of trust between the 
government and CACs, perceptions of neutrality were in fact desirable. More importantly, 
rather than as a vehicle for dominant interests, the perceived neutrality of the LF proved 
advantageous for the locals in their communication with the government, the dominant actor. 
The use of accounting noted in this chapter was not specifically for ‘cultural assimilation’ as 
noted by scholars such as Neu & Therrin (2004), but it was to include Tamil perspectives into 
wider management and government discussions. As this chapter demonstrates, the very 
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perception of neutrality can facilitate dialogue in circumstances of broken civil society and deep 
distrust.  
By ‘fitting’ within LF terminology and its broader network of action, communities gained 
possibilities for dialogue and participation. The perceived logic and system of the LF encased 
CACs into a model of peace-conflict. Concepts of development (good governance and human 
rights) were linked with these emergent identities and also used to construct what ‘peace’ and 
‘conflict’ entailed. The LF produced the logic of intervention by which people ‘fit’ or mould 
themselves to fit the contemporary governing paradigm and such development concepts. The 
ways in which the LF and its indicators were used to collect data and representations of 
populations of peace based on data reflect the charting of spaces for intervention. For example, 
back and forth discussions and changes around indicators in the FAST project remade 
representations of conflict and peace. The rationales behind collecting information changed (i.e. 
religion, gender, ethnicity etc.) to include depictions of progress based on proportions of 
religious groups engaged in areas. As a result, the categories for intervening on conflict gained 
substance and became self-reinforcing representations of reconciliation. This implies that the 
categories themselves are not only powerful (see Hacking, 1991), but that there is an active 
effort to conform to the generative process behind categories, a process in which the LF is 
implicated.  
In this setting, the LF played a pivotal role in engaging actors through its formal and neutral 
approach to contested communities. This stance develops Sykes & Matza’s (1957) framing of 
‘techniques of neutralisation’, meaning that in situations of extreme conflict accounting 
facilitates a transformation of deviance into society. In other words, by outlining community 
needs as activities, indicators and expense items, locals and NGOs were able to engage with 
society through an acceptable form of deviance. Additionally, Sykes & Matza’s (1957) 
rationalisation and justification process for making deviance possible was extended. This 
chapter illustrated ways in which feelings and distance were redirected into a project rationale 
for participation.  
This neutralisation effect of accounting allows for the expression of deviance as formats and 
within a language of technicality. For instance, the call for human rights and good governance 
is a sensitive issue from a government perspective, as discussions of ‘rights’ could lead to 
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critiques of the government itself. Viewed as a source of possible deviance, locals can connect 
the notion of human rights and good governance within the format of the LF even if they do not 
have a well-defined notion of peace and reconciliation. In this way, this chapter touches the 
building of stability around concepts and formats, especially the framework of the matrix, and 
transmits meanings to locals of not only what rights are but also what rights should entail in 
practice.  
This chapter investigated how attributes of neutrality and formality in LF facilitated 
community participation within the new governing paradigm. The next chapter will focus on 
how neutrality and formality support the visualisation of responsibilities in relation to the local 
context
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6 SEEING THROUGH SIGHTS: THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND OXFAM-
SARVODAYA 
 
The previous chapter explored how the LF provided a methodology to represent interests of 
Tamil communities in the North and East of Sri Lanka. This chapter will highlight ways in 
which visual aspects of the LF linked three different domains of accounting practice: planning, 
accountability and brainstorming. Based on an in-depth study of a single post-conflict project 
(Oxfam), this chapter suggests that visual and conversational elements in the LF enables 
coordination amongst partnership stakeholders and fosters the incorporation of local 
perspectives in the project. In this chapter, formality is viewed through new purposes added to 
the LF by partners in order to coordinate project participants. Relatedly, neutrality pertains to 
different medians and content used to present technical ambitions. This final episode underlines 
situations of conflict at the project level and how aligning participants requires social categories 
to be framed as technical inputs.  
Recently, studies in accounting have shed light on the role of images, charts, tables etc. in 
accounting. For individuals and groups, visual aids influence patterns of reflection, dictate 
colour choices in accounting documents and inform the presentation of financial information in 
a format other than text or numbers (Courtis, 2004; So & Smith, 2002; Quattrone, 2009).  
Similarly, the proliferation of visuals in accounting reports and publications have been 
associated with specific rationales and agendas. For example, in an effort to relay corporate 
social responsibility commitments, ‘non-numerate media’ increasingly occupy space in annual 
reports (Davison & Warren, 2009). More pointedly, Davison (2007) found that photographs 
were used to communicate ‘charitable accountability’ in line with social missions in NGO 
external reports. Thus far, scholars have mainly focused on visuals as set products (i.e. 
photographs, graphs and charts) and their median of delivery (i.e. annual reports, websites and 
presentations) (see Davison, 2009), yet little has been said about how visual attributes and 
methodologies can be incorporated into accounting concepts or practices.   
In this respect, in a study of early accounting treaties, Quattrone (2009) noted that to appeal to 
readers accounting depended on simultaneously visual and textual representations. 
‘Accounting’ as combinations of text, figures, images, matrixes and charts, propagated a visual 
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order which set forth a structural linearity, simplicity and reflective schemes for readers. 
Additionally, different representations of accounting reinforced the singularity of accounting, 
as highlighted by Quattrone (2009): “…for accounting to exist, it needs to attract and generate 
diversity; the more it attracts and generates heterogeneity, the more it is seen as a homogeneous 
practice” (p. 113). For Quattrone (2009), accounting and its diverse visual aspects were found 
to create ‘workable space and time’ which, in turn, supported a predetermined and structured 
method of accounting.   
In addition to underlying the importance of visuals in reproducing and organising accounting 
practice, Quattrone (2009) also outlined specific characteristics and the appeal of visuals. 
Diagrams, tables and ‘large schemes’ were invaluable since each “…visualise the logical path 
to be taken, and hence all of the material is presented to the eye reordered and reorganised in a 
clear, effective fashion that is easy to remember”. Quattrone (2009) further noted that matrixes 
rely on a ‘graphical layout [which] is a pattern of absences and presences’, meaning that what 
is accounted for and becomes ‘accounting’ rests on empty and workable fields. As such, visuals 
present pre-set ways of participating in accounting by supporting the imagining of reflection 
and logic through the arrangement of cells, linear flows of information and perceptions of 
‘emptiness’.  
In the same vein, in study of the petroleum industry, Jordan et al (2013) illustrated that to make 
‘risk’ more understandable, different aspects of risk maps were utilised by actors, some of which 
were visual. Notably, the risk map was not examined as a visual object, i.e. the risk map was 
not equivalent to a photograph or diagram. Alternatively, the risk map possessed visual features 
that facilitated coordination.  The ‘overview nature’ and simple presentation of risk maps were 
found to be powerful tools for aligning stakeholders and presenting a succinct project portfolio 
on risk. Although this study accentuates the potential for accounting techniques to assemble 
visual and non-visual attributes, the extent of visibility that is achieved sparsely understood. 
Mainly, how such accounting practices gain visibility and how they lose visibility at different 
junctures of project life.  
To grasp the fluid nature of visibility, formality and neutrality of the LF will be further explored 
and its application, from the remote villager to urbanite city dweller, investigated. Through the 
project partnership, stakeholders potentially give “reasons for his or her activities and is able, if 
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asked, to elaborate discursively upon those reasons (including lying about them)” (Giddens, 
1984, p.3). Through accounting, specifically the LF, stakeholders also possibly join a tacit 
structure of knowledge and action, or borrowing from Miller &Rose (2008), an ‘architecture’ 
which “…embodies certain relations between time, space, functions and persons…” (p. 64). 
For locals, accounting offers “particular  economic  representations  of  organizational  activities  
and  outcomes  to both  internal  participants  and  interested  external parties,” and as such it is 
“involved  in  the  creation of  a  quite  specific  organizational  order  and  mission” (Hopwood, 
1983, p.287).  Order and mission, in the project partnership, are to be shared amongst distant 
funders and local workers. The means of capturing the myriad expertise and local knowledge 
will be investigated and the role the Logical Framework plays in this regard.    
For Oxfam-Sarvodaya, the LF takes on the role of a dominant document, whereby, all associable 
annals and records such as partner work plans, evaluation reports, contracts, budgets etc. are 
referenced and integrated the LF. Due to its central role, the LF became an integral part of the 
project, and inseparable, from life in the project ecosystem. The LF became a window into the 
project and offered “a more or less continual flow of information among a number of 
participants” (Miller & O’Leary, 2000, p.4). In light of different stakeholders in the 
development sector and project space, Lewis & Mosse (2006) noted that the “co-existence of 
different rationalities, interests, and meanings” need to be navigated through by participants and 
also brokered or mediated “so as to produce order, legitimacy, and ‘success’ and to maintain 
fund flows (Lewis & Mosse, 2006, p. 16).   
This chapter suggests that the construct of the ‘local worker’ is mediated through different visual 
uses of the LF and uses it to cultivate a singularity of vision and facilitate a shared project 
architecture through diverse representations. In this context, sight is the cogitative 
transformation of our vast surroundings into specific recognisable (and actionable) 
management, and in turn worker credibility. Local workers, this chapter argues, experience a 
shift or reinvention of sight on three different fronts: plain sight (planning), oversight 
(accountability) and foresight (foresight).  To illustrate how different uses and visuals in these 
domains nurtures particular perceptions of time and work, this chapter proposes the following 
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distinctions39 between plain sight, oversight and foresight. Plain characterizes constraints 
(boundaries of project scope), functions and demands from workers, ooversight represents a 
workers way of becoming accountable and foresight is the projection of past and current worker 
experiences to plan for the future.  
Though not mutually exclusive, each sight is associated with three uses of the LF: planning 
(plain sight), monitoring (oversight) and brainstorming (foresight). This chapter is divided as 
follows:  
First, the main components and participants in the Oxfam-Sarvodaya partnership will be 
outlined.  
Second, the introduction of the LF into the project space will be discussed (plain sight). This 
section will outline how actors get motivated to commit or pledge into agreements and then 
eventually set-up a project. Also, it suggests that through contracting and planning workers 
become accustomed and proficient in how they should perform the work assigned to them. In 
this chapter, the handling of the immediate day is considered a framing of plain sight; a means 
of mediation that binds workers to a frame for acting and interpreting what they do at a particular 
moment in the present.  
Third, the use of the Project Monitoring Framework (PMF) which is based on the LF will be 
explored. Introduced into the project as a requirement by Oxfam in 2011, the PMF illustrates 
how the LF reinvents itself into a second, albeit supporting, use to the first. Through the PMF, 
it seems that one mediation pre-condition between distant partners is a common understanding 
of accountability and development of worker faculties to gauge their work in relation to it. Here, 
we witnessed an oversight function attached to the LF.  
                                                 
39 In this chapter, the framing of sights is informed by Burchell et al’s (1985) proposition of different ‘arenas’ in 
accounting. They define arenas as:  
 
“…institutions, bodies of knowledge, economic and administrative processes, systems of norms and measurement 
and classification techniques” (p. 400).  
 
The identification of these three sights is based on the timing of the introduction of a practice (i.e. planning was 
first in the project space and then accountability was later added), the mobilisation of certain expertise such as 
trainers and the forums and frequency in which sights take place (i.e. monthly meetings, end of the project report 
etc.).  
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Fourth, an example of how ‘bottom-up’ partner discussions were induced into frames and, as a 
result,  disciplined project participants into disclosing events of their daily lives within Oxfam 
development categories will be discussed. This will be analysed in the context of a 
brainstorming session with representatives from all Oxfam project partners. The meeting 
exchanges will illustrate how conversations were documented and given authenticity as part of 
the bottom up planning approach. This discussion, unlike planning and monitoring, is a detached 
use of the LF. Although not adhering to the LF format, it gives the perception of an adjacency 
to the LF for the participating actors.  Brainstorming as an exercise has the purpose of projecting 
past and present work to envision what is to be expected in the future; a means of coaching 
foresight amongst participants. 
 
Oxfam: Socio-Economic Development for Conflict-Affected Communities of the North 
and East of Sri Lanka  
 
Oxfam, hereafter referred to as ‘Oxfam’, applied for a €7,500,000 grant in 2008 with the 
Contracting Authority of the European Union for a project titled Socio-Economic Development 
for CAC of North and East Sri Lanka40. The project emphasised development for former CACs 
in the Northern districts of Mannar and Vavuniya and Eastern districts of Trincomalee, 
Batticaloa and Ampara. The application was submitted from the Colombo office of Oxfam in 
2008 and it was to meet 88% of the total funding required. The project duration was identified 
as 48 months, starting in July 2009 and ending in July 2013 (Dd-1). 
The preeminent objective of the project was to contribute to conflict mitigation and recovery in 
the North, East and neighbouring districts of Sri Lanka. The ancillary objective was to ‘address 
the rehabilitation and reintegration needs of conflict-affected IDPs, returnees and host 
communities in the North, East and neighbouring districts’ (Dd-1, p3). In general, the problems 
to be addressed through this project were the lack of sustainable agricultural markets, reduced 
capacities of IDPs, exploitation of women and the breakdown of government administration 
structures in the North and East (Dd-1). 
                                                 
40 Given the project proposal was submitted during the conflict, the project had to be adjusted in 2009 to fit the 
post-conflict scenario after 2009. 
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As part of the application process to EU, Oxfam was required to submit a LF as per EU 
guidelines (Figure 14). The EU’s use of the LF was reflective of how its greater commitment to 
funding NGOs had been coupled with a more stringent reporting requirement, specifically in 
project reporting frameworks, over the last two decades (Wallace, 1997). To meet the EU 
requirement, in association with some local partners, a seven-page LF was produced by Oxfam 
(Annex 21).  
The LF fulfilled the EU’s call for proposals with an aim of reinforcing the EU’s “well 
established approach to mainstreaming of gender equality, environmental sustainability and 
conflict mitigation” (Dd-2, p3). Oxfam replicated, verbatim, the EU’s aim in their LF, thereby 
synchronising Oxfam objectives to EU’s expectations.  
 
 
(Dd-8) 
Intervention Objectively verifiable Sources and means of Assumptions
logic indicators of achievement verification
Overall What are the overall broader What are the key indicators relatedWhat are the sources of
objectives objectives to which the action to the overall objectives? information for these indicators?
will contribute?
Specific What specific objective is the Which indicators clearly show What are the sources of Which factors and conditions outside
objective action intended to achieve to that the objective of the information that exist or can be the Beneficiary's responsibility
contribute to the overall objectives? action has been achieved? collected? What are the methods are necessary to achieve that
required to get this information? objective? (external conditions)
Which risks should be taken
into consideration?
Expected The results are the outputs envisaged to What are the indicators to measureWhat are the sources of What external conditions must be met
results achieve the specific objective. whether and to what extent the information for these indicators? to obtain the expected results
What are the expected results? action achieves the expected on schedule?
(enumerate them) results?
Activities What are the key activities to be carried outMeans: What are the sources of What pre-conditions are required before
and in what sequence in order to produce What are the means required to information about action the action starts?
the expected results? implement these activities, e. g. progress? What conditions outside the Beneficiary's
(group the activities by result) personnel, equipment, training, Costs direct control have to be met
studies, supplies, operational What are the action costs? for the implementation of the planned
facilities, etc. How are they classified? activities?
(breakdown in the Budget 
for the Action)
         LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ACTION
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Figure 18: EU Logical Framework Guidance 
 
After the proposal was approved by the EU, Oxfam contracted with local partners. As one of 
eight partners, Sarvodaya received a budget of approximately 1.4 million EUR. In this project, 
Oxfam’s role was mainly to “coordinate and facilitate linkages between its partners and 
facilitate a learning environment to strengthen capacity of local stakeholders and support the 
development of key advocacy messages” (Dd-1, p. 21). In this environment Oxfam assumed 
the role of a partner (not a donor), as the EU was the funding agency and the Donor., A 
Sarvodaya project manager confirmed that Oxfam’s role in this project was as  a ‘partner’ or an 
‘agent’ (Ib-3). This language of coordination was also complemented by a demarcation of legal 
and financial responsibilities, as Oxfam noted that their office will take charge of ‘donor 
contract management and accountability’ (Dd-1, p.21). 
As a local partner, Sarvodaya set up a national manager based in the head office as well as teams 
of staff in three conflict-affected district centres in the East of Sri Lanka:  Trincomalee, 
Batticaloa and Ampara (Annex 22). Staff in the district centres worked closely with Oxfam’s 
branch in Batticaloa which reported to an Oxfam office in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s capital.  
To coordinate head office, districts and Oxfam, a concerted effort was made to align planning, 
monitoring and data collection to fit within Oxfam’s templates and future proposals. The LF 
was central to this, as it informed the makeup of plans and monitoring frameworks. With the 
suggestion of ‘sights’, the following sections will discuss ways in which the LF gained traction, 
initially providing visibility and subsequently acceptance and reliance amongst the Sarvodaya 
managers & staff. This resulted in inclusiveness within the project and helped to make this a 
model for successful projects.  
 
Plain Sight: Rolling out the Proposal into Plans  
 
As part of Oxfam’s terms of agreement, the LF from the proposal was used to structure activity 
plans for national and district staff in Sarvodaya (Figure 15). From the LF, the three results listed 
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(which matched the overall proposal) were used as a starting point for planning. The three results 
from the LF and the proposal were as follows:  
Result 1: Livelihood 
57,000 target women and men of IDP, returnee and host communities have access to infrastructure 
and enhanced capacity to significantly improve their household income and food security 
Result 2: Water and Sanitation 
57,000 target women and men from IDP, returnee and host community families have increased 
access to water and sanitation infrastructure and are protected from water borne diseases 
Result 3: Social Development 
Improved protection and reduced gender based violence41 (GBV) for 57,000 target women and 
men from IDP, returnee and host community families  
         (Dd-1) 
 
In Sarvodaya, the three district offices assessed and engaged in activities to enhance household 
income, improve food security and increased access to water and reduction of GBV. A sample 
representing clients comprising women and men of ‘IDP, returnee and host community families 
were recruited to serve in the project. Sarvodaya accepted the ideas communicated in the LF 
and the proposal, such as GBV, were Donor requirements that needed compliance. The activities 
as well as data collected at the national and district level as per project initiatives needed to fit 
the local context and also match the idea and concepts outlined in the proposal (Ib-36).  
 
Figure 19: The Logical Framework as Activity Plans for District Staff 
                                                 
41 The concept of GBV itself arose out of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s and was reflective of mounting pressure 
for the UN Human Rights Commission to recognise gender violence, prominently rape, as a war crime (Etienne, 
1995). In relation to this project, efforts towards gender equality have been mainstreamed within the EU, and as 
such, GBV was built into Oxfam’s proposal and LF (De-2).  
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To transition from the LF and the proposal, the use of activity plans permitted a formalisation 
to ideas and concepts noted in results (i.e. GBV, target, IDP, access etc.). For example, activity 
plans were set by the district level of Sarvodaya and monitored by the head office of Sarvodaya 
and Oxfam. To make plans, the LF was the starting point, as a district manager noted: 
 
According to the Logframe we have an annual work plan. Then we develop that work plan 
quarterly. The quarterly work plan, we develop it into monthly. Monthly means something where 
we took the monthly plan and divided that into each responsibility. We have certain goals, mainly 
from the Logframe and this is how I manage my staff of four.  
Every morning we just have a quick ten minute meeting of what is their work, what’s today’s plan 
because we have to match it to the monthly plan.  
         (Ib-27)  
 
For this district manager, her work and her staff were coordinated based on a pre-set work 
format, time lines and goals from the LF.  A sense of opportuneness was attached to ideas and 
concepts as the proposal LF was represented into detailed and corresponding activity plans and 
was instrumental in task assignments and progress assessment at each daily meeting. In this 
way, the LF started to inform the daily routines for staff. Additionally, in making activity plans, 
the LF was no longer just a single document kept or viewed only by the EU, Oxfam, national 
and district managers. In accordance the Oxfam-Sarvodaya agreement, a series of templates 
were made to reflect the allocation of activities and targets within districts and amongst staff. 
Templates were set on an annual, quarterly, monthly and even daily basis (Annex 23; 24). By 
virtue of its universal use and the capture of all relevant project information, the LF became a 
chronicle that was considered as the central information source for project management and 
implementation.  The donor and management concerns around results were connected to district 
staff through an aligned set of plans. As a series of documents, the LF gained different kinds of 
visibility amongst staff. For some the LF and plans started to become more relevant and visible, 
yet for others, the LF faded into plans and became irrelevant to their daily work.  
The degree of LF use varied between districts. Some districts valued the LF as a key source of 
information and attached the LF and activity plans to their office walls to increase awareness, 
facilitate discussions and to promote interaction among management and staff. 
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. This is evident, for example, in how the national manager referred to displayed LFs and activity 
plans to ask questions in his field visits. In a field visit to a district office in 2012, the national 
manager gathered the district manager, programme coordinators and technical officers around 
a set of project documents on the wall (Image 1). “Where are we on this activity?” he asked in 
Tamil, “How many people have we reached so far?” In response, district level staff described 
what they have done, what they intended to do and highlighted delays they were experiencing 
with construction contractors, the government approvals etc. In this respect, by being displayed 
on the wall, the LF functioned as a physical gathering point for the national manager to check 
district level progress and served as an aid for discussions between the national and district 
level.  
 
 
Image 1: Sarvodaya Staff in Ampara studying the Logical Framework  
 
Yet, while the LF may have been physically visible and relevant to some, for others, plans 
introduced a sense of distance between them and the LF. For example, a technical officer in 
Trincomalee reflected that even though his activities were from the LF, he did not use the LF, 
he stated: 
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We have a Logframe and my construction activities and plans are from the log frame, yes. 
However, I don’t use the Logframe daily, I use the activities.  I mean in the log frame there are 
activities like what are the activities that we should do to improve their life conditions…  
But now actually we do not follow the log frame because those activities are from the log frame.  So 
now what we are doing is we are doing the construction monitoring.  In addition to construction, 
there are some other projects, like community awareness and giving seeds to farmers. (Ib-29) 
 
As noted above, the technical officer was aware that his activities were based on the LF, but he 
viewed his daily routine as separate from it. This type of recognition, yet disconnection with the 
LF was similar to other staff. For instance, even though line items in budgets were set up as 
costing per activity and resulted from the LF, the act of entering expenses into project templates 
was viewed as not related or part the LF itself (Ib-28; Ib-10). In other words, while staff were 
aware of the LF’s significance and role, the LF disappeared amongst its many iterations.  In this 
respect, the LF lost its form and degrees of visibility only to gain traction within daily work 
structures and plans.  
For district staff, the LF was both physically visible (i.e. displayed on walls and used in 
discussions) and also unobservable even though workers understood their orders and templates 
were derived from the LF. That said, for the national manager it was not a matter of whether the 
LF was present or not, as he had memorised it. He explained:  
I don’t need to look at it [the Logframe] every time. If you have it in your mind, if you are familiar 
with the Logframe, then you can ask questions. Say if one of our team is working in one activity, 
they can ask ‘why are you doing this, how is it related to this project? So they need to explain based 
on that, because the logic is easy. (Ib-26)  
 
For him, the LF left an imprint in his mind and, as such, informed how he posed questions and 
explained activities to his district staff. In his case, unlike the others, his use of the LF meant 
that the LF was stripped of its physical template or derivatives of itself, it was its logic that 
remained memorable. Notably, the use of the LF as an activity plan and the ways in which the 
LF was recognised (or partially recognised) by staff is of interest since these different reactions 
demonstrate how its pervasiveness starts to dominate as well as structure daily work (plain 
sight). In this case, part of dominating or colonising a project space is the LF’s ability to be 
reinvented into something new (yet coordinated), the ability to support greater accessibility such 
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as being displayed on walls, and the ability to loose form altogether and act as a mental reference 
point.  
The next sub-section will explore how different ways of seeing the LF manifests itself in village-
level decisions related to GBV activities under the LF’s ‘social development’ result area. In this 
post-conflict context, expected results from the proposal and the LF touched on central, and at 
times controversial, themes such as increasing economic power through infrastructure 
construction, water and sanitation for IDPs and protection for those affected by GBV.  Under 
social development, working with communities in conflict-affected areas on addressing GBV 
was especially difficult. The government was particularly sensitive to work around gender, 
given accusations of rape and violence committed and then covered up by military personnel 
towards the end of the conflict (Field Notes, 2013). The next sub-section will illustrate ways in 
which district and national staff navigated government concerns and strategized to attain the 
results listed within the LF. It will also highlight how the LF factored into staff decisions and 
became a proxy for reaching GBV targets.  
 
From the LF to GBV: Making it Work on the Ground  
 
In all three districts, social development activities were conducted which included addressing 
issues of GBV. Under result three of the proposal, targets and beneficiaries related to GBV were 
outlined as:  
 57,000 women and men from IDP, returnee and host community families’ around GBV be 
political, especially in Sri Lanka.  
 
A breakdown of number of GBV beneficiaries from IDPs, returnees and host community 
families totalling 57,000 and the types of actions to be undertaken to address the problem were 
included in the proposal LF, and in turn, further fleshed out in district level activity plans (Figure 
16).  
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Figure 20: Snapshot of District Level Monthly Workplan  
 
This sub-section will discuss two ways in which the LF filtered into decisions and strategies 
undertaken by staff to meet LF and proposal breakdowns. Firstly, calculations concerning the 
number beneficiaries into direct and indirect categories precipitated an effort to join local 
networks so as to collect required data. Secondly, to conduct GBV activities with government 
approval, other sections and contents of the LF (i.e. infrastructure and sanitation) were 
leveraged.  
Firstly, the target of 57,000 was also framed in terms of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ beneficiaries of 
the project. Details included in the LF for identifying such beneficiaries (i.e. IDP, returnee and 
host community families) cut across local distributions in relation to gender and ethnicities of 
Tamils, Sinhalese or Muslims. The setting of beneficiaries informed by status (i.e. returnee) or 
ethnicity to the exclusion of others had implications in the post-conflict context. For instance, 
the definition of IDP implicitly meant people of Tamil descent, as the majority of IDPs were 
Tamil. As a result, for project purposes, Tamils were associated with the label of IDP and not 
the Sinhalese or Muslims. This selection singled out Tamils/IDPs from their broader community 
context.  
Name: R. Thiyageshwary (PO - P & G) Month: January Name of the Organization: Sarvodaya - Kalmunai
Planed
Date Time Activity Budget 
Code
Purpose Y/N Reasons/Decisions/Achievements/comme
nts
AM
PM
AM Monthly report preparattion To feed the information into quarlerly 
report.
PM Finalizing the HIV handbook with Logistic officer 6.3.1.6 To provide as a guide during HIV 
awareness
AM
PM
AM Awareness on GBV for Paddy and market garden 
groups in 11th Colony (west)
PM Awareness on GBV for Paddy and marketgarden 
groups in Chawalakadai
AM Meet the women action group in Navithanveli. Select participants for GBV training
PM Weekly review with PM & handover the proper 
ducuments of referrel pathway to Logistic officer
Discuss the progress of the week
7 Saturday
8 Sunday
Improve understanding on GBV
6
Monthly Work Plan - 2012
Advance Work Plan Monthly Diary Performance Report
3
2
Staff meeting
Review progress, challenges and 
planning for the month of January
4
Getting approval from relavant departnment heads to 
finalize the referrel pathway
To  display the referrel pathway in all 
the working villages.
5
 169 
 
For staff, this also meant that the calculation of direct and indirect beneficiaries called for a 
familiarity or acceptance into local Tamil networks. Direct beneficiaries were identified as those 
who received goods and services. The indirect beneficiaries could not be easily measured. It 
was clear that the activities impacted communities and as the direct beneficiaries were part of 
the community, many in the community became indirect beneficiaries, ranging in the extent of 
the benefit. 
The national manager described this distinction as:  
In the Logframe, the direct beneficiaries are there. And, yes of course, the direct beneficiaries have 
got skills and benefits.    
But for indirect, the people in the other villages also will get some benefits. They get to know some 
useful information and they will hopefully share that information. That is pending work, but we have 
to measure it according to the Logframe.  (Ib-38) 
 
For the manager, the LF was the starting point for determining both direct and indirect 
beneficiaries. For him, the essence of ‘indirect’ in this project was sharing information, and to 
meet LF requirements, he devised ways of predicting patterns of sharing by focusing on local 
hubs and persons of interest within the communities. He noted:  
We can’t calculate directly, but when you work in the community, you can understand how if we 
are calculate one we can get three, four and so on. We get the overall picture.  
For example, I know one person who is working with a hospital. She is working with the hospital 
and she’s a government employee. But in the evening, normally she comes to the meeting. You 
know if you pass the message to her, she will definitely inform all the people. So there are some 
connectors we have to identify, she is the one who reaches other people.  
However, there are some leaders who can’t be sure they will share. Some messages they will share 
and you have to say, “Please tell everyone.” Then only they will share.  
So you have to identify. If you are from outside, it’s very difficult to work. You have to live with 
a community sometimes and you have to work for at least two months, three months, then only 
you can make sure, okay, who are the local points, who are the key persons and how to deal with 
that. (Ib-38) 
 
To calculate the number of indirect beneficiaries, the identification and use of key local persons 
was important for staff. Yet, to access some key locals, staff had to be accepted into their 
networks which raised other issues.  
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For instance, to collect information on key persons, the national manager’s identity of being 
‘Tamil’, but a Tamil from the North instead of the East, influenced his ability to work within 
communities. He noted:  
There are some people who talk differently to you. They will ask, “Where are you from? What is 
your caste?” What kind of background do you have? They will think, “You are not suitable to advise 
us.” So those things are also there.  
For example, when I went to one village in the East, I didn’t tell them I was from headquarters. I 
said I am from Jaffna in the North, and I work with the communities there. I live with the community 
and I’m also the member of our village and community centre. 
 So I am member of my village, so I know the community and everything. They said, “You are from 
Jaffna. You don’t know our cultures in the East”. 
It’s very difficult but there is a time you have to live with them. You have to prove and catch their 
mind. Then only it will work. (Ib-38) 
 
This illustrates that not only do personal attributes of staff factor into the ability to collect 
information in line with categories of the LF (i.e. indirect beneficiaries), but also that staff 
present themselves in different ways (i.e. rather than presenting oneself as from head office it 
was beneficial to refer to one’s ethnic community) in an effort to reduce personal barriers and 
to signal affinities with communities. In this instance, the setup and distinction of direct and 
indirect beneficiaries posed issues.  Decisions had to be made on how to gather this information 
which is related to the LF. As noted above, the ability to collect information was tied to affinity 
to locals, which in turn, caused staff to present and negotiate around their own identities.  
In addition to determining the number of beneficiaries, staff also had to conduct GBV activities 
listed in the LF without upsetting the government. As such, while included in the LF and other 
project documents, GBV was addressed without its own observable activity, and instead 
incorporated under other results areas such as livelihood and sanitation. In relation to this, the 
national manager described:  
Earlier, we faced difficulties with gender programmes. The government rejected all the gender 
components. In our Logframe we have the gender component to work with female households, but 
because of the government, we haven’t done gender-based programmes. So now, rather than doing 
gender-based programmes as a big formal meeting, we have done it a different way. 
For example, we initially planned to have training on gender-based finance which included training 
on gender issues and gender equality. This was part of the Logframe, but we couldn’t do the activities 
because the divisional secretariat [a government position] advised against gender programmes with 
NGOs. All the gender-components programmes have to done by the government. 
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So, rather than doing a gender-based finance programme, or gender-based finance trainings, we did 
a meeting in relation to the infrastructure. We called people a gender agenda and benefit. We were 
safeguarded from the government since we did gender under a different name, water and sanitation 
or something like different names. (Ib-38)  
 
To conduct gender activities in line with the LF, in this instance other LF result areas (water 
and sanitation) were used as an entry point for conducting gender activities in a way which 
technically still complied with government requirements. This is evident in the activity plans 
at the district level as tasks of awareness around GBV were included into interventions for 
paddy cultivation and discussions around local markets (Figure 16).   
In this situation, staff had a particular vision of how to address gender indirectly amongst 
within the framework of other programmes. In this respect, the national manager noted:  
They [the locals] will about water-related issues, disease and health. At the same time, they will 
discuss the gender issues as well. 
For us, we have a focus. They also think that we have a focus. When you see from the outside, this 
is not a gender-related workshop, a gender-related discussion. But this is like the water-resource 
management meeting regarding the disease, regarding the health. But we are capturing, we are 
asking different questions and they will come out with different gender issues. But we haven’t asked 
again and again, gender. Time to time, we ask gender. 
For example, you know, we can ask about disease related to gender, if it affects male or female 
mostly. So why? What happened? So what happens to the female? Why does it affect male or 
females mostly? These kind of questions. (Ib-38)  
 
In this way, the inclusion of gender from the LF and larger EU ambitions was completed 
indirectly within the community context. More specifically, to make gender operable amidst 
government restrictions in a post-conflict scenario, staff intentionally made gender and GBV 
invisible at the programme level, and instead gave  this concept presence within other areas of 
work and discussion. The way staff also leveraged parts of the LF to conduct GBV activities, 
implies that parts of it which are perceived to be ‘more technical’ can be used to present and 
mobilize more controversial activities.    
Overall, concepts and framework presented in the LF and proposal, are translated into the local 
context by staff, who at times made decisions on the ways in which content of the LF (e.g. 
GBV) become a known item or a shadow item within the local environment (knowable and 
unknowable). In addition, ideas such as GBV and distinctions between types of beneficiaries 
affect how staff present themselves within local situations.  At times, efforts to collect 
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information and identify local networks expose staff personal attributes and considerations 
which the staff must take into account to perform their daily work. That said, LF from the 
proposal stage does not only impact the way concepts are acted upon by staff, it also informs 
the construction of other methods and techniques used by staff, such as planning.   
This section illustrated ways in which the proposal LF was translated into staff work and how 
concepts of the LF directed and motivated staff decisions. That said, concepts were localised, a 
process which made attributes of staff themselves observable. Additionally, the mandated use 
of the LF in activity plans and other documents allowed the LF to switch in and out of staff 
mind-sets, Essentially, the LF took on new forms of visibility, though activity plans or on the 
wall as artefacts.  
The next section will outline the way in which the LF informed ideas of accountability in the 
project (oversight). Mainly, the chapter will explore the requirement of a ‘Project Monitoring 
Framework’ (PMF) based on the LF, the way the PMF was communicated through new formats 
at the field level and the effect of including locals at the community level (informally and 
formally) into the PMF.  
 
Oversight: From the Logical Framework to a Project Monitoring Framework   
 
 
In 2011, after a financial audit conducted by the EU of the project, Oxfam added a monitoring 
purpose to the planning role of the LF. In turn, Oxfam drafted an amendment to Sarvodaya’s 
original 2009 letter of agreement requiring Sarvodaya to develop a ‘Project Monitoring 
Framework’ (PMF) based on an amended LF. In the amendment, linking planning to monitoring 
was thought to “improve and ease Sarvodaya’s monitoring, accountability and learning in 
implementing the project” (Dd-4).  
Given this new role of accountability and learning attached to the LF, the LF itself moved into 
another domain of staff efforts. To reinvent the LF as a PMF, 5% of the budget was redirected 
to ‘Monitoring Evaluation and Learning’ (MEAL) for partner monitoring and district/partner 
level workshops. Facilitated by Oxfam, some of the workshops focused on reformulating the 
LF into a feasible monitoring plan for districts. For workshops, district staff presented the LF 
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as an interactive Powerpoint presentation, rather than the previous hardcopy proposals or 
electronic excel sheets and documents.  
For example, Oxfam hosted a workshop called the ‘EU-ACAP Project LFA Orientation’ in 
2011, which informed how the LF was linked to district level LFs, by way of making ‘sub-
indicators’. The process, however, was guided by information on Powerpoint slides, which 
outlined parts of the LF – inputs, outputs, results. In relation to a discourse of accountability – 
what to monitor, when to monitor and how to monitor – rather than the previous emphasis on 
the LF as planning. Through this and other similar workshops, the LF guided group discussions, 
as parts of the LF informed the flow of Powerpoint slides information (i.e. working from a LF 
result area to indicators) and reflections required of district staff during workshops (i.e. are the 
objectives/results clear and understandable? Are the indicators relevant, clear, and specific with 
achievable targets? (Annex 25). At the end of the workshop, district staff were shown a 
template, based on the LF, for creating their sub-indicators.  
 
Image 2: PowerPoint Slide from Oxfam LFA Orientation 
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From workshops, presentations of the LF as a template and guide for discussions informed the 
way district staff created their own district PMFs. And in workshops, the ‘sub-indicators’ of the 
LF were interpreted as a window to revising the LF. “From the workshops, we understand that 
we can’t change the LF, its fixed,” a district coordinator noted, “but we can change the 
indicators”.  
For making (and changing) sub-indicators, workshops were part of a three month effort between 
national and district offices to create PMFs for each district. Language from the presentations 
informed how indicators in the PMF were drafted, as noted by one district staff, “from the 
workshops, we saw that indicators needed to be SMART (specific, measureable, reliable and 
time bound). That is very important, and that is how we fill in our indicators for our district”. 
From workshops, ideas and templates of sub-indicators, the Powerpoint version presented in 
workshops was translated into an electronic template form to be filled by each district manager 
(Figure 21). 
 
Figure 21: Sub-Indicator Template 
 
For the PMF, indicators were a central point of entry to enter into discussions of monitoring 
with district level staff. From the result areas, LF indicators were refined further into ‘sub-
indicators’ to be monitored at the district level. Based on workshops and provided templates, 
 
Result 01 Log Frame Indicators Sub-Indicators 
 
57,000 targeted women and 
men of IDP, returnee and 
host community families, 
have access to infrastructure 
and enhanced capacity to 
significantly improve their 
household income and food 
security 
916 livelihood related 
infrastructure renovated or 
newly constructed in 
targeted project areas by the 
end of the project  
 
No of tanks renovated 
No of channel renovated 
No of Agro wells renovated 
No of Lift irrigation 
No of outlet established. 
At least 50% of targeted 
women use the infrastructure 
facilities by the end of the 
project 
No of women involved in 
market garden 7 paddy. 
No of women .represent in 
the executive committee  
No of women have co-
ownership in the 
constructions 
infrastructures  
No of women have access 
to collective marketing. 
 
At least 40% of targeted 
women entrepreneurs own 
enterprises making a profit of 
more than 25% by the end of 
the project 
 
No of women trained in 
value addition techniques. 
No of women trained in self 
seed paddy production. 
No of women engaged in 
organic far mining. 
 
30 % increase in household 
income of targeted 
beneficiaries by the end of 
the project 
 
No of households  
At least three effective pro-
poor pro-women government 
policy briefs or positive 
changes in implementation 
of policies on livelihood 
related issues 
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all three districts developed their own PMF. For districts, the perception was that the LF 
remained the same as sub-indicators were revised in response to changing project conditions. 
As noted by a district coordinator:  
The indicators that is the monitoring framework. Today also if we feel we have to change this, we can 
change. Log frame is a little bit different because we have the log frame in the proposal. That is done 
by Sarvodaya head office and with the support of Oxfam because Oxfam have a log frame for the 
programme. (Ib-27) 
 
PMFs, built from the LF, guided the way activities were monitored and fields of information 
set out in sub-indicators motivated the use of templates. Under the effort to monitor, the PMF 
included the local input of community mobilisers under ‘who should monitor’. As such, some 
district staff created their own handwritten templates in Tamil to guide community mobilisers 
(Annex 26). For example, a district coordinator created his own template in Tamil for his group 
of mobilisers to use, he described:  
Even the village-based mobilisers go on family visits and just observe that everything is clean and 
like that. If there are any misarrangements or unacceptable things, the village-based mobilisers 
advise the families to make it better. 
We monitor that kind of field village activity through the reports we are getting from village-based 
mobilisers every month. They will submit one report, “These kind of things I have done in my 
village.” So we read it and understand that. 
This is the format: in which date, in which category, result one, result three, result two, and result 
activity, what kind of activity she did, how many participants were there, what was the result. (Ib-
28) 
 
Even though community mobilisers participated in the PMF, the district coordinator noted that 
in order to monitor the activities they did not need “that kind of deep knowledge” (Ib-27).  
Even without a deep understanding of the PMF, community mobilisers are affected by the 
structure of accountability it represents. For example, in an audit conducted by the EU, a 
community mobiliser for GBV was asked to introduce and escort UC auditors to the houses of 
families she monitored in her community. Yet, when arriving at the houses, the EU auditors 
asked that she should stay outside, so as not to influence the opinions of family members they 
were interviewing for the audit. “I felt excluded from my own community”, she described, and 
“it was embarrassing that I had to wait outside of my friend’s house, when I know these people 
and I live with them. It was as if I did something wrong” (Ib-62). In this case, the label of 
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‘monitor’ attached to community mobilisers affected their ability to move freely. And, to audit 
or monitor meant that distance needed to be added into the relationship community mobilisers 
had with others.  
Similarly, the PMF’s account of a community mobiliser intersected with other concepts from 
the LF. For example, to be a beneficiary indicated under the LF, a certain notion of what a 
recipient should be was promoted, and in evaluations and monitor visits beneficiaries had to 
comply with a set standard. In one case, a beneficiary was removed since her daughter was a 
community mobiliser; since the daughter received a salary from the project, her mother had to 
be excluded (Ib-38).  
In this sense, the rise of PMF, made visible through presentations and reports, added an 
impression of distance in communities to reflect notions of accountability.  
 
Foresight: Brainstorming for the Future  
 
This last section explored the ways in which project discussions which were presented as open 
or brainstorming, at times, were reverse engineered to fit in with a particular format related to 
the LF. This section will outline how in a partner meeting held in 2012, discussions amongst 
national and district staff were presented as unstructured and a space for ‘free expressions’ yet 
gradually narrowed by Oxfam’s facilitators to fit within a particular framework of development. 
To illustrate this, this section will describe events and conversations held within the partner 
meeting and highlight points of narrowing and framing within the brainstorming process.  
Held in June 2012, Oxfam hosted a two-hour long meeting in their district office with 
representatives from each of their partner organisations in all districts. Oxfam staff took on the 
role of ‘facilitator’ and presented the meeting as a platform to collectively brainstorm content 
for a future proposal. Overall, the meeting was organised into four interactive parts: an overview 
of Oxfam values, the context and issues related to poverty in each district, innovative methods 
to fight poverty and a vision for the future of the East in Sri Lanka.  
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In this meeting, the facilitator’s overview of Oxfam values provided a vocabulary for the staff 
and narrowed the focus of discussion to represent concepts of ‘rights-based42’ (RBM) and 
‘needs-based43’ (NBA). “What do we do? What approach is our project using?” they asked, and 
with no response from the group, they answered their own questions, “We do RBM and NBA.”. 
The purpose of introducing RBA and NBA into the discussion was to roll out distinctions and 
                                                 
42 The Rights Based Approach (RBA) engages in development based on what ought to be and that the realisation 
of rights for all is paramount (Cornwall et al, 2004). It hinges on the UN Declaration of Universal Rights and 
Freedoms. Though rights were articulated in the Declaration in 1961, RBA as an approach was only pronounced 
in the 1990s (Cornwall et al, 2004). This, in part, is due to the establishment of ‘development’ as the terrain of 
economists, and human rights as domain for lawyers and activists (Cornwall et al, 2004). However, as former 
colonies gained UN membership in the 1960s and 1970 the purposes of development gradually expanded to include 
a language of rights (Cornwall et al, 2004). One notable step in bridging this divide is the 1986 Declaration on the 
Right to Development which stated development was a right in itself. It reads: 
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. 
The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to self-
determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on 
Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth 
and resources (UN, 2012).  
 
43 The Needs Based Approach (NBA) proposes that there are basic needs to be met (Sachs, 1996; Groves & Hinton, 
2005). The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) endorsed this approach in the mid-1970s, after which 
foreign assistance switched from solely emphasising economic progress to also supporting the fulfilment of 
minimum requirements (i.e. water, food and shelter) (Groves & Hinton, 2005).  
The premise of providing assistance based on need was also included in the 1980 Brandt Commission Report. This 
report commented and provided recommendations based on the state of international development, specifically 
focusing on economic disparities between the North and the South (Henderson, 1980). One recommendation, in 
light of NBA, was that in periods of reduced oil supplies, the most vulnerable developing countries “should be 
given priority to allow them to meet essential requirements…’ (Cited in: Henderson, 1980, p.104, italics in 
original). 
NBA, and its uptake, is signifigant as it assumes that up to a certain point of consumption or basket of goods 
‘needs’ are met; therefore, labelling the remaining market products as ‘non-essentials’ (Henderson, 1980). This 
conception of needs and addressing them departs from economic market approaches to understanding international 
development and contradicts economists’ faith in rational choice and perferences (Henderson, 1980).  This 
introduction of ‘needs’ is an analytical understanding which is independent from economics and therefore required 
a novel rationalisation of needs. However, Illich (1996) noted that ‘the poor’ are redefined. He stated:  
‘…the well-meaning experts are now busily at work reconceptualising their discovery, and in the 
process, re-defining humanity yet again. The citizen is being refined as a cyborg. The former individual 
who is a member of a ‘population’ has become a ‘case’, is now modelled in the image of an immune 
system that can be provisionally be kept functioning if it is kept in balance by appropriate management” 
(pp. 99).  
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define the concepts provided. This demonstrates that, even at the onset of a discussion presented 
as ‘open’, staff were given a particular discourse and concepts to frame their ideas. For instance, 
RBA and NBA framed how the responsibilities of the government aligned with communities. 
Noted in a conversation led by the facilitator:  
Facilitator: When you talk about the rights-based or needs based, who are the duty holders? Who 
are the right holders in the programme? Right holders who are having rights? 
Participant: Beneficiaries?  
Facilitator: Beneficiaries are the right holders. Who are the duty bearers? 
Participant: Service providers? 
Facilitator: Government, sorry. In a country who is the major duty bearers?  
Participant: The government. (Mb-3) 
Facilitator: It’s the government. We cannot compete with the government, but we are just 
supplementing, complementing with some models, right? So keep in mind when you talk about 
the programme and the development of things, so the rights are there and the needs are there. We 
are not the duty bearers, right. Duty bearers are the government, so we can just compliment or 
supplement or do some piloting or modelling…  
Okay, right now, this is a kind of brainstorming we are doing. (Mb-3) 
 
 
By introducing concepts of RBA and NBA at the start, district staff had a vantage point to reflect 
on beneficiaries as ‘duty holders’ in relation to the government’s ‘duty bearers’ in the remainder 
of the meeting. As the meeting progressed, staff were gradually required to reflect on their own 
experiences in relation to the national policy of Sri Lanka. Firstly, they were asked to describe 
the current context within their districts, yet the framing of context was limited to ‘social, 
political and economic’ conditions. For this exercise, the facilitator tried to guide staff to 
compare the civil war years to the post-war situation, and this comparison was the starting point 
for reflection on the current context.  He also noted:  
Now we are almost in the post war scenario. So in the post war scenario, what is the context right 
now? So in order to facilitate your thinking you can think like, maybe in terms of social context, 
how is the social context right now? Just think about the social context and then how is the economic 
context? And then, how is the political context right now? How is the culture?  
So around 10 minutes you can think. Start talking in small groups by district. Maybe you can think 
“Okay, I’m part of this district, okay what is the context right now?” For this one, we will give you 
a flipchart.  
So in terms of social, so you think socially, what is the context right now? Politically, economically, 
culturally, right? Can you come up with a few? In ten minutes. (Mb-3) 
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Based on the facilitator’s instructions, staff organised themselves by district and wrote down 
two main points under social, political and economic context, And, after ten minutes, facilitators 
asked staff to tape their flipchart to the wall, present it and explain to the group each point under 
category of context. In this process, as staff presented their points, facilitators corrected their 
distinctions between social, political and economic context. For example:  
Facilitator: What is the context right now? In terms of political, in terms of social, in terms of 
economical? So what’s the context? 
Start with social. 
Participant 1: Power sharing, rights…  
Participant 2: At this moment, we have political conditions with the provincial and central 
government. Central is run by the Muslims, provincial both by the Muslims and Sinhalese.  
Facilitator: Yes, because we are living in a post-war scenario. But give the general context, like do 
we have women participating in political parties… Now, you are talking about power, maybe that 
is in another context and you can talk about that there… remember…   
Social… that is not political… (Mb-3) 
 
During presentations, the facilitator reorganised staff discussions and narrowed them into a 
particular framing of the different ‘contexts’ represented. In addition, he earmarked issues of 
‘female representation’ as part of reflections for staff and also redirected comments made based 
on ethnicities (i.e. Tamil versus Muslim or Sinhalese). In this way, the meeting platform filtered 
discussions into a particular conception of ‘context’. 
This laid the foundation for further staff instructions to reflect on causes of poverty present in 
districts. Again, in the same groups, staff wrote down and presented their perceptions of causes 
and issues related to poverty. From presentations, debates arose on the causes and mechanisms 
to address poverty. For instance:  
Participant 1: … And there is no proper policy for the poverty elimination in the district level. It’s 
only the country level - the Mahinda Chinthana44 - where there is an effort to eliminate poverty. But 
there is no district level or province level poverty elimination policies. There are a lot of programs 
in these districts but there is no common policy at the district levels.  
Participant 2: but that policy at the national level applies at the district level. 
Participant 3: but it is not suitable no? And we can’t develop the program from the Colombo.  
                                                 
44 In Sri Lanka, Mahinda Chinthana means ‘the vision of  Mahinda’, the President, and is the name given to his 
policy platform 
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Participant 1: the policy is there. The question is about implementation.  
Facilitator:  You are saying that policy is not suitable to the local level…? (Mb-3) 
 
Eventually, participants agreed that a policy to address poverty exists, but the policy itself does 
not apply to the district level. Through such back and forth discussions, causes and issues related 
to poverty were identified and rephrased on each district’s flipchart. The content of what poverty 
was and its causes were arrived at through a form of edited debate and consensus. These points 
on poverty served as a jointly-held platform to devise ‘innovative solutions’. This demonstrates 
a narrowing of staff views into a particular understanding of poverty.  
In the same district groups, staff were given note pads to write their methods and solutions. 
After all participants had completed writing, they were asked present as well as attach their 
notes to the particular cause of poverty they wanted to address (Image 3).  
 
 
Image 3: District Group Presentation, ‘Matching’ their Solutions to Problems 
 
Through this exercise, district groups created visual and linear connections between district 
contexts, causes of poverty and solutions.  In this meeting, flipcharts and pieces of coloured 
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paper reflected an interactive narrowing and filtering of broad discussions into a concrete and 
recognisable format.  
For the next part of the meeting, the facilitator asked the staff to articulate their ‘vision’ for the 
East, he noted:  
So these are the issues and these are the underlying causes for poverty. Right so we’ll think after 10 
years or 20 years down the line what is going to be the Eastern region? Just envision how the region 
will look like in 10 or 20 years. Take a moment to think about the communities that you have just 
discussed about. (Mb-3) 
 
Staff worked individually and were given two minutes to write or draw anything they desired 
on note pads. They were then asked to present their individual visions and, after each 
presentation, the facilitator organised pieces onto a whiteboard with three titles: economic 
justice, gender justice and rights in crisis (Image 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4: Individual Visions Organised by Facilitators under Oxfam Priorities  
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On the board, pieces of paper which held individual aspirations for the future were allocated into 
Oxfam’s three priorities areas. For example, one district staff wrote her vision on her piece of 
paper as:  
All roads are well constructed 
All people have permanent houses 
No water scarcity  
Equally allocated resources for consumption  
No gender based violence (Mb-3) 
 
While this staff member focused on infrastructure and gender, another district staff stressed 
market participation and economic growth and added quantities to his vision, he wrote:  
50% farmers from the Eastern province supplying products to international markets 
Eastern province contributing 30% to the GDP of the country, especially Trincomalee 
contributing 10% of the GDP (Mb-3) 
 
These two visions were allocated under ‘economic justice’ by the facilitator, with the first 
placed in between economic and ‘gender justice’ due to its reference to gender. In this way, 
individual visions, communicated as pictures, narrations or figures, gained visibility and 
traction within Oxfam’s particular development approach.  
This meeting had four progressive steps and guided by facilitators, staff were involved in a 
process of funnelling their group discussions and individual aspirations into a connected and 
recognisable visual format. After the meeting, visual descriptions on flipcharts and pieces of 
paper were copied into a pre-defined excel template by facilitators. As the purpose of the 
meeting was to brainstorm for a future project, discussions and visuals had a particular end goal 
in mind, mainly to provide information which can be used within the next Oxfam proposal. 
Similar to the EU proposal submitted in 2008, a format would be required which was informed 
by a LF template.  
This meeting is of interest as it represents ways in which discussions presented as free and open 
are built to coincide with pre-determined frameworks. It demonstrates a process of narrowing, 
whereby staff is trained in the use of a standardised and appropriate vocabulary and the 
distinctions explained, these visual aids serve a purpose: they are the link between the minds of 
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staff and future templates to be filled. In this case, information is collected in a pre-set manner 
which can facilitate the preparation of future proposals and LFs.  
 
Discussion 
 
This chapter explores how different uses of the LF support three kinds of sight into project life: 
plain sight, oversight and foresight. The emphasis on sight has been given to explore how a 
common vision can be forged through visual and conservations between project partners 
(Quattrone, 2009).  
In this chapter, distinctions of sight, though not mutually exclusive from one another or adhering 
to steadfast uses of a LF, illustrate that participants are visually engaged into a certain role and 
prompted to frame reflections to ask particular questions. For example, when discussing the 
posted LF on the wall with district staff, the LF is an object which becomes an interactive 
reflective device for management conversations. This demonstrates that neutrality or formality 
are not limited to representation by calculations or numbers (see Porter, 1996; Power, 1997; 
Robson, 1991; Vannier, 2010). Notably, such attributes of accounting coordinate participant 
views and responsibilities through different visual and conversational depictions such as wall 
displays, PowerPoints, projectors, coloured sheets and discussions.  
Furthermore, this chapter highlights how participants rally around and organise themselves 
around constructs of results, objectives and activities. At the district level, ‘activities’ were most 
significant for allocating tasks, formal reporting and setting expectations in district teams. This 
finding is consistent with the previous chapter in that the grammar of the LF frames 
interpretations and experiences.  
Interestingly, through different sights, the LF gained and lost visibility amongst participants. Its 
use varied from rare to frequent. Some felt they were actively engaged with the LF and used it 
as reference point for discussions, while others surmised that it was a remote template which 
was not associated with their daily plans. Such use of the LF implies that the visual aspects of 
templates are of interest (see Jordan et al, 2013) and, more specifically, visual attributes and the 
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overall visibility of instruments can fade in and out of existence. Moreover, this ability to fade 
possibly adds to the LF’s perverseness in the project space.  
That said, the introduction of the PMF also meant that locals (i.e. community mobilisers) would 
also become accountable for their activities, as per LF. On the one hand, district staff felt they 
could revise the project through sub-indicators and that this allowed a form of participation. On 
the other hand, community mobilisers, in becoming part of the effort to collect information on 
sub-indicators, also were subject to expectations of distance and objectivity. For example, in 
being a community mobiliser, it was no longer appropriate to be present during an audit 
interview. As such, the PMF permitted new forms of participation in the project space, yet 
participation is structured to the extent that it can affect configurations at the community level.  
Furthermore, the drive to collect data ‘from the field’ was an effort supported by a slew of 
templates, workshops and meetings in all domains. On the one hand, the quest for data 
constrained the project, as participants had to interpret their daily life into prescribed formats 
(see Rottenburg, 2009). On the other hand, ‘indicator’ development has proved to be a flexible 
space for them, one in which they could re-define their work considering their context, not their 
assigned activity (Jordan et al, 2012). Similar to findings from previous chapters, the LF 
possessed flexible and inflexible uses and elements which were enacted upon participants.  
Additionally, the LF guided, implicitly and explicitly, decisions made in the field. For example, 
communities were counted and categorised based on technical assumptions of how to 
extrapolate the number of indirect beneficiaries. As noted by Bierschenk (1988), the use and 
application of categories such as ‘beneficiaries’ reframe community perceptions. Yet this 
chapter illustrates that managers leveraged conceptually technical parts of the LF (i.e. water and 
sanitation, infrastructure etc.) as a conduit to enter into conversations on the highly sensitised 
topic of GBV. Given government surveillance, participants had used the line item of 
infrastructure and the activity of meetings to discuss infrastructure as a means to indirectly 
discuss issues of GBV. This illustrates that controversial activities were purposefully made 
invisible through formally recording an effort as more technical. This is of interest since it 
provides insight on how the ‘qualitative’ becomes real through accounting by not being formally 
represented in documentation (see Robson, 1991).  
 185 
 
Lastly, presented as free and open, brainstorming in the project space is a reverse engineered 
process. Participants were guided to filter and frame general discussions and aspirations within 
a pre-determined format which would align and facilitate the preparation of future proposals 
and LFs. Through the use of flipcharts and note pads, brainstorming in this particular case led 
to a very structured and eventual visibility of aspirations into actionable categories which fit 
with Oxfam’s development approach. This implies that the substance of the LF (and other 
mechanisms) is not always tied to its physical matrix format.  
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7 CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis outlines situations of conflict faced by NGOs through empirical analysis. Social and 
administrative tensions present in society, organisations, partnerships and projects blend to 
create situations of conflict. This thesis argues that perceptions of neutrality and formality are 
desirable in situations of conflict given breakdowns in communication, informal relations and 
trust. It illustrates that structural arrangements and desensitised representations support wider 
stakeholder involvement and provide a platform for developing coordinated visions. In addition, 
this thesis suggests that internal actors and wider community stakeholders can potentially 
construct formal and neutral accounts of their knowledge, experiences and aspirations. In 
relation to other accounting studies, the ‘particular conception of organizational reality’ 
portrayed by the LF is fluid and based on assemblage of an ambiguous methodology and degrees 
of flexibility promoted by technical paradoxes of the LF (Burchell et al, 1980, p. 5). In this 
thesis, stakeholders participated in the making of fluid representations and developed their own 
set of constructs which were on par with other stakeholders. This thesis also proposes that 
constructs can be mobilised to redress imbalances in authority by providing internal actors and 
locals with opportunities to structure interactions, facilitate coordination and intervene in their 
own affairs. In the midst of sensitivities between conflict-affected communities and government 
actors, the LF was a space where “interests [were] negotiated, counter claims articulated and 
political processes explicated” (Burchell et al, 1980, p. 17). Such deployment of the LF’s 
neutrality and formality in situations of conflict suggests that previous calls to study accounting 
beyond its technical features (see Hopwood, 1978) should also examine ways in which such 
technicality of accounting enables participation, rather than act solely as a force for discipline 
as well as aligning actors to dominant governing interests (Covaleski et al., 1998; Ferjuson, 
1994; Hall, 2001; Neu et al., 2006; Rose & Miller, 2010).  
For this thesis, specific chapter contributions are as follows: 
 Chapter 2 illustrates how the desire for neutrality and formality developed over time and was 
linked to ambitions in international development in the 1950s and the 1960s. The LF was a by-
product of the ambition to access the experience of evaluators. In this setting, the LF was 
presented as a simple tool that combined both management and scientific thinking in order to 
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account for evaluator experiences and link elements of planning to evaluation in a project. 
Attributes of neutrality were attached to the LF matrix, and this form of neutrality was initially 
presented as an asset. In relation to Miller (1998), this chapter illustrates that attributes such as 
neutrality can drive changes at the margins of accounting. It also demonstrates that certain 
features of the LF such as its box-like template is memorable due to its ability to be presented 
as simple and open, and, at the same time, be viewed as complex and bounded by particular 
methods and ‘logics’.  
The remainder of the thesis focuses on attributes of neutrality and formality in situations of 
conflict faced by Sarvodaya. Chapters 4 to 6 explore how attributes of neutrality and formality 
shape, inform and structure different forms of conflict within Sarvodaya. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that Sarvodaya’s 1985 DC made internal and external accounts of the movement 
and Sarvodaya itself visible. These accounts, one motivated by donors and the other internally 
generated around movement customs and philosophies, organised themselves and were 
influenced by possibilities of conflict. This illustrates that the division between externally driven 
and internally generated accounts is not discrete and conflicts can give rise to new hybrid 
innovations. This challenges distinctions in literature made between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
accounts (Ebrahim, 2005; Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008), and speaks to work on 
hybridised logics in NGOs (see Battilana & Dorado, 2010). It also notes that neutrality was a 
valuable resource which was called upon at different junctions in the DC relationship.  
Chapter 5 focuses on Sarvodaya’s current post-conflict development projects which utilise the 
LF. In this chapter, the LF is an avenue for discussions between the distant government and 
communities in the North and East of Sri Lanka. The ability to teach the format of the LF and 
the ability to localise it into Tamil and Sinhalese, even though it’s not perfectly used, are of 
value. In the post-conflict scenario, the LF as a ‘neutral technical instrument’ (see Miller & 
Power, 2013) is desirable as it reframes controversial topics of good governance and human 
rights into a format which is overtly technical so as to be non-threatening to the government. In 
addition, the LF as a ‘technique of neutralisation’ brings perceived forms of deviance from 
communities into a desensitised and governable form of deviance.  This finding resonates with 
views that acts of quantification via science can cultivate forms of trust, in effect a ‘mechanical 
objectivity’, and that such forms have a role in society (Porter, 1996). The act of measuring can 
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provide standard ‘stable concepts’ which can be used to overcome distance between specialists 
and societies (Porter, 1996). In post-conflict Sri Lanka, stable and neutral concepts and formats 
of the LF provided a voice for conflict-affected communities in the North and East. And, the 
LF was not an ‘ammunition machine’ to rationalise and promote dominant government interests 
(Burchell et al, 1980). In this case the ability to make concepts of good governance and human 
rights technical, rather than political, supported possibilities for communities to reach the 
government and uplifts local visions and systems into the governing paradigm.  
The final chapter suggests that the LF manifests and creates different forms of visibility in the 
project space, which in this chapter is framed as different ‘sights’: plain sight, oversight and 
foresight. This chapter argues that the LF created forms of visibility in the project space, 
especially in the case of the Oxfam-Sarvodaya partnership. The LF was used for planning, 
monitoring and brainstorming, and its template was iterated into activity workplans, budgets, 
indicators, monitoring frameworks and even used as a basis for framing open ended discussions. 
The way that the LF is used to structure daily work (plain sight) provided guidance to district 
staff, while PMFs frameworks and indicators (oversight) were a window for donors and 
headquarters to monitor. Through brainstorming in a project planning session, donors, district 
and national level staff were guided into a common vision for project works and communities.  
This chapter extends the visual dimensions of accounting (Jordan et al, 2013; Quattrone, 2009) 
in that it illustrates that the LF, in all kinds of sight, comes in and out of visibility. At times, the 
LF is unrecognisable by staff, yet at others it is displayed on walls predominately for staff 
discussions. It also takes on new forms through PowerPoints and white boards, even as it 
transitions from being an electronic document to a hardcopy. In this sense, the visual power of 
the LF moves in and out of staff purview and is both ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’.  
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Limitations of the research and future directions  
 
While this thesis heeds the call to ‘study accounting in the context in which it operates’ (see 
Hopwood, 1983), it also has limited itself to studying the LF within an NGO in Sri Lanka. By 
restricting its scope to the LF, this thesis possibly did not capture wider evaluation ecosystems 
(see Miller & O’Leary, 2000) in which the LF participates and resides. In addition, Sarvodaya 
functions simultaneously as a grassroots movement and a NGO, which may not be similar to 
other NGOs.  
In terms of data collection, while extensive access has been granted to conduct this study, 
spending an extended period of time would be beneficial to trace the use of the LF and other 
evaluation devices throughout the life of selected projects. In addition, the inability to speak and 
read in local languages did create forms of distance between the researcher and actors in some 
instances. For future studies, a working knowledge of Tamil and Sinhala would be an asset, 
especially when travelling to conflict-affected communities.  
Furthermore, while this thesis provided an overview of different situations of conflict, further 
investigations on types of conflict between organisational actors, society and within the project 
space would be of value. Mainly, while studies in accounting stress the presence of conflict and 
accounting’s role in promoting and masking the dominant interests within situations of conflict 
(see Arnold & Hammond, 1994), greater interest in defining and mapping the mechanics of 
conflict in relation to accounting is required.  
Furthermore, instead of interrogating accounting as more than a neutral, formal or technical 
endeavour, this thesis called for an exploration of how such attributes are mobilised to enrol and 
empower actors. While this thesis explored ways in which neutrality can be advantageous in a 
context in which conflict is visible in terms of war, ethnicity and even in the form of legal 
mechanisms to address the conflict, further research is needed on the role of neutrality and 
formality in situations where conflict is perhaps not obvious or not present at all. That said, this 
study provides a starting point for investigating the mobilisation of neutrality and formality by 
outlining ways in which attributes can be desirable to facilitate innovation, voice and even 
patterns of visibilities which permit participation. With this in mind, the potential of accounting 
to be a mechanism of control (see Barman, 2007; Ebrahim, 2003; Rottenburg, 2009) should not 
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be ignored. For future research, a more nuanced perspective may be beneficial, whereby 
neutrality and formality, usually associated with the powerful, can also potentially become part 
of the arsenal used by the less powerful, and in the words of Scott (1987),  a ‘weapon of the 
weak’.  
In this way, just as Burchell et al (1980) spoke about accounting’s role in creating ‘new patterns 
of visibility’ and Hopwood (1980) called for more investigation on ways in which accounting 
changes in substance and function, this thesis claims that part of the changing matter of 
accounting is creating visibility for the interests of weaker actors. In this vein, picking up on 
Hopwood (1992), “accounting is not purposeful but can be made so” and this thesis opens up 
discussions beyond defining accounting as ‘not neutral’ or tied to governing powers. It shifts 
the conversation to ways in which adding neutrality and formality into relations, organisations 
and societies are, in fact, desirable for less powerful actors.   
Existing studies concerning NGOs and local communities view evaluation devices and 
accounting as part of a top down form of governance, a force of neo-liberalism or an arm of 
imperial powers (Ferjuson, 1994; Jayasinghe & Wickramasinghe, 2011; Neu, 2000; Neu et al., 
2006). This thesis, however, suggests that while the origins of such mechanisms may be foreign, 
they can also be adapted, reclaimed and localised to the extent that systems are made available 
to those who otherwise would remain weak.  
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Annex 1: Interviews and Documents from JKF, USAID and PCI 
 
Interviews conducted within USAID/WB/Other with staff from the 1960s – 1970s  
Reference Organisation  Position  
Ia-1 Practical Concepts Incorporated/Fry Associates  (1960s-
1970s) 
Founder, creator of the LF (1970s) 
Ia-2 Practical Concepts Incorporated (1970s)/Management 
Systems International  
Trainer under PCI  
Ia-3 USAID (1970s) Director of Evaluation i (1970s) 
Ia-4 Practical Concepts Incorporated  Trainer under PCI (1970s) 
Ia-5 World Bank Trainer (1970s) 
Ia-6 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) Evaluation officers (1960s) 
Ia-7 BOND International Director  
 
Office of the President (United States 1960s) and USAID documents  
Reference Date Title Author  
Da-1 20.1.1949 President Truman Inaugural Address Truman, Harry S 
Da-2 5.1.1957 Eisenhower Doctrine Eisenhower, D. D.  
Da-3 1957 Fact Sheet “Point Four” ICA 
Da-4 1961 The White House: Special Message on Foreign Aid, Office of 
President Kennedy 
Salinger, P. 
Da-5 1961 A Special Report by Congressman Udall Udall, M 
Da-6 1961 Recruitment for the Aid Program Petrie, D. 
Da-7 1961 JFK Address at UN General Assembly, 25 September 1961 Kennedy, J.  
Da-8 1961 Memorandum: Mr. Ralph A. Dungan Watson, T.  
Da-9 7.8.1961 Letter to Rathbone, Standard Oil Company (FG 105-14) Dungan, R. 
Da-10 1962 The United Nations Development Decade: Proposals for Action United Nations 
Da-11 19.12.1962 Letter to Mr. Warne from Special Assistant to the President (FG 3-2) Reardon, T. J.  
Da-12 11.7.1964 David E. Bell, Oral History Interview: Oral History Project of JFK 
Presidential Library 
Turner, R. & Bell, 
D. 
Da-13 1965 Report to the Administrator: Improving AID Program Evaluation Lincoln, G. 
Da-14 1968 Report to the Administrator on Improving A.I.D’s Program  Bernstein, J.  
Da-15 1970 Project Evaluation and the Project Appraisal Reporting System FCI 
Da-16 1971 Installation of AID’s Project Evaluation System PCI 
Da-17 1979 The Logical Framework: A Manager’s Guide to a Scientific Approach 
to Design and Evaluation 
PCI 
Da-18 1987 The Logical Framework Approach to Project Design, Review and 
Evaluation in AID: Genesis, Impact, Problems and Opportunities 
Solem, R.  
Da-19 1988 Foreign Aid and American Purpose Eberstadt, N 
Da-20 1998 Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection: Robert S. Zigler North, H. & Zigler, 
R.  
Da-21 2004 US Development Aid an Historic First: Achievements and Failures in 
the 21st Century 
Butterfield, S. H. 
Da-22 2009 Better Aid Improving Incentives in Donor Agencies: Good Practice 
and Self-Assessment Toolkit. 
OECD 
Da-23 2012 Amherst: In Memory of Lawrence Posner Amherst College 
Da-24 2013 About Us Coffey International 
Da-25 2013 Marcus Ingle, Ph. D.  Portland State 
University 
Da-26 2013 Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate US Foreign Assistance Lawson, M. L.  
Da-27 ND “Lincoln Brigade”: One Story of the Faculty of the USMA Department 
of Social Science 
VanDriel, M. 
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Annex 2: Example Letter ‘Big Business’ from the Office of the President (1961) 
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Annex 3: Logical Framework Worksheet provided by Fry Associates 
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Annex 4: 1979 PCI Logical Framework 
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Annex 5: Fieldwork Meetings and Interviews  
 
Summary of Meetings  
 
Code Date Title  Organisation 
    
    
Mb-1 05.18.2012 General Council Sarvodaya 
Mb-2  Finding a Solution Together, NORAD Year 1 
Review 
Sarvodaya, NORAD 
Mb-3  Oxfam –GB/ EU Sarvodaya, Oxfam 
Mb-4  Oxfam – GB/EU Sarvodaya, Oxfam 
Mb-5  USAID – Karuna Sarvodaya 
Mb-6  Mine Risk Education Sarvodaya 
Mb-7  Mine Risk Education Sarvodaya  
Mb-8  Project staff, pre-Jaffna briefing Sarvodaya 
Mb-9  Project Progress Review Meeting (PPRM) Sarvodaya 
Mb-10  Informal contractor/project manager, Japanese 
Embassy 
Sarvodaya 
Mb-11  TEA – HelpAge Briefing Sarvodaya  
Mb-12  HQ General Assembly Meeting Sarvodaya 
Mb-13  War Child Holland-Sarvodaya Sarvodaya 
Mb-14  FairMaid SWOT Sarvodaya 
Mb-15  UN Breastfeeding Week Sarvodaya  
Mb-16  NORAD, final report Sarvodaya 
Mb-17  Oxfam-Sarvodaya (Trincomalee) Sarvodaya 
Mb-18  Oxfam-Sarvodaya (Batticaloa) Sarvodaya 
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Summary of Interviews 
 
Code Position Project/Department Organisation 
    
Phase 1 (Preliminary, December 2011) 
I0-1 Director Education, Curriculum 
development 
National Institute of 
Education 
I0-2 Manager Informal section National Institute of 
Education 
I0-3 Director Research National Institute of 
Education  
I0-4 Director Education Government of Sri Lanka 
I0-5 Teacher Children’s shelter Sarvodaya 
I0-6 President President Sarvodaya Women’s 
Movement, formerly SIDA 
Phase 2 (May to July, 2012) 
Ib-1 President & founder Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-2 General Secretary  Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-3 Director of Human Resources  Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-4 Director of Projects Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-5 M&E Officer  Projects Department Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-6 Project manager Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-8 Project manager USAID Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-9 Project manager USAID Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-10 Senior Project Accountant Finance Department Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-11 Director of partner coordination Department of Partners Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-12 Project manager/Assistant  Department of Partners Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-13 President Executive  Sarvodaya Women’s 
Movement 
Ib-14 Director Executive Suwa Setha 
Ib-15 Provincial Coordinator  District Sarvodaya, Batticaloa  
Ib-16 Supplier  Malester International Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-17 Beneficiary Malester International Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
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Ib-18 Beneficiary Malester International Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-19 Beneficiary Malester International Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-20 Beneficiary Malester International Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-21 GHC nurses  Malester International Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-22 Field officer  USAID Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-23 Field officer  USAID Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-24 Project managers  Karuna Peace Sarvodaya, Trincomalee 
Ib-25 Community religious leader Karuna Peace Sarvodaya, Kilinochchi 
Ib-26 Project manager Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, Ampara 
Ib-27 Project coordinator  Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, Ampara 
Ib-28 Logistics officer  Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, Ampara 
Ib-29 Technical officers Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, Trincomalee 
Ib-30 Project manager Save the Children Sarvodaya, Jaffna 
Ib-31 Project manager Mine Rise Education Sarvodaya, Jaffna/ 
Kilinochchi 
Ib-32 Analyst  Operations Section  United Nations  
Ib-33 Promotions officer Operations Section  United Nations  
    
Phase 3 (June – July, 2013) 
    
Ib-34 President and founder Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-35 General Secretary  Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-36 Director of Deshodaya Deshodaya, NORAD Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-37 Director of Projects  Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-38 Project manager  Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-39 Project manager  British Asian Trust Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-40 Project Accountant Finance Department Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-41 Director of partner coordination Executive Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-42 Project manager for  Institute of Higher Learning Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-43 Director  International Unit Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-44 Vice President  
Sarvodaya Movement’s 
Movement 
Sarvodaya, HQ 
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Ib-45 Project manager Deshodaya, NORAD Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-46 Project Coordinator  TEA Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-47 Project manager   TEA Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-48 
Project manager/Monitoring & 
Evaluation Officer  
TEA Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-49 Project manager Swiss Solidarity Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-50 Project manager   Swiss Solidarity Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-51 Project Coordinator  ECD Unit Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-52 Project manager  ECD Unit Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-53 Project manager ECD Unit Sarvodaya, HQ 
Ib-54 Donor manager  War Child Holland 
Ib-55 Project manager  NORAD 
Ib-56 Project manager   NORAD 
Ib-57 Project manager  
 Peacebuilding & 
Development Institute of 
Sri Lanka 
    
Phase 4 (December, 2013) 
    
Ib-58 Director  Oxfam-EU Chamber of Commence 
Ib-59 Project manager   Oxfam-EU Chamber of Commence 
Ib-60 Government Agent  Batticaloa Government 
Ib-61 Project managers (x2) Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, Batticaloa 
Ib-62 Gender Community Mobiliser  Oxfam-EU Sarvodaya, Batticaloa 
Ib-63 Consultant  CIDA (former) 
Ib-64 Donor Liaison Officer   Sarvodaya-DC (former) 
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Annex 6: Overview of Documents Referenced 
 
Archival Sarvodaya documents and Donor Consortium communications (1960s to 2000)  
 
Reference Date 
 
Title Author(s)/Institution  
Db-1 1975/1976 Ethos and Workplan: Lanka Jatika Sarvodaya Shramadana 
Sangamaya 
Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement: At a glance  
Sarvodaya 
Db-2 06.01.1978 Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement: National Organisational 
Structure and Note on Organisational Service 
AT Ariyaratne 
Db-3 05.1980 Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement: Five Year Plan Sarvodaya  
Db-4 10.01.1980 Sarvodaya Development from the village up  Sarvodaya Press  
Db-5 08.1984 Sarvodaya Village Link-Up News Sarvodaya  
Db-6 07.06.1986 Sarvodaya Economic Enterprises Development Services 
(SEEDS): Policy Statement Approved by the Sarvodaya 
Executive Council on the Formation of SEEDS 
Sarvodaya 
Db-7 1987 Five Lessons and a Goal A.T Ariyaratne 
Db-8 24.02.1988 Sarvodaya & Resource Partners A.T Ariyaratne 
Db-9 30.07.1989 Political institutions and traditional morality  A.T Ariyaratne 
Db-10 18.08.1989 Study on the Qualitative Impact Evaluation of the Development 
Education Activities within the Life Line Programme of 
Sarvodaya 
Marga Institute, Sri 
Lanka Centre for 
Development Studies  
Db-11 09.1989 Sarvodaya as a Movement D.A. Perera and AT 
Ariyaratne 
Db-12 03.1990 Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement: Eighth progress report of 
the donor monitoring team  
Dieke Buijs, NOVIB 
Andy Jeans, ITDG 
Boyd McBride, CIDA 
Robert Salomon, 
NORAD 
Ian Smillie, CIDA  
Db-13 10.1990 Ninth Monitoring Report of the Sarvodaya Donor Consortium 
  
Peter Kardoes, NOVIB 
Robert Saloman, 
NORAD 
Ian Smille, CIDA 
 David Wright, 
ITDG/ODA 
Db-14 05.1991 Sarvodaya Strategic Plan (1991-1994) Sarvodaya  
Db-15 09.1991 Tenth Monitoring Report of the Sarvodaya Donor Consortium  Peter de Haan, NOVIB  
Boyd McBride, CIDA 
Colin Relf, ODA 
Robert Salomon, 
NOARD  
Db-16 28.12.1991 A Five Stage Programme to Overcome Obstacles and achieve a 
Sarvodaya Society  
AT Ariyaratne  
Db-17 09.1992 Eleventh Monitoring Report of the Sarvodaya Donor 
Consortium  
Reidar Dale,  NORAD 
Cri Kars-Marshall,  
NOVIB 
Colin McKone,  ODA 
Brian Rowe,  CIDA  
Db-18 14.04.1993 Donor Liaison Officer’s (DLO) Comments on Indicators  
April 14, 1993 
 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-19 1994 Banking with the Poor – NGOs and Banks AT Ariyaratne 
Db-20 24.01.1994 Reaching the Poor – Experience of NGOs AT Ariyaratne  
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Db-21 10.18.1994 Memo from K.D Ariyadasa to Mr. A. Woodbridge 
RE: Donor Consortium Meeting  
October 18th, 1994 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-22 25.03.1995 Donor Liaison Office for Sarvodaya  
From: Dunni Goodman  
To: The Consortium and Sarvodaya 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-23 03.31.1995 Comment on Auditor’s report, March 31st, 1995 
 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-24 13.04.1995 Hank Friso to Anne Woodbridge  
Re: Sarvodaya – 1995/6 CIDA funding and 
consortium/Sarvodaya meeting March 22nd, 1995 
Date: April 13th, 1995 
 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-25 10.05.1995 Inter-CIDA email Hank to Anne (05/10/1995) 
 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-26 14.09.1995 Note on Sarvodaya Consortium Meeting of 14th September, 
1995 (Anne)  
 
 
Db-27 15.10.1995 
 
RE: Sarvodaya’s second funding request  
 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-28 18.10.1995 To: Ann Woodbridge 
From: Sara Sargent & Hank B J Friso 
 
 
CIDA internal 
communication 
 
Db-29 1997 The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) 
Third Edition: Handbook of objectives oriented planning 
NORAD 
Translated by: Decade 
Service  
Db-30 1997 Apostle of Peace P. Ratayake 
Db-31 2001 Bhava Thanha (Volume 1) A.T Ariyaratne 
Db-32 2003 Bhava Thanha (Volume 13 A.T Ariyaratne 
Db-33 n/a Annex A, Project Approval Memorandum, Sarvodaya Rural 
Development – Phase 3 (1993/94) 
CIDA 
Db-34 1999 A.T Ariyaratne: Collected Works Vol. V A.T Ariyaratne 
Db-35 1990 A Commitment to Service: A tale by Jehan Perera of the 
Sarvodaya Movement 
Sarvodaya  
Db-36 1996 Statement of Financial Contributions  Sarvodaya 
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NORAD and Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Committee project documents  
 
Reference Date Title Author 
Dc-1 2010 Mine Risk Education and Community Based Child protection 
program in Kilinochchi district – 2010 
Sarvodaya  
Dc-2 04. 2010 Sarvodaya mid-term of community empowerment for peace, 
reconciliation and development 
Peter Bauck, Ivar 
Evensmo and Anberiya 
Hanifa 
Dc-3 11. 2011 Report of the Commission of the Inquiry on Lessons Learnt 
and Reconciliation  
LLRC Commission, 
Government of Sri Lanka  
Dc-4 25.03.2012 Community Empowerment for People-Centered Devolution of 
Power for Sustainable Peace and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka : 
Based on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’s 
(LLRC) Recommendations of December 2011 
Sarvodaya  
Dc-5 2012 FAST: Year One Final Report  Sarvodaya 
Dc-6 2013 Swiss Solidary Project, Logframe and Budget Sarvodaya Shramadana 
Societies/Sarvodaya  
Dc-7 2013 Swiss Solidary Project, Logframe (Tamil)  Sarvodaya Shramadana 
Societies/Sarvodaya 
 
 
Oxfam-Sarvodaya Documents  
 
Reference Date Title Author  
Dd-1 2008 Socio-economic measures for conflict-affected IDP returnees 
and host communities, Grant Application 
Oxfam-GB 
Dd-2 2008 Socio-Economic Measures to Support Conflict-Affected IDPS – 
Returnees and Host Communities in Sri Lanka, Open Call for 
Proposals 
EuropeAid 
Dd-3 2009 Letter of Agreement Oxfam-GB 
Dd-4 2011 Amendment No. 1 to Letter of Agreement dated 12th October 
2009 between Oxfam GB and Lanka Jathika Sarvodaya 
Shramandana Sangamaya hereinafter referred to as 
SARVODAYA 
Oxfam-GB 
Dd-5 2011 EU-ACAP Project LFA Orientation Oxfam-GB 
Dd-6 2011 Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, Learning Oxfam-GB 
Dd-7 2011 Result 3:Improved Protection and reduced GBV for 57,000 
target women and men from IDP returnee and host community 
families 
Oxfam-GB 
Dd-8 2012 Logical Framework for the Action EuropeAid 
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Annex 7: Fieldwork Interview Guide 
 
BACKGROUND  
 
 Position, previous employment, education etc.  
 
ORGANISATION 
 
 Years of service 
 Philosophy, values etc.  
 Evolution of the movement/NGO 
 
ASSIGNED PROJECTS  
 
 Project details: purpose, location, length, donor etc.  
 Context: post-war development, language, government etc.  
 Duties within the project: daily tasks, interactions, field visits, reports etc.  
 Training available and type (i.e. monitoring, evaluation etc.)  
 Setup and role within planning, monitoring and evaluation  
 Lines of responsibility and reporting: head office, district, partners, communities and 
donors etc.  
 
DOCUMENTS AND THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
 Use of templates, formats, diagrams etc.  
 Role, if at all, of the LF 
 LF benefits and drawbacks  
 Memorable features of the LF  
 
OTHER 
 
 Other comments 
 Other contacts, documents etc. recommended 
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Annex 8: Shramadana Camps held from 1967 to 1987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No. of Camps  Participation  No. of Villages 
1967 9,726                 9,310               -                       
1968 72                     9,726               100                      
1969 43                     8,453               161                      
1970 38                     3,008               280                      
1971 18                     11,202             397                      
1972 65                     2,613               454                      
1973 171                    14,320             565                      
1974 104                    18,685             740                      
1975 169                    36,919             791                      
1976 325                    73,543             876                      
1977 379                    119,296           910                      
1978 778                    163,043           947                      
1979 896                    491,313           2,107                    
1980 3,430                 286,140           3,272                    
1981 3,576                 222,682           4,052                    
1982 3,077                 224,175           4,420                    
1983 2,299                 264,396           4,937                    
1984 910                    144,156           6,037                    
1985 3,910                 314,412           6,940                    
1986 7,999                 363,944           6,404                    
1987 3,804                 413,810           8,000                    
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Annex 9: Five Stages of Village Development 
  
i. The initial stage  The first stage launches the process of ‘awareness creation’ to make individuals 
and the village population as a whole aware of the factors that led to their 
impoverishment. The stage also includes acceptance that the village economic 
regeneration must be preceded by a restoration of social values and 
relationships. This is done through the organisation of shramadana camps 
 
ii. The formation of a 
social infra-structure 
In this stage a social infrastructure is formed by organising the different age 
and occupation groups. Methods used here are shramadana camps to satisfy 
some basic human needs, group discussions and organising activities in which 
the village population is permanently involved. Examples of this include 
creating a children service centre, home gardens etc.  
 
iii. The integrated village 
development stage 
Using a village survey conducted by the youth group with the help of 
Sarvodaya field workers, a list of basic needs in the village is compiled. The 
list is the basis from which a village development plan is prepared, taking into 
consideration the available resources, from the village itself, from the 
Movement, from the government and other resources. The plan is finally 
discussed by the Sarvodaya Village Council, which consists of three 
representatives of each of the groups in the village (children, youth, mothers, 
farmers and elders) and ten elected members. Part of these programmes are 
formed by the establishing of economic activities.  These provide opportunities 
for livelihood for groups of village youth and finance several other Sarvodaya 
activities in the village, such as the maintenance of the children service centre, 
allowances for Sarvodaya field workers, etc.  
 
iv. The village re-
awakening stage 
 
In this stage, the village still develops itself according to an integrated village 
development plan, but now with a minimum of resources from outside the 
village. It is in this stage that, for example, the children service sevikas and 
other village level workers are maintained by the village itself. The leadership 
in the village has found their own way to make sure that government 
programmes are implemented in the village. Economic activities are profitable 
and pay for Sarvodaya activities such as the organisation of shramadana and 
cultural activities 
 
v. The Sarvodaya village 
stage 
 
It is in this stage that villagers can afford to help other villages on the path to 
self-development. They are also able to assist other villages in post-crises. For 
instance in the cyclone of November 1978 stage V villages helped others to 
rehabilitate the population, build their houses and rebuild the local social 
organisation.. 
  
(Db-4, p.8)  
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Annex 10: Three Major Programmes of Sarvodaya (1985) 
 
Lifeline Focus on guiding villages through the five stages of Sarvodaya’s development 
model. A Gramadana Worker (GW) from Sarvodaya would be assigned to a 
village to facilitate sharamdana camps, mothers’ groups, children’s services etc.  
 
Sarvodaya Economic 
Enterprise for 
Development (SEEDS) 
Rural Enterprise Program (REP) Improve access to capital savings 
and loans at the village level 
 
Rural Enterprise Development Services 
(REDS) 
Focus on the need for technology 
in rural villages such as product 
and packing research, business 
strategy etc.  
 
Management Training Institute  Train communities, the 
government and Sarvodaya 
workers to develop management 
skills  
 
Relief, Reconciliation, 
Reconstruction and 
Reawakening (RRRR) 
 
 
Respond to the needs of victims of violence in the North and East of Sri Lanka 
 
Other 
Early Childhood Development Program 
(ECDP) 
 
Sarvodaya Rural Technical Services 
(SRTS)  
 
Suwa Setha  Welfare projects for the disabled  
 (Db-3) 
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Annex 11: Draft Village Development Matrix Template 
 
Phase of Development            Number of Villages  
 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 
Phase 1 – mobilization       
Phase 2 – organization       
Phase 3 – development/credit       
Phase 4 – self reliance       
 
(Db-13) 
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Annex 12: Proposed Analytical Framework for the Graduation Model 
 
GOAL OBJECTIVES STRATEGY INPUT OUTPUT 
STAGE I 
 
 
 
 
 
STAGE II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAGE III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To build psycho-social 
infrastructure as a foundation 
for subsequent integrated 
village development  
 
 
To establish various supportive 
functional groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To establish the village level 
registered S.S.S and initiate 
economic and infrastructure 
development programmes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. To create familiarity with Sarvodaya 
principles and willingness among villages to 
get further involved.  
 
B. To create the ability to organise and 
implement functioning mother’s, children, and 
youth group  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. To create the ability to establish and manage a 
viable society and to identity needs for 
savings and loan program  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Undertake Shramadana 
camps and family 
gatherings  
 
2. -  Form groups  
 
-  Maintain groups  
 
-  Conduct ECCDP 
training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Explore village needs 
through SRTS  
 
-  Conduct ERC youth 
training  
 
-  Enforce village youth 
training 
 
 
3. Register and maintain 
SSS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o Conduct 3 Shramadana 
Camps to meet basic needs 
  
o Organise family gathering 
once a month  
 
o Motivate mothers, youth 
and children  
 
o Organise meetings 1x per 
month, prepare minutes  
 
o Train leaders of mother’s 
and youth groups at 2 day 
training sections  
 
o Establish pre-school  
 
o Train Pre-school teacher 
 
o Identity basic needs for 
SRTS involvement  
 
o Conduct 2 week youth 
training  
 
o Gramadana worker 
discusses establishment of 
society  
 
 
o Register SSS and receive 
Rs. 15000/-  
 
o Operate a bank account  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 10%-15% within their age 
group are members (% of 
women in the community)  
 
 
 
 
* Building for pre-school is 
secured 
 
* Pre-school teacher has had 2 
weeks training 
 
 
 
 
 
* 20%-30% of community 
families are members  
 
* Annual work plan gets 
formulated and implemented  
 
* Annual financial reports 
received at society register  
 
* Month meetings; minutes 
available 
 
 
 
* Renewal, payment of members 
by all members 
 
* Infrastructural implement 
evident (wells, toilets, etc. 
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STAGE IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STAGE V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To strengthen communities 
self-support capacity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To achieve village financial 
independence and spread inter-
village support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Create the ability to maintain S.S.S support 
the Pre-school teachers and establish income 
generating and community financing systems  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Sustain SSS’s ability to exist independently, 
negotiate external resources for village 
programmes and support other villages  
 
 
 
-  Train SSS members  
 
-  SRTS agrees on 
specific project   
 
-  Maintain pre-school    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Conduct village 
poverty survey 
 
-  S’ independent 
projects launch a 
programme  
 
-  Inform SSS about 
REP   
   
    
 
   4. Manage the SSS 
 
 
 
-  Initiate savings and 
credit programmes  
 
 
 
 
5. Support the SSS 
when requested  
 
 
 
 
o Conduct management 
training  
 
o Write a proposal and 
implement project  
 
o Provide a 3 months training 
for pre-school teachers  
 
o Provide balanced meals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o Identify poorer households 
 
o Women’s Movement, SS, 
legal aid initiate a project  
 
o REP field workers join 
Gramadana workers to 
introduce REP  
 
 
o REDS input  
 
o Implement annual 
programme  
 
o Economic and savings 
programmes are in 
operation  
 
 
 
o Focus on poor families  
 
o Operate children’s savings 
programmes 
 
* Pre-school teacher received 3 
months training  
 
* Frequency of meals served at 
least... times per week  
 
* Contribution of mothers to 
food for children at least… Rs. 
Per week  
 
* Pre-school attendance should 
be >... % 
 
 
* …% of children of needy 
families join Pre-school  
 
* 30%-40% families enrolled as 
members  
 
* >.. % repayment of loans  
 
* 5% profit of economic 
programmes deposited in 
children’s savings fund  
 
* Minimum of 15 families are 
beneficiaries of loans  
 
* …% of poor families receiving 
loans  
 
* Minimum savings deposits Rs. 
100  
 
* At least % parents pay pre-
school teachers  
 
* SSS implements development 
programmes with external 
resources 
 
* 5% of profits from economic 
projects of the SSS is paid to 
Pre-school teachers  
 
* Minimum savings deposits of a 
member is Rs. 1000  
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Annex 13: Sarvodaya Graduation Model 
 
 
Stage 1: Psychological infrastructure development: Changing the mindset of the people 
that they themselves are the change agents for their own wellbeing based on 
model of self-reliance   
Stage 2: Social infrastructure development: Need assessments and collective work 
towards fulfilment of basic needs  
Stage 3: Institutional development: Establishment of Sarvodaya Shramadana Societies 
and getting them registered as independent legal entities45  
Stage 4: Income and employment generation: Start of micro-finance activities and 
income generation projects at the village level  
Stage 5: Political empowerment and sharing with neighbouring villages: promoting the 
concept of citizenry and enhance engagement with the other State and non-State 
actors in the locality including the political authorities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Under the Societies Ordinance, Act No. 16 of 1891 
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Annex 14: Chart of Sarvodaya Results 
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Annex 15: President Task Force, Example Form Submitted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project name: Mine Risk Education and Community Based Child Protection 
Donor: Unicef
Locations: Killinochchi district
Project period: 12 months from August 2010 to July 2011
Brief description:
No Cattegory Activity
Unit cost 
SRL
Total Cost SRL District
Divisional 
Secretariat 
GN Divisions
Program 
/Beneficiary 
1.0 ToT for Government officials 
and Humaniriatian agencies 
2,250 45,000
45 GN 
divisions
90 villages 20
2.0 Support to District Forum 
activities 
700 35,000 50
3.0 Establishment of SPA and 
functional (construction) 
233,720 2,804,640 12
4.0 Fixing Play items 125,000 1,500,000 12
5.0 Sign board 11,000 495,000 45
6.0 Street drama expressing MRE 
awareness
510 10,200 20
7.0 District celebration of 
international mine awareness 
day 
97,500 97,500 1
8.0 Local supplies to SPA 
(stationeries)
6,000 270,000 45
9.0 Provide capacity building for  
5 days training to Sarvodaya 
staff on MRE.   
5,750 143,750 25
10.0 Organize quarterly review 
meeting UNICEF and 
Sarvodaya officials to 
participate
1,000 10,000 10
11.0
Provide 3 days street theater 
ToT program to 20 performers   
3,600 72,000 20
12.0 Training to community 
volunteers MRE, SPA, 
communication with children, 
child participation  and 
community mobilization 
905 81,450 90
1.0 Formation of  community 
based structures (children 
clubs, youth and Village Child 
Rights Monitoring Committee) 
700 94,500 135
2.0
Establishment of SPA 233,720 4,206,960 18
3.0 Fixing play items 125,000 2,250,000 18
4.0 Renovation of existing area for 
play activites 
125,000 1,875,000 15
5.0 Incentive to community 
workers -   SPA (2  per village 
supporting & facilitating SPA 
activities)
36,000 3,240,000 90
6.0 Cultural and drama activities 4,000 180,000 45
7.0 Training  children’s clubs on 
life skills and child rights 
9,000 405,000 45
8.0 Children club registration;   
Stationery and Photo copy 
etc. 
500 22,500 45
9.0 Training of community 
structures on basic helping 
skills, child participation, 
community mobilisation and 
general child protection.
4,500 405,000 90
10.0 Training of key ground level 
government officials on 
general child protection, 
legislations on child 
protections, reporting and 
referral system. 
95,940 479,700 5
11.0 Referral and linkage with state 
and non-state service 
providers in livelihood 
activities, education, health 
and nutrition and water and 
sanitation.
500 45,000 90
12.0 Case referrals to received 
treatment, psychosocial 
support, vocational training 
and other services
1,000 20,000 20
13.0
Victim Assistance emergency 
fund for individual cases
400,000 400,000 1
19,188,200TOTAL VALUE
This project provides Mine Risk Education to the communities and other stakeholders including government officials and NGO 
workers working in the area and constructs Safe Play Area (SPA) for children in the Killinochchi District to support child 
protection in the target area
Objective2: To 
strengthern community 
based structures and 
support government 
statutory bodies to 
prevent and respond to 
child rights violations, 
through promotion of 
play activities and 
provision of psycho-
social support for 
children in 90 villages 
in the 45 selected GNs 
in Killinochnchi district.
Killinochchi
Mine Risk Education and Community Based Child Protection - Unicef
Objective 1: To 
promote activities that 
reduce risk of 
community members 
that include children, 
NGO and government 
officials to land mines 
and explosive 
remnants in 45 
selected  GNs in 
Killinochchi District.
Killinochchi
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Annex 16: MRE Monitoring Plan  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
TYPE OF MONITORING RESPONSIBLE  PERSONS SUBMITTED TO TIME LINE 
Volunteers monitoring 
Field officers, VCRMC, 
Samurdhi officers Project coordinator Twice a week 
Volunteers monitoring 
Sarvodaya coordinator, DS, 
CRPO and Social Services  
UNICEF CP 
specialist  Monthly 
Safe Play Area  
Field officers, VCRMC, 
Samurdhi officers, other 
community structures 
identified  Project coordinator Twice a week 
 Safe Play Area 
Sarvodaya  coordinator, DS, 
CRPO and Social Services  
UNICEF CP 
Specialist  Monthly 
Safe Play Areas  
Overall coordinator of  
Sarvodaya 
UNICEF CP 
Specialist  Monthly 
QA monitoring- DMAO QA team leader 
UNICEF CP 
Specialist  Weekly 
Quarterly monitoring  
Sarvodaya  coordinator, 
UNICEF, Kilinochchi 
District officials  UNICEF Colombo  Quarterly  
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Annex 17: Village Logframe from Swiss Solidarity Project in Tamil 
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Annex 18: Excerpt from FAST Logical Framework-Results Framework, 2012 
 Intervention 
Logic 
Objectively 
Verifiable 
Indicators 
Means of Verification Assumptions 
O
v
e
ra
ll 
o
b
je
ct
iv
e
 
Goal 
 
Ethnic harmony 
and peace 
ensured between 
the diverse 
groups of people 
living in the 
conflict and 
tsunami affected 
districts of Sri 
Lanka  
 
Active participation of 
community in peace 
activities increased 
throughout project 
districts 
No. of public officers 
who learn Sinhala 
/Tamil increases 
Tamil language is 
given due recognition 
in practice -sign 
boards, police / GN 
work etc... 
 
 
Government Peace 
Bulletin 
Census data / Data from 
Ministries etc... 
Police records and Peace 
Monitoring Forces 
records 
Village society records 
/surveys 
Government 
continues the 
emphasis on peace 
and reconciliation 
Civil and Religious 
Leaders highlight 
respect for all 
cultures and religions 
programmes on 
peace e.g. teaching 
another language is 
carried out efficiently 
Development take 
place in war ravaged 
areas 
IDPs are resettled  
P
ro
je
ct
 P
u
rp
o
se
 
1.Consciousness 
of peace 
expanded such 
that non-violence 
and harmonious 
interpersonal 
relationships 
become the social 
norm, and war is 
no longer an 
option in the 
minds of the 
people  
Increased community 
participation in  
activities at 
community level 
decreased violence 
situation among the 
community 
Increased community 
participation in Inter 
ethnic / religious 
activities 
No. of persons in the 
community who learn 
Sinhala / Tamil 
languages increases 
No. of persons in the 
community who have 
a friend from another 
ethnic group, is 
increasing 
Household surveys 
conducted by end of the 
project. 
Grama Niladari Records 
Village society records 
Village society records 
Village society records 
Other donors will 
continue to support 
other important 
elements of 
Sarvodaya’s peace 
and development 
programme 
Sarvodaya will be 
able to generate the 
intended internal 
income to meet the 
counter-part 
operational costs 
committed for the 
CEPRD project 
Undertaking north- 
south visits are 
facilitated by the 
security situation 
Local leaders support 
inter-ethnic 
collaboration 
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Annex 19: Excerpt of FAST Budget Narratives by Activity 
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Annex 20: FAST Sinhala/Tamil Narration and Activities 
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Annex 21: Excerpt from Oxfam-EU proposal Logical Framework 
This Logical Framework was revised from the original Logical Framework included in Oxfam-GB’s proposal to the EU.  
 
 231 
 
 
 232 
 
 
 233 
 
Annex 22: Sarvodaya District Staff Positions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
 
Annex 23: Example Workplan for the District 
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Annex 24: Excerpt from Oxfam-Sarvodaya District Monthly Activity Plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name: C. Nandakumar (PC) Month: January Name of the Organization: Sarvodaya - Kalmunai
Planed
Date Time Activity Budget 
Code
Purpose Y/N Reasons/Decisions/Achievements/comme
nts
AM
Staff meeting
Review progress, challenges and 
planning for the month of January
Y Done
PM
Work Plan & Reporting
Work Plan for January 2012 and Report 
for December 2011
Y Done
AM
Group Meeting at 4th Colony Re-forming the groups
Prepared schedule with AI provience to 
provide awareness on glicidia. 
PM Group Meeting at Chalambakkeny Re-forming the groups Meeting with MG gropu of Slambakery.
AM
Group Meeting at 4th Colony
Meet the loan beneficiaries to discuss 
about the project
Y Done
PM Discuss with PO - FCCISL To discuss about the future action of the 
formed Producer Organization.
due to FCCISL busy schedule it was post 
poned to 11.01.2012
AM
PM
AM
PM
7 Saturday
8 Sunday
AM Y Sarvodaya all staff meeting.
PM Met the bank loan beneficiaries and 
discussed with the village committee in 
Veerathidel. 
AM
Meeting at Chavalakkada & Navithanveli - 1 On Clisyderiya Cultivation
N Met the CEB engineer to handover the 
request letter for three phase power supply for 
the existing seed paddy processing unit. 
PM
Discussin with PM
Support to draft monitoring format for 
result - 1
Discussed with PC and PO G & P seperately 
on result 1 & Result 3.
AM
Meet the AI-Province regarding Glisyderiya,          
Meet the AI-Central regarding Seed Paddy Group’s 
registration
Get the Idea of Size of the Clisyderiya 
stick, period for plantation, prize & etc.  
AI promise to give a model constitution
Y Done
PM
Meeting at 11th Colony-East                                             
Meeting at 11th Colony-West
On Clisyderiya Cultivation                         On 
Clisyderiya Cultivation
N Consultative meeting with SARC members 
and key representatives of SHG. PO - OGB, 
DPO - FCCISL and SPM Sarvodaya also 
participated. 
AM Meeting at 15th Colony                                     
Meeting at 4th Colony
On Clisyderiya Cultivation                         
On Clisyderiya Cultivation
Y Done
PM Meeting at Annamalai - 03 On Clisyderiya Cultivation  Y Done
AM Meeting at 19th Colony On Clisyderiya Cultivation Y Done
PM Meeting at 19th Colony Re-forming the groups Y Done
14 Saturday
15 Sunday
AM Meet the Secretary of the Seed Paddy Producer Org 6.1.1.9 To discuss about the future plan
PM Meet the AI Central To discuss about rest of the Training for 
the Seed Paddy Org.
AM Meet the MG Group's executive committee in 19th 
Colony
To discuss about the DAFT Training N
PM Meet the MG Group's executive committee in 11th 
Colony
To discuss about the DAFT Training N
AM
Plan the Complain Box
To place the Complain Mechanism in the 
Villages
PM
Meeting with SARC Manager
To discuss with the SHG Group in the 
new villages
AM
Visit to CEB Ampara 
To meet the Engineer on Electricity 
Connection for SARC Building
PM
Meet the Technical Asst. ASIRI Motors
To get the Quotation for the service of 
SARC Paddy Processing Unit
AM Meet FCCISL PO 
To discuss about the Pine Apple 
Cultivation
N Future of SARC discussed with the SARC 
members and SHGs in presences of PO 
OGB, SPM Sarvodaya and DPO FCCISL.
PM Meeting in 4th Colony
Discuss about the Pine Apple Cultivation
Y Done
21 Saturday
22 Sunday
AM Follow up visit to 19th Colony,                              
Follow up visit to 4th Colony
On Clisyderiya Cultivation                     
On Clisyderiya Cultivation
N Sarvodaya all staff meeting
PM Follow up visit to 11th Colony-East                              
Follow up visit to 11th Colony-West
On Clisyderiya Cultivation                     
On Clisyderiya Cultivation
AM Meet the Secretary of the Seed Paddy Producer Org Follow up visit for the Seed Paddy 
Cultivation
Y And also discussed with paddy group 
beneficiaries about the exposure visit on post 
harvest and lost reduction techniques. 
PM Meet the AI-Province Regarding Glisyderiya Follow Up Y Done
AM Meet the CIC 
Regarding the Soil Testing
Y ( Vani work on it)
PM Meet the AI Central Regarding the Soil Testing
AM
Location Identification for Soil Testing
With the help of AI select the places N
PM Meet the Farmers/Farmer org. To select the places for Soil Testing N
AM DAFT Training Part-I in 19th Colony Refresher on DAFT Y Done
PM DAFT Training Part-II in 11th Colony Refresher on DAFT Y Done
28 Saturday
29 Sunday
AM
PM
AM Monthly Reporting
PM Monthly Planning
……………………………………………………………………
Approved By
Project Manager
31
25
26
27
20
23
Weekly planning & Review
Travelling to Jaffna
Sarvodaya Project in Jaffna 
30
10
11
12
Staff meeting and siramadhana
24
13
16
17
18
19
2
Monthly Work Plan - 2012
Advance Work Plan Monthly Diary Performance Report
Meet Rice pounding beneficiaries in 4th Colony and 
11th Colony
To finalize the beneficiaries                 
………………………………….
Prepared By
C.Nanthakumar
3
4
5
6
9
Discussion with the paddy groups about the 
exposure visit on post harvest and lost 
reduction in Anuradhapure. 
On leave
Participated in EPPR -11
All Sarvodaya district staff meeting in Jaffna.
Sarvodaya Holiday
N
As per the action plan developed in SARC 
meeting on 20th discussed with Annamalai 
and Sorikalmunai SHGs about future of 
SARC.
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Annex 25: Powerpoints from LFA Orientation, PMF 
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Annex 26: Templates for Community Mobilisers in Tamil  
 
 
 
